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volumes and larger return volatilities, and the resulting overpessimism exerts downward pressure and 
induces temporary underpricing. The third study highlights the impact of limited director attention on 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. We find that exogenous director distraction affects board 
monitoring intensity and leads to a higher level of inactivity by management. The final essay helps explain
why analysts at reputable brokerage houses produce more accurate earnings forecasts. This follows 
both from the direct influence of better resources provided by the firms and from the sorting in the labor 
market, which leads reputable firms to hire more talented candidates. We estimate a two-sided matching 
model to disentangle these two effects and quantify their relative importance.
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I am fortunate to have Patrick as my advisor, whose extensive guidance
and invaluable mentorship have made me the researcher I am. Being the head
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Financial agents such as equity analysts and board of directors play important
roles in stock markets. Their actions influence investors’ trading strategies,
managerial decisions, and corporate outcomes, and thereby affect capital allo-
cations, market efficiency, and stock prices. This thesis consists of four empir-
ical essays on analysts and directors, focusing on the causes and consequences
of their behavior and labor markets.
In Chapter 2, we study how sell-side equity analysts form earnings ex-
pectations. Many investors rely on analyst forecasts to evaluate companies’
future prospects and make trading decisions. However, different analysts who
cover the same company at the same time often disagree with each other and
issue divergent forecasts. Such disagreement might not only increase informa-
tion uncertainty but also lead investors to form opposing opinions about the
company, which could result in capital misallocations and mispricings. To the
best of our knowledge, despite the large body of literature on analysts, which
mostly focuses on what makes a good analyst and what improves forecast
accuracy, there is little empirical evidence on the source of analyst disagree-
ment. This chapter contributes to the literature by documenting a channel
that systematically drives the disagreement among analysts.
More specifically, we exploit the fact that the majority of U.S. sell-side
analysts cover two or more different industries at the same time, and test
the hypothesis that analysts’ expectations vary with the performance of their
1
other coverage industries. Using a large panel of earnings forecasts for the
period 1993-2016, we find strong evidence that negative shocks to other cov-
erage industries make analysts more pessimistic about the focal firms. Our
identification approach compares different analysts making forecast for the
same firm at the same time, ensuring that differences in firms’ fundamentals
do not confound the estimation results. The effect is more pronounced when
the focal firm is subject to ex-ante higher information asymmetries.
Moreover, we find that those pessimistic forecasts are less accurate and
significantly lower than the realized earnings, and that analysts become more
pessimistic even if the focal firms have no relationships with the shocked indus-
try. These findings cannot be fully explained by information spillover effects,
i.e., analysts covering shocked industries acquire valuable information about
the focal firms that are not accessible to other analysts. Instead, the evidence
is consistent with the idea that analysts heuristically overgeneralize bad news
from other coverage industries and become overly pessimistic about the focal
firms.
To obtain insights into why financial economists should care about this
heuristic expectation-formation, Chapter 3 builds on the finding of analyst
overgeneralization and examines its impacts on the financial market. We de-
velop a simple trading model to derive two testable predictions. First, because
overgeneralization induces analyst disagreement, it leads to higher trading vol-
umes and larger return volatilities. Second, the model predicts that bad news
in other coverage industries lead analysts to make excessively pessimistic fore-
casts, which exert downward pressure and induce underpricing.
Taking these theoretical predictions to the data, we find strong supporting
evidence. Considering the performance of other coverage industries as belief
shocks that affect analyst expectations, we show that a one-standard-deviation
increase in belief shock dispersion translates to 6.4%-8.1% more analyst dis-
agreement and is associated with up to 13.7% higher daily trading volume and
5.9% larger stock return volatility. In other words, analyst overgeneralization
significantly aggravates information asymmetries and increases information
uncertainty about firms’ fundamentals.
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Moreover, firms with more analysts affected by negative belief shocks ex-
perience a significant decline in stock price prior to earnings announcements.
Consistent with the underpricing prediction that the price will reverse when
the true information is revealed, affected firms experience higher positive price-
reversal upon earnings announcements, conditional on the direction and mag-
nitude of earnings surprises. In sum, the empirical evidence confirms the theo-
retical predictions that analyst overgeneralization significantly affects trading
activities, volatility, and pricing.
These two chapters also provide useful insights for other strands of lit-
erature. As overgeneralization affects analyst expectations and consequently
moves the stock prices for reasons not related to firms’ fundamentals, it can be
used to construct instrumental variables for analyst or investor disagreement,
as well as for trading volumes, volatilities, and temporary mispricing. Given
the scarcity of exogenous variations of these variables, my results could be
helpful for future empirical research in related areas.
Findings about analyst overgeneralization not only help explain analyst
disagreement, but also shed light on how sophisticated financial agents form
expectations, especially those who are multi-tasking. The evidence from eq-
uity analysts suggests that multi-tasking agents might overgeneralize outcomes
from one task when forming beliefs and making decisions for other tasks. The
question then arises: Does multi-tasking also affect agents’ actions in other
ways?
Chapter 4 turns to the board of directors, another type of multi-tasking
agent in the financial market. They have the critical task of actively mon-
itoring and advising top management, to ensure that managers act in the
best interest of shareholders. However, a directorship is rarely a full-time job.
Most directors have other occupations, and many directors serve on multiple
boards. Given that attention is not unlimited for directors, we study the effect
of director distraction on corporate decision making and valuation.
We rely on a sample of directors with multiple directorships for the period
1996-2017. These directors need to distribute attention among their director-
ships, which provides a useful setting to study the effect of director attention.
3
Although we cannot observe exactly how much time or energy directors spend
on each of their directorships, we conjecture that directors may be distracted
when attention-grabbing events occur to the other directorships they have, in
particular, industry-specific shocks. We follow this idea to construct a firm-
quarter-level distraction measure by exploiting shocks to unrelated industries
in which directors hold additional positions. To validate whether this measure
really captures director attention, we examine board meeting attendance and
show that directors that our measure identifies as distracted indeed attend
fewer board meetings.
By examining Tobin’s Q and stock performance, we find that firm value
drops significantly when board members are distracted. A deviation from no
distraction to the average distraction level is associated with a 3.3% discount
in quarterly Tobin’s Q, and a stock market underperformance of about 72
basis points per quarter. This effect is particularly strong when the distracted
directors are independent and/or sit on an important committee of the board.
Firms with more director distraction are less active, as they invest significantly
less and are less likely to announce takeovers. The evidence is consistent with
the idea that board monitoring intensity declines with director distraction,
which gives managers the freedom to shirk at the expense of shareholder value.
Our results contribute to the important debate on the busyness of cor-
porate boards. Directors with multiple directorships may be too busy to ef-
fectively monitor management, but the busyness also reflects the quality of
directors, which could provide advantages for firms. This study disentangles
busyness from director ability and provides evidence on the costs of having
busy directors. Thus, our findings support policies restricting the number of
directorships that an individual is allowed to have.
In Chapter 5, we shift focus from the behavior of financial agents to their
labor markets frictions. In particular, we study how sorting in the labor market
explains the performance differences across sell-side equity analysts. Workers
at more prestigious companies tend to have better performance. For example,
academic researchers at higher ranked schools have better publication records;
and attorneys at larger law firms win more court cases. In the case of equity
4
analysts, those employed by more reputable brokerage houses produce on av-
erage more accurate earnings forecasts. An analyst employed by the most
reputable brokerage is about 6% more accurate than an analyst employed by
a minor brokerage, which is equivalent to an advantage of 17.5 years of more
experience.
This performance premium is driven by two distinct effects: more rep-
utable brokerage firms have more resources that improve analysts’ forecast
accuracy; and the sorting in the labor market, which allows more reputable
brokerage houses to hire more talented analysts in the first place. Distin-
guishing these two effects is however challenging, as the sorting mechanism
creates an endogeneity problem. The relation between firm reputation and
analyst performance is endogenous, because more talented analysts work for
more reputable firms and analysts’ talent is not observable.
We disentangle these two effects and quantify their relative importance,
by estimating a two-sided matching model for the labor market of analysts.
The matching model allows for a one-to-many assortative matching process
between firms and analysts, which helps control for the selection effect. Our
estimation results suggest that both effects are important: the influence effect
accounts for 73% of the total effect of brokerage firms’ reputation on analyst
forecast accuracy, while the sorting effect accounts for the remaining 27%.
To summarize, this dissertation provides new insights into the behavior
and labor markets of important financial agents. Psychological and cognitive
factors significantly influence the decision-making of analysts and directors,
and consequently affect stock trading activities and firm valuations. On the
other hand, the evidence from analysts’ labor markets shows to what extent
employers could help improve the judgment of individual agents. Our find-
ings not only contribute to the academic literature, but also have relevant
implications for practitioners and policy makers.
Declaration of contribution
In this section, I declare my contribution to each chapter of this dissertation
and acknowledge the contribution of others.
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Equity analysts are key information agents in financial markets. They process
information about coverage companies and produce earnings forecasts that
help investors evaluate firms’ future prospects and make trading decisions.
However, analysts often disagree with each other and issue divergent forecasts
for the same firm at the same time. Such disagreements lead investors to
form different expectations about firms’ future cash flows, which could result
in capital misallocations and mispricings. Despite the large body of literature
on analysts, empirical evidence on the source of their disagreement remains
limited. In this paper, I exploit the diversity of analysts’ coverage industries to
study whether their earnings expectations vary with the performance of other
industries that they cover. Comparing earnings forecasts made by different
analysts for the same firm in the same quarter, I find that analysts become
more pessimistic following negative shocks to their other coverage industries.
There are two potential channels through which shocks to other coverage
industries can affect analysts’ expectations about the focal firms. First, these
industry shocks may contain valuable information about the focal firms that is
1This chapter is based on Renjie (2019).
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only learned by analysts covering those industries and is not accessible to the
other analysts. Industry coverage facilitates information acquisition, especially
soft information obtained through their social networks (Cohen, Frazzini, and
Malloy, 2010). Accumulated industry expertise also allows analysts to better
assess the effects of the industry shocks (Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2017).
Moreover, analysts who do not cover the shocked industries may have limited
attention and may therefore overlook the impact of related news events on
the focal firm (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008).
Consequently, analysts covering shocked industries can obtain a comparative
information advantage and incorporate superior information in their earnings
forecasts.
The second channel is implied by a common behavioral phenomenon known
as overgeneralization, which is the process of overly extending evidence from an
unrepresentative sample to reach broad and inaccurate conclusions (e.g. Beck,
1979; Clark, Beck, and Alford, 1999; Walton, 1999). This mechanism can
lead analysts to overgeneralize an industry-specific shock to form expectations
about the state of the world (e.g., economic conditions and business cycles).
As a result, even though the industry shocks do not encompass any useful
information about the focal firms, analysts would still adjust their forecasts
accordingly as if the shocks were informative. Because the affected forecasts
are essentially based on noise rather than information, I refer to this channel
as the noise channel. I conduct a number of tests to distinguish between the
information channel and the noise channel, and the evidence supports the
second mechanism.
My main findings can be illustrated with the following example. Consider
two equity analysts covering a coal mining company, COAL Corp, in 2011.2
Analyst A additionally covers two firms in the transportation industry, while
analyst B covers a gold mining company. Forecasts made by both analysts
are usually close to the consensus and to the actual earnings. However, when
forecasting COAL’s earnings for fiscal quarter 2011Q3, their opinions diverge
2This example comes directly from my sample, but for courtesy I change the name of the
company and analysts and adjust the exact calendar dates.
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significantly. While analyst B issues an EPS forecast of $0.32 on September
21, which is near the consensus of $0.34, analyst A holds an exceptionally
negative view about COAL and issues a forecast of $-0.28 on September 22.
My hypothesis suggests that analyst A’s distinct pessimism is due to the recent
performance of the transportation industry, which indeed fell by 19% over the
period from June 22 to September 21. Because the gold mining industry has
not experienced such negative shocks, analyst B’s forecast does not deviate
from the consensus or from his historical standards. This difference in opinions
has significant effects on COAL: between September 20 and 22, the option-
implied volatility increases by 43% and the daily trading volume increases
by about 150%; and the stock closes down 3.1% on September 22. Analyst
A’s pessimism eventually turns out to be mistaken, as COAL announces its
earnings of 2011Q3 to be $0.35 per share later in October.
This example represents a systematic pattern across the universe of equity
analysts in the I/B/E/S database over my sample period from 1993 to 2016. To
capture analysts’ belief shocks resulting from other industries’ performance, I
define industries based on the 49 Fama-French industry classifications and use
the corresponding portfolio returns to measure industry shocks. Consistent
with the notion that other coverage industries’ performance affects analysts’
expectations, I find that analysts produce significantly more pessimistic earn-
ings forecasts following negative shocks to the other industries they cover.
Specifically, suppose a given industry experiences a cumulative return of -10%
in a quarter, analysts who cover this industry will issue on average 2.7% more
pessimistic earnings forecasts for the firms operating in another industry rel-
ative to their peers who cover the same firm at the same time but do not
cover the shocked industry. This effect is more pronounced (up to 4.3%) when
analysts are forecasting for firms with more information asymmetry.
I further investigate why industry shocks turn into belief shocks that influ-
ence analysts’ expectations. Do analysts acquire more information by learning
from negative shocks to the other industries and foresee companies’ unfa-
vorable earnings (information)? Or do they just heuristically overgeneralize
other industries’ performance and become overly pessimistic (noise)? First, I
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test the effect of belief shocks on analyst forecast accuracy. The information
hypothesis predicts that analysts acquire superior information and therefore
produce more accurate forecasts, whereas the noise hypothesis predicts that
analysts incorrectly adjust their expectations and therefore produce less ac-
curate forecasts. Second, I estimate the effect of belief shocks from related
and unrelated industries separately. Two industries are considered unrelated
if they do not have the same three-digit NAICS code, have no industry-level or
firm-level supplier-customer relationships, and do not belong to the same prod-
uct market. Because news in unrelated industries are unlikely to encompass
useful information about the focal firms, the information hypothesis predicts
an insignificant effect of those belief shocks, while the noise hypothesis pre-
dicts a significant effect because overgeneralization also applies to unrelated
industries.
The results of these two tests provide strong evidence in support of the
noise channel. Following a belief shock of -10%, the affected analysts are
about 2.1% less accurate because their forecasts are much lower than the
realized earnings. This effect is economically sizable, as analysts need about
7 years more of firm-specific experience to offset this inaccuracy. Negative
shocks to both related and unrelated industries significantly lower analysts’
expectations and mislead them to make inaccurate forecasts. These findings
are difficult to reconcile with any information stories, but they conform to the
idea that analysts heuristically overgeneralize other industries’ performance
and mistakenly lower their expectations.
To identify the effects of belief shocks, I control for stock × fiscal year-
quarter fixed effects in all specifications to exploit variation within firm-quarters
by comparing earnings forecasts made by analysts with different belief shocks
for the same firm at the same time. These fixed effects capture firm-quarter
variation resulting from factors that make a particular company’s earnings
easier (or harder) to predict for all analysts in some quarters than in others,
or from events that make all analysts more pessimistic (or optimistic) in some
quarters than in others. Examples of such factors are voluntary management
disclosures, merger rumors, and worker strikes. My results remain virtually
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the same when I control for time-varying observable analyst characteristics
such as their experience and workload. Moreover, I use calendar quarter fixed
effects to control for time trends (e.g., business cycles) that affect all ana-
lysts issuing forecasts around the same time for different firms, and analyst
× stock fixed effects to control for all unobserved but time-invariant analyst
characteristics, such as talent, education, industry expertise, and firm-specific
preferences.
Using other industries’ stock market performance to identify analyst belief
shocks has a number of advantages. First, industry performance is arguably
exogenous to analysts’ personal characteristics. Second, reverse causality is
implausible because it is unlikely that any single analyst can influence the
performance of an entire industry. Third, it is much more difficult to come
up with any confounding factors that would drive industry performance and
analysts’ earnings forecasts for firms in a different industry simultaneously.
In contrast, firm-level performance is more ambiguous because of the poten-
tial correlation between stocks covered by the same analyst. Studies such as
Israelsen (2016) document excess comovement among stocks covered by the
same analyst. Finally, industry returns capture industry-wide shocks such as
(de)regulations and technology innovations, which, compared to firm-level id-
iosyncratic shocks, are more likely to influence analysts’ expectations about
the state of the world.
Nevertheless, one may still argue that analysts’ forecasts may affect firm
policies of industry leaders and thereby influence the industry performance
(reverse causality), or that the belief shock variable does not adequately cap-
ture industry shocks (measurement errors). To rule out these confounding
stories, I exploit the oil price crash in 2014-15 as an exogenous negative shock
to the oil industry. The price plunge is mostly due to the excess supply and
weakening global demand, which is totally orthogonal to analysts’ opinions.
In a difference-in-differences framework, I find that analysts who cover the oil
industry become about 7.6% more pessimistic and 4.4% less accurate about
non-oil firms after the shock, relative to those who cover the same firm at the
same time but do not cover the oil industry. This provides another piece of
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evidence suggesting that the effect of industry shocks on analyst expectation
is causal.
Throughout this paper, I take analyst coverage as given and remain agnos-
tic about why analysts cover particular companies or industries. This implicit
assumption is unlikely to contaminate my results for two reasons. First, be-
cause analysts’ industry coverage remains mostly time-invariant in my sample,
it has already been absorbed by the analyst × stock fixed effects. Second, an-
alysts are more likely to initiate coverage for firms about which they have
favorable expectations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Tehranian et al.,
2013). Therefore, analysts’ endogenous coverage choices would prevent me
from finding any effects of the negative belief shocks.
It is noteworthy that I do not find a similar effect from positive belief
shocks. Analysts mainly respond to negative shocks. This asymmetry is likely
due to the negativity bias—that is, events of a more negative nature have a
greater impact on one’s behavior and cognition than those with equal inten-
sity but of a more positive nature (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001). It is also
consistent with the findings in the psychology literature that individuals tend
to overgeneralize negative news much more than positive ones (e.g., Walton,
1999).
A remaining concern is whether my results merely capture analyst distrac-
tion instead of changes in analyst expectations. One may argue that analysts
issue relatively lower earnings forecasts for focal firms because they are dis-
tracted by other coverage industries with salient negative performance. I test
this possibility by examining analyst forecast revisions. I find no evidence
of distraction because analysts revise their forecasts with the same frequency
when other industries perform extremely well or poorly. On the contrary,
shocks to other industries lead analysts to revise forecasts in the same di-
rection and magnitude, reinforcing the view that shocks to other industries
influence analyst beliefs.
Further robustness tests show that my baseline results are persistent in
different subperiods of my sample and are robust to alternative industry clas-
sifications based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification, the three-digit
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GICS industries, industries based on two-digit SICH codes, and the Hoberg
and Phillips (2016) 10-K text-based 50-industry classification (FIC-50). My
findings are not merely driven by specific crisis episodes or any particular
industry (mis)classifications.
When using earnings surprises to decompose belief shocks into expected
and unexpected components, I find that analysts respond to both expected
and unexpected shocks. Additionally controlling for the relative performance
of coverage firms shows that a negative industry shock lowers analysts’ beliefs
more if their coverage firms in that industry are substantially affected by the
shock. Analysts are also more likely to overgeneralize industry-wide shocks
than firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. However, while more experienced analysts
working for bigger brokerage houses are on average more accurate, these factors
do not mitigate the impact of overgeneralization.
This chapter contributes to several strands of literature. First, my findings
speaks to the large body of literature on the determinants of analysts’ forecast
accuracy and bias (see Kothari, So, and Verdi (2016a) for a recent literature
review). In particular, my findings add to the literature on how psychological
biases induce analysts’ forecast errors (e.g., Ramnath, Rock, and Shane, 2008).
I show that overgeneralization leads analysts to incorrectly adjust expectations
and to consequently make inaccurate forecasts. Unlike most prior studies, this
heuristic can also explain the sign of forecast errors.
Second, I contribute to the more general literature that studies the impact
of experience on decision making in financial markets (e.g., Vissing-Jorgenson,
2003; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009)). Murfin
(2012) shows that banks impose stricter loan covenants when they suffer losses
on their loan portfolios. In the same spirit, Koudijs and Voth (2016) demon-
strate that personal experience can affect individual risk-taking in margin
lending. Gurun et al. (2015) and Giannetti and Wang (2016) document that
corporate scandals and Madoff-Ponzi schemes reduce households’ trust and
confidence in the financial market. My paper is closely related to Malmendier
and Nagel (2011, 2016), who establish that personal lifetime experiences shape
individuals’ expectations. My findings are similar to theirs to the extent that
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analysts’ expectations are influenced by their “recent experience”, that is, re-
cent performance of other coverage industries. However, the implication of
overgeneralization is different in the sense that it can lead a multi-tasking
agent to weight information from one task too heavily when making decisions
for other tasks. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to link
overgeneralization to the belief-forming process of financial agents. Because
many financial agents multitask (e.g., portfolio managers with multiple funds),
this heuristic can be useful for modeling their expectations.
My findings are also relevant from practitioners’ perspective. Due to a lack
of supply of industry-experienced analysts, brokerage houses face the trade-
off between the costs and benefits of allocating non-industry experts (Bradley
et al., 2017). I show that all analysts covering multiple industries diminish
expectations and produce less accurate forecasts once they are influenced by
belief shocks, even those who cover only two industries. Overgeneralization
could thus be considered a potential cost of assigning multiple industries to
analysts.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 outlines the concep-
tual framework and discusses the empirical methodology. Section 2.4 presents
the main findings of this paper, and section 2.5 further strengthens the iden-
tification by exploiting an exogenous industry shock. Section 2.6 explores the
heterogeneity of analysts. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data
I obtain individual analyst quarterly earnings forecasts and actual earnings of
all U.S. firms from the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Detail database. To avoid impre-
cision arising from I/B/E/S’s rounding of forecasts, I use the CRSP cumulative
adjustment split factor to split-adjust the raw unadjusted data. Information
about analyst identities and brokerage firms are drawn from the I/B/E/S Rec-
ommendations database. Because I/B/E/S recommendation data are only
available from 10/29/1993, my sample period starts in 1993Q4 and ends in
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2016Q1. I retain analysts that are present in both the Detail and Recommen-
dations databases. For each analyst i making a forecast about firm j for fiscal
year-quarter t, I use analyst i’s latest earnings forecast issued prior to the an-
nouncement of the actual earnings but not later than 30 days after the fiscal
quarter-end of t. To identify analyst coverage, I use the annual forecast data
and assume that analyst i covers stock j for the whole fiscal year if analyst i
issues a forecast for that given fiscal year.
Figure 2.1: Analysts covering multiple industries
This figure contains two graphs: (1) the fraction of stocks out of the universe of the
I/B/E/S database that are followed by at least one analyst who covers more than
one Fama-French 49 industry in each calendar year of my sample; (2) the fraction
of analysts out of the universe of the I/B/E/S database who cover more than one
Fama-French industry in each calendar year of my sample; (3) the fraction of ana-
lysts out of the universe of the I/B/E/S database who cover unrelated industries in
each calendar year from 1996 to 2015. As explained in section 2.4.2, I consider two
industries unrelated if they are not in the same three-digit NAICS code industry, have
no supplier-customer relationships with each other, and do not belong to the same
product market.
Next, I match all firms to Compustat Annual using CUSIPs and fiscal
year-end dates, and to CRSP daily using CUSIPs and dates. I retain all
matched firms and assign each firm to one of the 49 Fama-French industries
based on its historical SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD or Compustat item
SICH when HSICCD is missing). Fama-French 49 industry portfolio returns
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are downloaded from the data library of Kenneth R. French. Figure 2.1 depicts
the fraction of I/B/E/S analysts covering at least two Fama-French industries
and the average fraction of stocks covered by at least one of those analysts over
the period 1993-2016. As shown, almost 70% of I/B/E/S analysts cover two
or more industries, and over 90% firms are followed by one of those analysts.
For robustness checks, I also consider other industry classifications, such as
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industries, the two-digit
SICH code, and the Hoberg-Phillips product market classification.
Finally, I exclude firms that have no analyst covering multiple industries.
The final dataset consists of 1,423,192 analyst-firm-quarter observations with
12,175 unique analysts and 9,246 unique stocks. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports
the number of unique stocks, the number of unique analysts, the number of
unique analyst-stock pairs, the average number of analysts covering a partic-
ular stock, and the average number of Fama-French industries and of stocks
covered by analysts within each calendar year of my sample period. As shown,
the average number of analysts covering a given firm increased from 4.0 in 1993
to 9.7 in 2016. Analysts’ workloads have not changed a great deal, remain-
ing around 10 firms in 3 different FF-49 industries. The diversity of coverage
industries is thus a common feature throughout my sample period.
Panel B of Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics of the variables used
in this study. My main dependent variables of interest are earnings forecast
and forecast errors. To measure how different an analyst’s forecast is from
the consensus among other analysts, I follow prior research and compare her
forecast to the average of all analysts who issue forecasts for the same firm
i and fiscal year-quarter t (Clement, 1999a; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Kothari
et al., 2016a). This controls for any firm-quarter factors that influence all
analysts’ expectations. I therefore define
Adjusted EPS Forecastijt =
Raw Forecastijt −Mean Forecastjt
SD Forecastjt
, (2.1)
where Raw Forecastijt is the raw earnings per share forecast in dollars made by
analyst i for the earnings of fiscal quarter t of stock j, which is split-adjusted
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Table 2.1: Data sample and summary statistics
This table describes the sample and reports the summary statistics of the main vari-
ables. Panel A tabulates, for each calendar year in my sample from 1993 to 2016,
the number of unique stocks, the number of unique analysts, the number of unique
analyst-stock pairs, the average number of analysts covering a particular stock, and
the average number of Fama-French 49 industries and of stocks covered by analysts.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for the main sample of analyst-stock-quarter
observations for the period 1993-2016. The adjusted EPS forecast is computed as
in Equation (2.1); forecast error is computed as in Equation (2.3); PMAFE is com-
puted as in Equation (2.2); experience and firm experience are analysts’ overall and
firm-specific experience, respectively, computed as the number of years between an an-
alyst’s current earnings forecast and his/her first ever announced forecast and his/her
first forecast for a particular firm; number of stocks is the number of stocks covered
by an analyst; number of industries is the number of industries covered by an analyst;
and broker size is the number of analysts employed by a broker in a calendar year.
Adjusted EPS forecast, forecast errors, and PMAFE are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels. Detailed definitions of all the variables are presented in Table 2.A.1.
Panel A: Sample
Number of Avg. By analyst
Year Number of Number of analyst-stock analyst Avg. number of Avg. number of
Stocks analysts pairs coverage industries covered stocks covered
1993 1,749 1,147 9,230 4.0 3.6 10.2
1994 2,074 1,622 12,620 4.8 3.4 9.2
1995 2,190 1,773 13,609 4.9 3.3 9.1
1996 2,479 1,967 15,085 4.7 3.3 9.2
1997 2,691 2,312 16,659 4.7 3.1 8.5
1998 2,772 2,720 18,969 5.3 2.9 7.9
1999 2,694 2,896 19,843 5.7 2.7 7.7
2000 2,499 2,819 18,937 5.7 2.6 7.5
2001 2,375 2,874 19,420 6.4 2.5 7.3
2002 2,340 2,945 21,201 6.7 2.5 7.6
2003 2,326 2,773 20,925 6.8 2.5 8.0
2004 2,587 2,962 23,613 7.1 2.5 8.4
2005 2,763 3,004 24,997 7.2 2.6 8.6
2006 2,807 3,048 25,877 7.2 2.7 8.9
2007 2,941 3,046 26,894 7.2 2.8 9.1
2008 2,886 2,913 26,127 7.3 2.8 9.2
2009 2,772 2,752 26,096 7.8 2.9 9.7
2010 2,839 2,872 28,273 8.4 3.0 10.1
2011 2,872 3,022 30,364 8.6 3.1 10.3
2012 2,900 2,910 31,147 8.8 3.2 11.1
2013 3,058 2,824 32,731 8.9 3.4 11.8
2014 3,279 2,840 33,854 8.5 3.6 12.3
2015 3,432 2,748 34,470 8.5 3.7 12.8
2016 2,078 2,053 12,981 9.7 2.9 9.0
using the CRSP cumulative adjustment split factor from the CRSP Daily file;
Mean Forecastjt and SD Forecastjt are, respectively, the mean and standard
deviation of forecasts made by all analysts for firm j and fiscal quarter t.
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Panel B: Summary Statistics
N Mean St. Dev.
Percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Dependent variables
Adjusted EPS forecast 1,423,192 0.00 0.89 -1.14 -0.62 0.00 0.62 1.15
Forecast errors 1,423,192 0.00 0.80 -1.00 -0.38 0.00 0.37 1.00
PMAFE 1,423,192 -0.02 0.67 -1.00 -0.42 -0.05 0.26 0.76
Number of revisions 1,423,192 0.37 0.67 0 0 0 1 1
Forecast revisions (SUF) 314,742 -0.18 0.99 -1.55 -0.89 -0.27 0.60 1.20
CAR(0, 1) (in %) 314,742 -0.13 4.96 -4.26 -1.83 -0.10 1.61 4.04
Main explanatory variable
Belief Shock 1,423,192 0.02 0.10 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.12
Negative Shock 1,423,192 -0.03 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Positive Shock 1,423,192 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.12
Explanatory variables for robustness
Belief Shock (EW) 1,423,192 0.02 0.10 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.12
Belief Shock (Related) 1,031,484 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.14
Belief Shock (Unrelated) 1,031,484 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09
Belief Shock (FF12) 1,423,192 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.10
Belief Shock (GICS) 1,411,961 0.03 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.14
Belief Shock (Sic2) 1,423,192 0.03 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.14
Belief Shock (HP50) 1,271,360 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.13
Control variables
Overall experience 1,423,192 6.47 5.03 0.88 2.39 5.34 9.52 13.81
Firm experience 1,423,192 2.85 3.24 0 0.52 1.73 4.02 7.27
Number of stocks 1,423,192 14.01 7.37 6 9 13 18 23
Broker size 1,423,192 62.85 54.82 11 22 48 89 125
Number of industries 1,423,192 3.61 2.37 1 2 3 5 7
Number of industries (FF12) 1,423,192 2.47 1.42 1 1 2 3 4
Number of industries (GICS) 1,423,192 3.00 2.07 1 2 2 4 6
Number of industries (Sic2) 1,423,192 3.78 2.40 1 2 3 5 7
Number of industries (HP50) 1,423,192 3.35 2.31 1 2 3 4 7
Number of industries (Naics) 1,423,192 3.63 2.52 1 2 3 5 7
The denominator standardizes forecasts such that they are comparable across
firms. Note that after demeaning, a forecast below 0 implies that an analyst
is more pessimistic relative to her peers covering the same firm at the same
time.
As for forecast errors, prior research mostly uses the PMAFE (proportional
mean absolute forecast error) to measure analyst inaccuracy (e.g., Clement,





where AFEijt denotes the absolute value of the forecast error (forecast minus
actual) for analyst i’s forecast of firm j for fiscal quarter t, and Mean AFEjt
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is the average AFE of all analysts covering firm j for fiscal quarter t. This
variable controls for any firm-quarter factors that affect forecast accuracy.
Moreover, the sign of the forecast errors is also important when comparing
analysts’ expectations with firms’ actual earnings. Therefore, I follow the





where FEijt is forecast earnings minus actual earnings.
These three variables and all of the firm-quarter level continuous dependent
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Detailed definition of the
control variables are presented in Table 2.A.1. The construction of the belief
shocks is explained in the next section.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
In this section, I first use a simple conceptual framework to illustrate the role
of other coverage industries’ performance in shaping analysts’ expectations. I
then discuss the identification of belief shocks and describe the empirical strat-
egy for estimating the effect of those shocks on analysts’ earnings forecasts.
2.3.1 Conceptual framework








δk · Pijkt + ηijt, (2.4)
where analyst imakes a forecast based on public signals Πjt = (Πj1t, . . . ,ΠjMt)
′
and her private information and incentives Pijt = (Pij1t, . . . , PijKt)
′ about firm
j. Public signals Πjt could be macroeconomic factors such as interest rate hikes
and tax cuts, or firm-specific events such as voluntary management disclosures
and M&A deals, which are observable to all analysts covering firm j. Private
signals Pijt could include private information obtained from the analyst’s so-
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cial network or pressure from the analyst’s brokerage house to issue favorable
forecasts. This representation of analyst forecasts is motivated by the large
body of literature on sell-side analysts’ forecasts (see Kothari et al. (2016a)
for a recent survey).
This paper tests the idea that analyst i derives some private signals about
firm j from collecting and processing information about her other coverage
industries. As in the example above, covering the poorly performing trans-
portation industry seems to lower analyst A’s earnings expectation about the
focal firm COAL. More formally, suppose that analyst i covers stocks in κ other
industries, I conjecture that she obtains private signals ζijt = (ζij1t, . . . , ζijκt)
′
from researching those industries. Conforming to the notion that those pri-
vate signals could affect analyst beliefs, I refer to them as “belief shocks” in





′Zijt + ηijt, (2.5)
where Zijt = Pijt \ ζijt. That is, the subjective analyst forecast depends on
publicly available information, the analyst’s belief shocks from other coverage
industries, and her other private information and incentives. Next, I explain
the identification of belief shocks.
2.3.2 Identifying belief shocks
Consider an analyst i making an earnings forecast for stock j in fiscal quarter
t is exposed to potential belief shocks from the other industries she covers in







ikt × IndRetikt, (2.6)
where S
(−j)
it denotes the set of stocks followed by analyst i in quarter t, exclud-
ing stocks in the same Fama-French 49 industry as stock j, thereby allowing




tures how important stock k is to analyst i; and IndRetikt is the cumulative
return of the Fama-French industry of stock k over the quarter before analyst
i issues the most recent earnings forecast for stock j in quarter t. If an analyst
covers stocks in only one Fama-French industry, I set the BS variable to be
zero. I now explain the construction of w
(−j)
ikt and IndRetikt in more detail.
First, w
(−j)
ikt is meant to capture the weight of stock k to analyst i in
quarter t. The weighting-scheme is motivated by Harford, Jiang, Wang, and
Xie (2018), who find that, because of their career concerns, analysts allocate
more attention to firms with relatively larger market capitalization in their
portfolio. As a result, analysts’ beliefs are more likely to be affected by news
events in industries to which analysts devote more research efforts. To this










where mvelt denotes the market value of equity of stock l at the fiscal year-end
preceding fiscal quarter t. Alternatively, I consider equal weights in (2.6) to
measure belief shocks and obtain similar results, as shown in Table 2.6.
Second, IndRetikt is meant to capture the performance of the Fama-French
industry of stock k over a period before analyst i issues the most recent earn-
ings forecast for stock j in quarter t. Suppose that analyst i issues the forecast
on day τ , I compute the cumulative returns of the Fama-French industry of
stock k over the window [τ − 90, τ ].3 It is noteworthy that my results are
robust to different windows. I have experimented with various window spans,
from 60 days to 180 days, and the results are similar to those presented here.
Constructing the belief shocks in this way has the following advantages.
First, it relies on stock market performance of industries other than that of
stock j, which is arguably exogenous to the characteristics of analyst i. Sec-
ond, I use industry-level performance rather than firm-level performance to
mitigate the potential concern of omitted-variable bias. For instance, analyst
3In some cases, the analyst issues the forecast a few days after the fiscal quarter-end day
τ1. For such cases, I compute IndRet over the window [τ1 − 90, τ ].
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i might become more pessimistic for other reasons (other private signals) and
might therefore issue more pessimistic earnings forecasts for both stock j and
k. The pessimistic forecast about stock k might also put downward pressure
on the price of stock k. In this case, analyst i’s more pessimistic forecast
about stock j is not due to the bad performance of stock k. However, a single
analyst’s forecast is unlikely to drive the performance of the whole indus-
try, and thus using industry-level performance resolves this endogeneity issue.
Third, industry returns capture industry-wide shocks rather than firm-level
idiosyncratic shocks, which are more likely to influence analysts’ expectations
about the state of the world. Finally, on a cognitive level, extreme returns in
an industry are more salient and more likely to affect analysts’ beliefs. The
BS variable captures this effect because the BS variable moves in the same
direction and magnitude with the industry returns by construction.
2.3.3 Estimating the impact of belief shocks
I conjecture that the performance of other industries influences analysts’ ex-
pectations about the focal firm and thus affects their earnings forecasts. Sub-
stituting the constructed measure of belief shocks for ζijt in Equation (2.5),
I can examine how analysts’ forecasts respond to these belief shocks by esti-
mating the following model:
yijt = αjt + β ×BSijt + εijt, (2.8)
where i indexes analysts, j indexes firms, t indexes fiscal year-quarters, and yijt
is the dependent variable of interest (e.g., EPS forecast and forecast errors).
The main coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effects of belief shocks,
BSijt. This coefficient would be significantly positive if analysts’ earnings
expectations are affected by the performance of other industries they cover.
The stock × fiscal year-quarter fixed effects, αjt, allow me to compare
earnings forecasts made by two analysts with different belief shocks for the
same firm at the same time. These fixed effects capture all publicly available
information (i.e., Πjt in Equation (2.5)) and therefore can control for firm-
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quarter variation driven by factors or events that affect the expectation of
all analysts, making them more pessimistic (or optimistic) in some quarters
than in others. Examples of such events are shareholder litigations and merger
rumors. To absorb the firm-quarter fixed effects, I follow the literature (e.g.,
Clement (1999a); Malloy (2005); Bradley et al. (2017)) to demeaning both
the dependent and the independent variables within each firm-quarter group,
which gives
ỹijt = β × B̃Sijt + ε̃ijt. (2.9)
The tilde indicates demeaned variables henceforth. Note that the main depen-
dent variables of interest, the adjusted EPS forecast and (absolute) forecast
errors, are already demeaned and scaled within firm-quarters by construction.
In addition, I control for some observable analyst-specific characteristics
that previous studies have found to affect analysts’ forecasts: analysts’ overall
experience and firm-specific experience in years, the number of industries and
stocks covered by analysts, and employer size (Clement, 1999a; Bradley et al.,
2017). These variables capture a part of analysts’ private information and
incentives, i.e., Zijt from Equation (2.5). Detailed definitions of these variables
are presented in Table 2.A.1.
Moreover, I include the calendar year-quarter fixed effects to control for
common time trends such as macroeconomic shocks or business cycles, which
could influence the expectations of analysts covering different firms but making
their forecasts around the same time. I also include the analyst × stock fixed
effects to control for any unobserved but time-invariant factors in Zijt, such
as analysts’ skill, education, and industry expertise. I use analyst × stock
fixed effects instead of analyst fixed effects alone to account for unobservable
heterogeneity within the same analysts across the different stocks that they
cover. For example, analysts might consistently spend more time and effort on
a particular firm than on other firms they cover, or they may consistently be
more pessimistic or accurate about a particular stock than about other stocks
they follow.
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Therefore, my final regression model takes the form
ỹijtq = αq + αij + β × B̃Sijt + γ′X̃ijt + ε̃ijtq, (2.10)
where q indexes the calendar year-quarter in which the analyst i issues the
forecast, αq denotes the corresponding year-quarter fixed effects, αij denotes
the analyst × stock fixed effects, and X̃ijt is a vector of control variables
demeaned within firm-quarters. I two-way cluster the standard errors by cal-
endar year-quarter and by analyst × stock to account for possible correlations
within cohorts of analysts who make forecasts around the same time and for
potential serial correlation within the tenure of an analyst following the same
stock. This clustering yields the most conservative standard errors.
To allow for differences in analysts’ responses to the sign of the belief
shocks, I also estimate the effects of negative and positive shocks separately.
If analysts respond to negative and positive shocks differently, not allowing for
such potential asymmetry could downward bias the estimate of β in Equation
2.10 towards zero. The following model accounts for the potential asymmetry:
ỹijtq = αq + αij + β1 × B̃S
−
ijt + β2 × B̃S
+
ijt + γ
′X̃ijt + ε̃ijtq, (2.11)













ikt × IndRetikt × 1(IndRetikt > 0). (2.13)
To assess the effect of extreme shocks and salient performances, in some spec-
ifications I also replace BS−ijt and BS
+
ijt with the indicator variable of the
bottom decile (D1) of BS−ijt and the top decile (D10) of BS
+
ijt, respectively,
where D1 and D10 capture the salient negative and positive performances, re-
spectively. Both β1 and β2 would be significantly positive if analysts respond
to both negative and positive belief shocks.
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The main identifying assumption to obtain an unbiased estimate of β (or
β1,2) is cov(BSijt, εijtq) = 0. Because the error term εijtq contains analysts’
unobserved time-varying private information and incentives that are not cap-
tured by Xijt and αij , the assumption essentially means that the belief shock
variable does not systematically covary with any other unobserved private sig-
nals about firm j obtained by the analyst. This assumption is justified because
the belief shock variable is constructed based on the performance of other cov-
erage industries, which is arguably exogenous to analysts’ unobservable (even
time-varying) personal characteristics. It is also highly unlikely that a single
analyst can influence the performance of an entire industry. Moreover, any
proponent of the existence of confounding factors would have to explain how
they relate to the industry shocks and analysts’ earnings forecasts for firms in
a different industry simultaneously, and why they do not affect other analysts
who cover the same firm at the same time.
Another implicit identifying assumption is that analyst coverage is ex-
ogenously given and orthogonal to analysts’ earnings forecasts and coverage
industries’ performance. In practice, however, which firms or industries an
analyst chooses to cover is certainly not random. I argue that the endoge-
nous nature of analysts’ coverage decisions is not likely to contaminate my
results. Note that analysts tend to cover the same set of industries through-
out their careers, because analysts have information advantages and social
connections in industries in which they have experience and expertise, so it is
costly for them to switch (Bradley et al., 2017). Thus, using the analyst ×
stock fixed effects mitigates the endogeneity concerns by controlling for this
time-invariant heterogeneity. Fewer than 15% of the analysts in my sample
have changed their industry coverage more than twice during the sample pe-
riod, and excluding those analysts does not affect my results qualitatively.
Moreover, studies on analyst coverage decisions (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien
(1997) and Tehranian et al. (2013)) document that analysts are more likely to
cover stocks about which they have favorable expectations. I also show in Ap-
pendix B that coverage initiation is not associated with more negative belief
shocks. Therefore, analysts’ endogenous coverage choices would, if anything,
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actually work against my findings on the effect of negative belief shocks.
2.4 Main Results
This section presents my main empirical results. I document that analysts is-
sue significantly more pessimistic earnings forecasts when they observe (salient)
negative performance of other coverage industries. These downward-biased
forecasts are less accurate and lower than the actual earnings, which suggests
that analysts overgeneralize negative shocks to other industries and become
overly pessimistic about the state of the world.
2.4.1 Earnings forecasts
While my main tests are designed to address identification issues, Figure 2.2
shows that the effect of belief shocks on analyst forecasts is pronounced even
in the raw data. I divide the data into 10 subsamples based on the domain
of belief shocks and compute the mean and the corresponding 90% confidence
interval of the adjusted EPS forecasts in each subsample. Because EPS fore-
casts have been demeaned within each firm-quarter group, negative forecasts
imply that analysts are more pessimistic relative to their peers covering the
same firm at the same time. The plot displays a strong correlation between
analyst forecasts and negative belief shocks. The more negative the belief
shock is, the more negative the analyst forecast becomes, which implies that
analysts tend to be more pessimistic relative to the consensus when other cov-
erage industries perform worse. Interestingly, analysts seem to respond mostly
to negative belief shocks. There is no clear correlation between forecasts and
positive belief shocks.
To formally test the effect of belief shocks on analysts’ earnings forecasts, I
first estimate Equation (2.10) in Table 2.2. The dependent variable is adjusted
EPS forecast, which is computed as in Equation (2.1). All of the specifica-
tions control for the stock × fiscal year-quarter fixed effects by demeaning all
variables within firm-quarters to compare forecasts issued by different ana-
lysts making forecasts for the same firm in the same quarter. I also control
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Figure 2.2: Analyst forecasts and belief shocks
This graph shows how analysts’ adjusted EPS forecasts (y-axis), computed as in
Equation (2.1), vary with the value of belief shocks (x-axis). I divide my sample
into 10 subsamples based on the domain of the belief shocks. Belief shocks in the
first subsample take values smaller than 0.20, belief shocks in the second subsample
take on values in [−0.20,−0.15), those in the third one take values in [−0.15,−0.10),
and so forth up to the tenth and final subsample taking values larger than 0.20. I
plot how the average value of analyst forecasts varies across those subsamples. Error
bars indicate 90% confidence intervals. Note that because analyst forecasts have been
demeaned within each firm × fiscal year-quarter group, a negative value implies that
an analyst is more pessimistic relative to her peers covering the same firm at the same
time.
for an analyst’s overall and firm-specific experience, the number of stocks and
different Fama-French 49 industries covered by the analyst, the size of the
analyst’s brokerage house, and the calendar year-quarter fixed effects. In col-
umn (1), the coefficient on the belief shock variable is positive and statistically
significant (t = 2.998), which implies that analysts observing more negative
(positive) performance of other industries make significantly more pessimistic
(optimistic) earnings forecasts. The coefficient estimate remains similar in
column (2), where I additionally include the analyst × stock fixed effects to
control for time-invariant but unobserved analyst characteristics such as tal-
ent, education, and industry expertise. Because the full sample contains all
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analysts, including those covering only one industry, one might be concerned
about an unfair control group. In column (3), I resolve this issue by focusing
on the subsample consisting only of analysts covering multiple industries. As
is shown, the results are not sensitive to the sample selection. If anything, the
coefficient on the belief shock variable even increases slightly.
To test the effects of positive and negative belief shocks separately, I esti-
mate Equation (2.11) in columns (4) and (5). Column (5) includes analyst ×
stock fixed effects. It is interesting to note that the effect of belief shocks seems
to come mostly from the negative performance of the other industries. The
estimated coefficient on the negative shocks is large and statistically signifi-
cant (t = 2.823 in column (5)), while that on the positive shocks is negligible
and statistically insignificant. Because the negative shock variable only takes
negative values, the positive coefficient implies that the analysts issue signif-
icantly lower forecasts in comparison to their peers when the performance of
the other industries is worse (more negative returns). Going a step further,
I replace the negative and positive belief shock variables, respectively, with
the indicator variable of the bottom decile (D1) and the top decile (D10) of
the belief shock variable in column (6). As is shown, only salient negative
performance has a significant impact on analyst forecasts (t = −3.643).
The estimated effect of belief shocks is also economically meaningful. From
column (5), for example, if analysts observe a negative performance of -10%
from the other industries, their forecasts are about 2.7% standard deviations
lower than the consensus, relative to other analysts whose coverage industries
are not affected by such negative shocks. The estimate in column (6) suggests
that upon a salient negative shock resulting in negative returns of -9% and
lower (the bottom decile), affected analysts become on average about 4.5%
more pessimistic about the firm’s earnings relative to their peers.
Table 2.2 confirms the asymmetry shown in Figure 2.2 that the effect of
positive belief shocks is negligible. This kind of asymmetry in the reaction
to negative and positive shocks is, however, not exceptional. Studies in both
economics and finance have provided abundant evidence that individuals or
financial agents often react more or exclusively to negative news or shocks than
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Table 2.2: Impact of belief shocks on analysts’ EPS forecasts
This table reports the estimated effect of belief shocks on analysts’ EPS forecasts.
The dependent variable is adjusted EPS forecast, which is computed as in Equation
(2.1). In column (2), I additionally include the analyst × stock fixed effects. Column
(3) shows the results of the subsample consisting of only analysts following multiple
industries. In columns (4) and (5), I estimate Equation (2.11) to examine the effects
of positive and negative belief shocks separately. In column (6), the negative and
positive belief shock variables are replaced with, respectively, the indicator variable
of the bottom decile (D1) and top decile (D10) of the belief shock variable. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the calendar year-quarter level and analyst × stock
level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Adjusted EPS Forecast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock 0.151∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(2.988) (2.705) (3.243)
Negative Shock 0.220∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(2.437) (2.823)






Overall experience −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(−5.179) (−2.457) (−3.076) (−5.194) (−2.471) (−2.457)
Firm experience 0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.003 0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.003∗
(2.913) (−1.750) (−1.503) (2.908) (−1.757) (−1.757)
Number of industries −0.013∗∗ 0.000 0.001 −0.009 0.009 0.005
(−2.465) (0.060) (0.129) (−1.519) (1.228) (0.787)
Number of stocks −0.003 −0.009 −0.010 −0.004 −0.009 −0.009
(−0.698) (−1.520) (−1.492) (−0.716) (−1.601) (−1.576)
Brokerage size −0.022∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(−10.528) (−5.192) (−3.581) (−10.542) (−5.174) (−5.204)
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Mult. ind. Full Full Full
Observations 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,178,422 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192
R2 0.001 0.194 0.201 0.001 0.194 0.194
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to positive ones (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1998; Tetlock, 2007; Williams, 2014). Psychologists formally refer
to this asymmetry as the negativity bias, and it has been investigated and
verified in many different domains, especially the formation of impressions
(e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and de Vohs, 2001; Rozin and
Royzman, 2001). Another potential explanation is that analysts tend to be
overly optimistic by default (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell and
Bernard, 1992; Kothari et al., 2016a). Because analysts are already optimistic
on average, even though they might respond to positive shocks and adjust
their forecasts accordingly, their final forecasts might not deviate sufficiently
from other analysts’ optimistic forecasts for econometricians to detect any
significant difference. The results on forecast revisions provided in Section
2.4.2 lend support to this conjecture. Given the trivial effect of positive belief
shocks on the final forecast (see Tables 2.2 and 2.6), I focus on the effect of
negative belief shocks henceforth.
In sum, my estimation results show that negative shocks to other coverage
industries lead analysts to make significantly more pessimistic earnings fore-
casts, which is consistent with my conjecture that the performance of other
coverage industries plays an important role in shaping analysts’ expectations
about focal firms’ earnings. I next investigate the underlying mechanisms
through which analyst forecasts are affected by those negative belief shocks.
2.4.2 Information versus noise
There may be two channels through which industry shocks can influence an-
alysts’ expectations. First, shocks to other industries may encompass useful
information about the focal firms, and this information is only acquired by ana-
lysts covering those industries and is not accessible by other analysts. Covering
a particular industry provides analysts with better access to material informa-
tion, such as through conference calls with firm officials (Cohen et al., 2010).
Industry expertise also gives analysts a competitive advantage in their ability
to analyze the impacts of the industry shocks (Bradley et al., 2017). Analysts
who do not cover the shocked industries may have limited attention and may
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therefore overlook the impacts of other industries’ events on the focal firm
(e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). Consequently,
analysts covering shocked industries have a comparative information advan-
tage and incorporate superior information in their earnings forecasts. I refer
to this channel as the information channel.
In contrast, the alternative channel follows the implications of a well-known
cognitive bias called overgeneralization. Overgeneralization, also known as
hasty generalization, is the tendency to draw a broad conclusion about a pop-
ulation based on evidence from a small sample group that does not accurately
represent the entire population (e.g., Walton, 1999). Multi-tasking individu-
als with this cognitive bias may overgeneralize the outcomes of or experience
with one task when making decisions for other tasks even though the outcomes
of one task are not at all informative about the other tasks. It is noteworthy
that the psychology literature has also found strong evidence for the asymmet-
ric effect of positive and negative shocks: individuals tend to overgeneralize
negative events much more than positive ones (e.g., Beck, 1979; Clark et al.,
1999). Under this channel, even though the negative industry shocks do not
sufficiently represent the whole economy or have any useful information about
the focal firms, analysts might still heuristically overgeneralize those shocks
to lower their expectations about economic conditions and therefore become
more pessimistic about the focal firms. Consequently, the pessimistic forecasts
made by affected analysts are driven by noise rather than information. I refer
to this second channel as the noise channel.
To investigate whether analysts learn from the other industries’ perfor-
mance, the information channel, or whether they heuristically overgeneralize
shocks to other industries, the noise channel, I first test the effect of belief
shocks on analysts’ forecast accuracy. The information channel predicts that
analysts acquire superior information and therefore produce more accurate
forecasts, whereas the noise channel predicts that analysts observing more
salient performance would incorrectly adjust their expectations and thus pro-
duce less accurate forecasts.
Second, I estimate the effect of belief shocks resulting exclusively from ar-
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guably unrelated industries, i.e., industries that are neither horizontally nor
vertically linked with the focal firm’s industry. The information channel pre-
dicts that the effect of belief shocks on forecasts is no longer significant because
analysts are less likely to acquire useful information from unrelated industries.
In contrast, the noise channel still predicts a significant effect of belief shocks
on forecasts because the overgeneralization also applies to unrelated industries.
Forecast accuracy
In Table 2.3, I first use signed forecast errors as the dependent variable to
estimate the effect of negative belief shocks on analyst forecast accuracy. I
consider signed forecast errors because it is important to detect whether fore-
cast errors move in the same direction as the belief shocks. More specifically,
does the negative performance of other industries indeed lead to less accurate
forecasts that are below the actual realized earnings?
Column (1) estimates Equation (2.10) to test the overall effect of belief
shocks on signed forecast errors, while column (2) estimates Equation (2.11)
to examine the effects of positive and negative belief shocks separately, but
only the coefficients on the negative shock are reported as those on the posi-
tive shock are negligible. All specifications include the stock × fiscal quarter,
calendar quarter, and analyst × stock fixed effects. As is shown in column
(2), the coefficients on the negative belief shock variable are positive and sta-
tistically significant, which suggests that analysts influenced by those negative
shocks make significantly more negative forecast errors than those made by
their peers. Estimating the effect from salient negative shocks in column (3)
leads to the same conclusion.
Relatively more negative forecast errors could mean that their forecasts
are significantly lower than the actual earnings realized by the firm, but it
could also mean that their forecast errors are closer to zero when their peers
make larger and more positive forecast errors. Note that the former would
imply that analysts affected by negative shocks issue less accurate forecasts,
whereas the latter would imply that they make more accurate forecasts. To
disentangle these two confounding results, I use PMAFE, i.e., the absolute
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Table 2.3: Impact of belief shocks on forecast accuracy
This table reports the effect of negative belief shocks on analysts’ forecast accuracy.
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the (signed) forecast error, which
is computed as in Equation (2.3). The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6)
is the PMAFE, which is computed as in Equation (2.2). In columns (1) and (4),
I estimate Equation (2.10). In the other columns, I estimate Equation (2.11) to
examine the effects of positive and negative belief shocks separately, but only report
the coefficients on the negative shock, as those on the positive shock are negligible.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the calendar year-quarter and analyst ×
stock level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Forecast Errors PMAFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock 0.147∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗
(3.203) (−6.819)




Overall experience −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−2.177) (−2.193) (−2.179) (−0.765) (−0.767) (−0.766)
Firm experience −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(−2.092) (−2.104) (−2.102) (−2.767) (−2.770) (−2.747)
Number of industries −0.002 0.007 0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.006
(−0.320) (0.910) (0.542) (2.067) (2.124) (1.200)
Number of stocks −0.010∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.011∗∗
(−1.905) (−1.991) (−1.977) (−2.403) (−2.409) (−2.329)
Brokerage size −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗∗
(−5.671) (−5.656) (−5.682) (−1.944) (−1.940) (−1.964)
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192
R2 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.170 0.170 0.170
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forecast errors, as the dependent variable in column (4) to (6).
As shown, the coefficient on the negative belief shock variable in column
(5) is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the magnitude
of the forecast errors increases significantly when the performance of the other
industries are more negative. Analysts affected by negative belief shocks issue
significantly less accurate earnings forecasts than their peers do. The coeffi-
cient estimate of -0.209 suggests that if other coverage industries experience
a negative return of -10%, the forecast accuracy of affected analysts drops by
about 2.1% relative to their counterparts, whose coverage industries do not ex-
perience such negative shocks. This effect is economically sizable, as analysts
need about 7 years more of firm-specific experience to offset this inaccuracy.
To assess the effect of salient negative shocks, I focus on the coefficient of
the bottom decile (D1) variable in column (6), which is 0.048 and statistically
significant (t = 5.987). If analysts observe a salient negative performance
from the other industries in the bottom decile (lower than -9%), their forecast
accuracy is about 4.7% lower than that of their peers, which analysts need
about 15.7 years more of firm-specific experience to offset.
Moreover, I find no evidence that those negative shocks encompass infor-
mation that improve analysts’ accuracy in the future, as lagged belief shocks
have no significant impact on forecast errors (see Appendix C). Another po-
tential concern is whether my findings are driven by analysts’ overreaction to
their past forecast errors. If analysts form diagnostic expectations (Bordalo,
Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer, 2018a; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2018b),
they might overcorrect to past forecast errors and make overpessimistic fore-
casts subsequently if their previous forecasts have been overoptimistic. I show
in Appendix D that the effects of belief shocks are not affected by analysts’
response to past forecast errors.
Overall, the results are strongly in favor of the noise hypothesis: analysts
overgeneralize negative shocks in other industries and lower their expecta-
tions about firms’ earnings incorrectly, resulting in inaccurately low earnings
forecasts relative to the actual earnings. Inconsistent with the information
hypothesis, analysts do not provide more accurate forecasts when they expe-
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rience negative performance in other industries.
Unrelated industries
As discussed by Bradley et al. (2017), analysts with industry experience and
expertise are often in limited supply. Even for brokers having analysts with
related industry expertise, those analysts have only limited attention and may
be too busy to cover new companies. The brokerage houses would therefore
have to assign companies to analysts who are available but lack the related
industry experience and knowledge. As a result, some analysts might cover
firms in two or more unrelated industries.
This misallocation provides a natural setting to distinguish between the
information channel and the noise channel. Namely, shocks to unrelated in-
dustries are less likely to encompass useful information about focal firms. The
information hypothesis predicts that analysts would only respond to related
industries’ performance and not (or much less) to unrelated industries’ per-
formance. The noise hypothesis predicts that analysts would overgeneralize
shocks to related and to unrelated industries and make less accurate forecasts
regardless of the industry relatedness.
To identify industry relatedness, I use the three-digit NAICS codes as in-
dustry classification to compute the belief shock variable. This industry clas-
sification allows me to identify vertically linked industries, i.e., industries that
have supplier or customer relationships. I detect possible economic links using
the 2007 U.S. Input-Output Tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which are based on the NAICS codes and which provide detailed information
on the flows of the goods and services among industries4. I define supplier-
customer industries as those industries with any flows to a given industry.
In addition, I detect firm-level customer-supplier links by using the network
relationships constructed by Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016). They obtain the
identity of large customers of all public US firms, which, under regulation
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131, are obliged
4I use the 2007 table of the commodities by industry valued at purchasers’ prices un-
der Use Tables/After Redefinitions/Purchaser Value (https://www.bea.gov/industry/io_
annual.htm).
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to report the identify of any customer representing more than 10% of total
reported sales. Moreover, I use the Compustat Segment files to identify busi-
ness and operating segments of conglomerate companies that have a different
industry classification than the company’s primary sector. Finally, to detect
horizontal links in product markets, I utilize the 10-K text-based network in-
dustry classification (TNIC-3) data developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016).5
Specifically, suppose that an analyst covers industries I1 and I2, with two
different three-digit NAICS codes. When computing the belief shock of this
analyst with respect to stock k in industry I1, I consider industry I2 unrelated if
(1) I1 and I2 have no flows of goods and services with each other in the Input-
Output table (no industry-level supplier-customer links); (2) firm k has no
large customer in industry I2 (no firm-level supplier-customer links); (3) firm
k has no subsegment operating in industry I2; and (4) firm k has no product
market rivals in I2 (i.e., none of the firms in I2 is associated with firm k in the
TNIC-3 database). Otherwise, I2 is classified as a related industry for firm k.
Figure 2.1 plots the percentage of analysts in the I/B/E/S database who cover
companies in such unrelated industries. As is shown, around 20% of I/B/E/S
analysts cover neither horizontally nor vertically linked industries. Because I
only have TNIC-3 data for the period from 1996 to 2015, the following analysis
focuses on this subperiod of my sample.
In Panel A of Table 2.4, I restrict the sample to the firms with at least
one analyst who covers an unrelated industry, and I use the specification in
columns (2), (5), and (6) from Table 2.2 and columns (1) to (3) from Table 2.3
to estimate the effect of the belief shocks resulting exclusively from unrelated
industries. As is shown, the results are similar to the baseline results based on
all other coverage industries: the estimated coefficient on the negative belief
shock variables is significantly positive, while that on the indicator variable
D1 of salient negative shocks is significantly negative, implying that negative
shocks to unrelated coverage industries lead analysts to make incorrectly lower
earnings forecasts for the focal firms. The magnitude and t-statistics of the
5I thank the authors of Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016) for
making their data publicly available.
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Table 2.4: Impact of shocks to unrelated industries
This table shows how industry relatedness affects my results for the period from 1996
to 2015. In both panels, the dependent variables are the adjusted EPS forecast in
columns (1) to (3) and forecast errors in columns (4) to (6). Panel A estimates the
effect of belief shocks resulting exclusively from unrelated industries for firms with
at least one analyst who covers an unrelated industry. Panel B estimates the effects
of shocks to related and unrelated industries simultaneously for analysts who cover
both related and unrelated industries. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
calendar year-quarter and analyst × stock level, and the t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample of firms with at least one analyst covering an unrelated industry
Adjusted EPS Forecast Forecast Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock (Unrelated) 0.024 0.030
(0.900) (1.230)
Negative Shock (Unrelated) 0.126∗ 0.129∗∗
(1.699) (2.016)
D1 (Unrelated) −0.027∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(−2.521) (−2.738)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,031,484 1,031,484 1,031,484 1,031,484 1,031,484 1,031,484
R2 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.190 0.190 0.190
Panel B: Subsample of analysts who cover both related and unrelated industries
Adjusted EPS Forecast Forecast Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock (Related) 0.090∗ 0.095∗∗
(1.904) (2.310)
Belief Shock (Unrelated) 0.019 0.021
(0.756) (1.009)
Negative Shock (Related) 0.201∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(2.031) (2.377)
Negative Shock (Unrelated) 0.108∗ 0.098∗∗
(1.892) (1.982)
D1 (Related) −0.038∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(−2.698) (−2.537)
D1 (Unrelated) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(−2.619) (−2.866)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 474,943 474,943 474,943 474,943 474,943 474,943
R2 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.151 0.151 0.151
37
coefficients are smaller than those in the baseline, which is not surprising
because the effects of belief shocks from related industries are omitted in this
setting. Nevertheless, the results in Panel A provides evidence in support of
the noise hypothesis: even though negative shocks to unrelated industries are
not likely to be informative about the focal firms, they still influence analysts’
expectations for the focal firms.
An interesting follow-up question is how analysts respond differently to
the performance of related and unrelated industries. Is it possible that the
information hypothesis applies to related coverage industries while the noise
hypothesis applies to unrelated ones? In Panel B of Table 2.4, I focus on a
subsample of analysts who cover related and unrelated industries, and estimate
their response to belief shocks from related and unrelated industries separately.
The specifications are the same as in Panel A.
As is shown, negative shocks to both related and unrelated coverage indus-
tries lead analysts to make inaccurate pessimistic forecasts, which is difficult
to reconcile with the information hypothesis. Despite the substantial reduc-
tion in the sample size, the statistical significances of negative belief shocks
from unrelated industries still increases slightly relative to those in Panel A,
after controlling for the effects of belief shocks from related industries. The
coefficient estimates of belief shocks from related industries are larger than
those from unrelated industries, which suggests that analysts’ expectations
are more influenced by related industries’ performance. This findings is rea-
sonable because analysts are more likely to believe that shocks from related
industries are informative about the focal firms than those from unrelated in-
dustries. However, unreported tests of the equality of coefficients indicate that
the difference in the two coefficients is not statistically significant in any of
the specifications. The effects of belief shocks from related and unrelated in-
dustries seem to add up to the total effects from our baseline results in Tables
2.2 and 2.3.
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the negative per-
formance of other coverage industries leads analysts to incorrectly lower their
expectations and produce less accurate forecasts. Belief shocks from both
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related and unrelated industries seem to only provide noise rather than use-
ful information about the focal firms. These findings lend support to the
noise channel and soundly reject the information channel. Analysts heuristi-
cally overgeneralize negative shocks to their other coverage industries, become
more pessimistic about the state of the world, and therefore issue downward-
biased earnings forecasts relative to their peers who do not cover the shocked
industries.
Forecast revisions
One potential concern is whether my results are driven by analyst distrac-
tion. Kempf et al. (2017), for example, study investor distraction by using ex-
treme positive and negative industry returns as a proxy for attention-grabbing
events. One may argue that shocks to other industries do not influence an-
alysts’ expectations, but rather distract their attention from the focal firms.
As a result, distracted analysts issue relatively conservative earnings forecasts
that turn out to be less accurate. This argument has difficulty explaining
why analysts are not distracted by salient positive industry performance, and
it is difficult to reconcile with the large body of literature showing that, if
anything, sell-side analysts are optimistic by default. Nevertheless, I formally
investigate the possibility of analyst distraction by examining analyst forecast
revisions.
If analysts were just distracted by other coverage industries with extreme
returns, they would allocate less effort to the coverage firm and revise their
forecasts less frequently than usual. In Table 2.5, I estimate Equation (2.11)
in columns (1) and (2) with the total number of revisions as the dependent
variable. The belief shock variables are computed here over the period from
the earnings announcement date of fiscal quarter t−1 to that of fiscal quarter
t. As is shown, neither negative nor positive extreme performance of other
coverage industries affects analyst revisions significantly. Thus, there is no
evidence that analysts spend less effort on the coverage firms or revise their
forecasts less often.
In addition, I use the following specification to estimate the effect of belief
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Table 2.5: Impact of belief shocks on forecast revisions
This table reports the effect of belief shocks on analysts’ forecast revisions. The
dependent variable is the number of forecast revisions issued by analyst i for firm
j regarding fiscal year-quarter t in columns (1) and (2), the magnitude of forecast
revision, which is measured as the standardized unexpected forecast (SUF) computed
as in Stickel (1992a) in columns (3) and (4), and the cumulative abnormal returns
around the announcement of analyst i’s forecast revision in columns (5) and (6).
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the calendar year-quarter and analyst ×
stock level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Number of Revisions Forecast Revision CAR(0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative Shock 0.013 0.467∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.573) (5.013) (−0.663)
Positive Shock −0.019 0.293∗∗∗ 0.002
(−0.713) (3.930) (0.536)
D1 −0.004 −0.063∗∗∗ 0.001
(−0.831) (−7.092) (1.411)
D10 −0.001 0.027∗∗∗ 0.000
(−0.170) (2.788) (0.552)
Forecast revision 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(11.699) (11.677)
Overall experience −0.001 −0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(−1.325) (−2.095) (1.184) (1.195) (0.645) (0.643)
Firm experience 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 −0.000 −0.000
(11.862) (12.166) (−1.160) (−1.154) (−0.784) (−0.782)
Number of industries −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−3.121) (−3.631) (−0.155) (−0.031) (−0.110) (−0.079)
Number of stocks 0.031∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.010 −0.000 −0.000
(6.904) (9.124) (−0.998) (−1.009) (−0.026) (−0.037)
Brokerage size 0.029∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗ 0.000 0.000
(10.519) (12.569) (1.686) (1.677) (0.328) (0.333)
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,178,422 1,423,192 315,792 315,814 315,792 315,814
R2 0.219 0.225 0.250 0.249 0.314 0.314
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shocks on the magnitude of analyst j’s r-th forecast revision for firm i in fiscal
year-quarter t:






where r indexes forecast revisions (within each analyst-firm-fiscal year-quarter
pair). The dependent variable is the standardized unexpected forecast (SUF)
computed as in Stickel (1992a) and Malloy (2005) to measure revision magni-
tude. The belief shock variables are computed as described in section 2.3.2 but
over the window between the announcement date of an analyst’s most recent
forecast r and the announcement date of her previous forecast r−1 for the same
firm and fiscal quarter. All of the variables are demeaned within firm-quarters
to control for the stock × fiscal year-quarter fixed effects. The sample contains
314,742 forecast revisions. The estimation results are shown in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 2.5. The direction and magnitude of analyst forecast revisions
are strongly associated with the (salient) performance of other coverage indus-
tries: analysts revise their forecasts downwards (upwards) significantly more
when the other industries experience sizable negative (positive) shocks. This
finding contradicts the notion of analyst inattention, as distracted analysts
would not incorporate other industries’ shocks into their revisions.
In columns (5) and (6), I examine the stock price impact of forecast re-
visions associated with belief shocks by estimating Equation (2.14) with the
three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the forecast revision announce-
ment date as the dependent variable. This test provides additional evidence to
distinguish whether belief shocks encompass information or noise. The fore-
cast revisions made by analysts affected by belief shocks would have a greater
impact on stock prices if those analysts bring valuable information to the mar-
ket. As is shown, conditional on the direction and magnitude of the revisions,
belief shocks do not significantly affect the market reactions, which again does
not support the information channel. Moreover, the insignificant coefficients
on belief shocks suggest that investors do not unravel the biases in analysts’
forecasts resulting from belief shocks.
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The findings in Table 2.5 also confirm the asymmetric effect of negative and
positive belief shocks, although they suggest a less extreme version. In par-
ticular, analysts also revise forecasts upwards following positive belief shocks
despite the significantly smaller magnitude. This finding lends support to the
notion that as analysts are already optimistic on average, even though they
might respond to positive shocks and revise their forecast upwards, their final
forecasts might not differ sufficiently from other analysts’ optimistic forecasts
for econometricians to detect any significant difference. The asymmetric effect
of negative and positive belief shocks is probably not due only to the negativity
bias, but also to the analysts’ average optimism.
2.4.3 Robustness
In this section, I show that my main findings are robust to alternative weight-
ing schemes when constructing the belief shock variable, to different subperiods
in my sample, and to alternative industry classifications. Table 2.6 presents
the results of the robustness tests. In Panel A, I reestimate the specification
in columns (2), (5), and (6) from Table 2.2 with the adjusted EPS forecast as
the dependent variable. In Panel B, I reestimate the specification in columns
(1) to (3) from Table 2.3 with signed forecast errors as the dependent variable.
First, I estimate the effect of belief shocks computed by equally weight-
ing analysts’ coverage industries in Equation (2.6), which yields coefficient
estimates of similar statistical significance and even slightly larger magnitude.
Second, I divide the main sample period into four subperiods: before and
after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the 2008 financial crisis period,
and the post-crisis period. Reg FD, which was ratified by the SEC in 2000,
prohibited selective information disclosure by firms to a subset of analysts
and thus could affect analysts’ private information, such as their personal
connections to the management (e.g., Cohen et al., 2010). As is shown, the
results in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods and in the post-crisis period are
similar to the baseline. However, during the financial crisis, analysts seem to
only respond to salient negative industry performance. One likely explanation
is that analysts were already very pessimistic about the economy because of the
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Table 2.6: Robustness tests
In Panel A, the baseline estimates in the first row refer to columns (2), (5), and (6)
from Table 2.2, and I reestimate the corresponding specifications in those columns
with the adjusted EPS forecast as the dependent variable. In Panel B, the baseline es-
timates refer to columns (1) to (3) from Table 2.3, and I reestimate the corresponding
specifications in those columns with signed forecast errors as the dependent variable.
I first present the results of belief shocks computed by using equal weighting for the
industries in Equation (2.6). I then show the coefficient estimates when restricting the
sample to four different subperiods. Furthermore, I consider five alternative industry
classifications: Fama-French 12 industries, GICS industries (three-digit), industries
based on two-digit SICH codes, and the Hoberg and Phillips (2016) 10-K text-based
50 industry classification (FIC-50). I compute the belief shock variable using those
five alternative industry definitions. For brevity, I only present coefficients of interest,
and I suppress the control variables. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
calendar year-quarter and analyst × stock level, and the corresponding t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Panel A: EPS forecast as the dependent variable
Table 2.2: (2) Table 2.2: (5) Table 2.2: (6)
Negative Positive
Belief Shock Shock Shock D1 D10 Obs.
Baseline (FF49) 0.133*** 0.266*** -0.019 -0.045*** 0.001 1,423,192
(2.705) (2.823) (-0.369) (-3.643) (0.253)
Alternative weight:
Equal-weighting (FF49) 0.138** 0.284*** -0.033 -0.047*** -0.001 1,423,192
(2.548) (2.735) (-0.588) (-3.281) (-0.167)
Subperiods:
Pre-Reg FD: 1993-2000 0.111* 0.239** 0.019 -0.035* 0.007 281,574
(1.711) (2.118) (0.289) (-1.936) (0.568)
Post-Reg FD: 2001-2006 0.116 0.378*** -0.188 -0.050** -0.003 344,654
(1.563) (2.687) (-1.596) (-2.317) (-0.216)
Financial crisis: 2007-2009 0.130 0.219 -0.077 -0.052* -0.011 223,218
(1.414) (1.624) (-0.819) (-2.001) (-0.818)
Post-crisis: 2010-2016 0.168*** 0.265** 0.094 -0.038*** 0.007 573,746
(2.709) (2.285) (1.327) (-2.868) (0.851)
Alternative industry classifications:
Fama-French 12 0.123** 0.239* -0.004 -0.022* 0.003 1,423,192
(2.095) (1.959) (0.064) (-1.745) (0.405)
Three-digit GICS 0.125*** 0.303*** -0.002 -0.033*** -0.004 1,409,349
(3.084) (3.082) (-0.067) (-3.043) (-0.764)
Two-digit SIC 0.151*** 0.346** 0.013 -0.045*** 0.001 1,423,192
(2.697) (2.377) (0.264) (-3.538) (0.217)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 0.121** 0.342*** -0.033 -0.038*** -0.004 1,242,909
(2.408) (2.793) (-0.718) (-3.092) (-0.493)
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Panel B: Forecast errors as the dependent variable
Table 2.3: (1) Table 2.3: (2) Table 2.3: (3)
Negative Positive
Belief Shock Shock Shock D1 D10 Obs.
Baseline (FF49) 0.147*** 0.271*** 0.005 -0.050*** 0.001 1,423,192
(3.203) (2.937) (0.103) (-3.923) (0.274)
Alternative weight:
Equal-weighting (FF49) 0.156*** 0.291*** -0.001 -0.051*** 0.001 1,423,192
(3.118) (2.887) (-0.021) (-3.608) (0.215)
Subperiods:
Pre-Reg FD: 1993-2000 0.097 0.266** -0.024 -0.042** 0.000 281,574
(1.572) (2.166) (-0.305) (-2.139) (0.026)
Post-Reg FD: 2001-2006 0.177** 0.423*** -0.109 -0.061*** 0.008 344,654
(2.378) (3.024) (-1.021) (-2.798) (0.623)
Financial crisis: 2007-2009 0.117 0.171 -0.007 -0.045* -0.009 223,218
(1.489) (1.438) (-0.102) (-1.903) (-0.872)
Post-crisis: 2010-2016 0.190*** 0.320*** 0.092 -0.046*** 0.003 573,746
(3.270) (2.969) (1.403) (-3.269) (0.449)
Alternative industry classifications:
Fama-French 12 0.146*** 0.283** -0.003 -0.029** -0.001 1,423,192
(2.725) (2.421) (-0.046) (-2.422) (-0.100)
Three-digit GICS 0.135*** 0.312*** 0.009 -0.039*** -0.003 1,409,349
(3.513) (3.212) (0.306) (-3.757) (-0.648)
Two-digit SIC 0.170*** 0.375*** 0.025 -0.048*** 0.003 1,423,192
(3.382) (2.861) (0.575) (-3.836) (0.524)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 0.128*** 0.317*** -0.005 -0.042*** -0.005 1,242,909
(2.738) (2.722) (0.118) (-3.372) (-0.786)
crisis. Thus, only extremely negative signals could change their perspective,
making them even more pessimistic, which is consistent with the main findings.
In sum, the estimation results in the subperiods provide important evidence
showing that my main findings are persistent over time and not solely driven
by extreme negative events such as the financial crisis.
Furthermore, I consider five alternative industry classifications: Fama-
French 12 industries, the three-digit Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) industries, industries based on two-digit SICH codes, and the Hoberg
and Phillips (2016) 10-K text-based 50 industry classification (FIC-50). I
compute the belief shock variable using each of these five alternative industry
definitions. As is shown in Table 2.6, the statistical significance and magnitude
of the point estimates are qualitatively the same as those of my baseline results.
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Therefore, my findings are not likely to be driven by a particular industry
(mis)classification or by measurement errors.
2.5 An Exogenous Industry Shock: the Oil Price
Crash in 2014-15
The findings in this paper so far provide strong and robust evidence that neg-
ative shocks to other coverage industries make analysts overpessimistic about
the focal firms. This evidence is plausibly causal because (1) industry shocks
are unlikely to correlate with analyst-specific characteristics; (2) my identifi-
cation approach compares forecasts made by different analysts for the same
firm at the same time, ensuring that differences in firms’ fundamentals cannot
explain the results; and (3) I include analyst × stock fixed effects to control for
unobserved time-invariant differences across analysts covering the same firm.
But even then, one may still argue that (a) analysts’ forecasts can affect the
firm policies of industry leaders and thereby influence the performance of the
overall industry (reverse causality), and (b) the belief shock variable fails to
capture industry shocks adequately (measurement errors). Even though it is
difficult to conceive how an individual analyst can cause changes in corpo-
rate practices that are immediately value-destroying for the entire industry, or
how industry returns can systematically misspecify industry shocks, I further
strengthen my identification by exploiting an exogenous industry shock that
is clearly orthogonal to analyst opinions.
The oil industry is full of booms and busts. After four years of relative
stability, the crude oil price experiences a dramatic decline in 2014-15: from
a peak of $115 per barrel in June 2014, the oil price plunges below $50 by
the end of January 2015. This sharp fall puts severe economic stress on the
U.S. oil companies and drives the entire industry (Fama-French 49-industry
code 30) down by about 30%, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.3. How-
ever, the downturn remains mostly industry-specific and does not have any
significant negative spillovers on other industries. Indeed, the overall market
actually increases slightly by about 5% over the same period. This contrast
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Figure 2.3: Oil price shock in 2014-15 and analyst forecasts
This graph shows how analyst forecasts change amid the oil price shock in 2014-
15. Panel A plots the daily cumulative returns of the market portfolio and the oil
industry portfolio (Fama-French 49-industry code 30) from 7/1/2014 to 6/30/2015.
Panel B plots the average adjusted EPS forecasts made for non-oil firms and issued
during each of the four sub-periods from 8/1/2014 to 7/31/2015, separately based on
whether the analyst covers the oil industry in both 2014 and 2015. I exclude firms
without any analyst covering the oil industry. I also plot the corresponding 90%
confidence intervals. Note that because the forecasts have been demeaned within
each firm×fiscal year-quarter group, a negative value implies that an analyst is more
pessimistic relative to her peers covering the same firm at the same time.
provides a useful case to test whether analysts form divergent expectations
following the different performance of their other coverage industries. More
importantly, because this crash in oil prices is mainly due to the oversupply
from unconventional oil sources, the weakening global demand, and OPEC’s
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renouncement of price support, the resulting negative shock to the oil indus-
try is totally exogenous to analysts’ forecasts and recommendations, which
addresses the concern of reverse causality.6
I use a difference-in-differences (DD) approach and define the treatment
group as analysts who cover the oil industry in both 2014 and 2015. The
sample is restricted to forecasts made between 8/1/2014 and 7/31/2015 and
for non-oil firms covered by at least one analyst in the treatment group. I
further exclude analysts who have changed industry coverage between 2014
and 2015, ensuring that the results are not contaminated by analysts’ endoge-
nous coverage choices. These criteria yield 590 firms with 254 analysts in the
treatment group and 951 analysts in the control group.
In Panel B of Figure 2.3, I plot the average adjusted EPS forecasts for each
of the four sub-periods from 8/1/2014 to 7/31/2015 across the firms in this
subsample, separately based on whether the analyst covers the oil industry.
The adjusted forecasts are demeaned within firm-quarters to control for differ-
ences in firms’ fundamentals. Even in this univariate comparison, the figure
shows a clear pattern: before the price crash materially hits the oil industry,
analysts in the treatment and control groups make similar forecasts. After the
shock (2015 Feb-Apr), analysts in the treatment group become significantly
more pessimistic about the focal firms, relative to their peers who do not cover
the oil industry. As the forecasts made during 2015 May-Jul are again similar
between analysts in the treatment and control groups, this industry shock ap-
pears to have a short-lived effect on analysts’ beliefs, which is consistent with
the baseline results.
In Table 2.7, I test the impact of this oil industry shock on analyst expec-
tations more formally by estimating the following regression specification:
ỹijt = α+β1Cover Oili×Postt+β2Cover Oili+β3Postt+γ′X̃ijt+εijt, (2.15)
where β1 gives the DD-estimator, which is expected to be negative if the depen-
dent variable is the adjusted EPS forecast in columns (1-2) and signed forecast
6For example, see Arezki, Rabah, and Olivier Blanchard (2015), “The 2014 Oil Price
Slump: Seven Key Questions”, VoxEU.org
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errors in columns (3-4), and positive if the dependent variable is PMAFE in
columns (5-6). The control variables are the same as those in Table 2.2 and
2.3. Post is a dummy variable that equals one if a forecast is issued between
2/1/2015 and 4/30/2015, indicating the “after shock” period. I cluster the
standard errors at the analyst × stock level to account for potential serial
correlations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
The results confirm the hypothesis that the negative oil industry shock
leads analysts who cover oil companies to incorrectly lower expectations for
focal firms in other industries. The DD estimate has the expected sign and is
statistically significant in all columns. Column (1) shows that analysts who
cover the oil industry become about 7.6% more pessimistic about the focal
firms after the shock, relative to the peer analysts who do not cover the oil
industry. Column (3) and (5) show that their pessimistic forecasts are lower
than actual earnings and about 4.4% less accurate. In the other columns, when
I further restrict the sample to only IT firms (Fama-French 49-industry codes
32-38), which is arguably unrelated to the oil industry, I still find that analysts
who cover the oil industry have significantly lowered their expectations and
made overpessimistic forecasts. Therefore, industry relatedness and spillovers
are unlikely to confound my results.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this section strengthens the base-
line results: negative shocks to one coverage industry makes analysts overpes-
simistic about firms in other industries. In this particular case, the severe
negative shock to the oil industry caused by the oil price crash significantly
affects the earnings forecasts made by the treatment analysts for non-oil firms.
Because the source of this industry shock is known and exogenous to the opin-
ions of analysts who cover oil companies, the results suggest that the effect of
industry shocks on analyst expectations is causal.
2.6 Additional Analysis
The results thus far are consistent with the notion that other coverage indus-
tries’ negative performance lowers analysts’ expectations about the state of
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Table 2.7: Impact of oil price shock on analyst forecasts
This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of oil price
shock in 2014-15 on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Cover Oil is a dummy variable
that equals one if an analyst covers the oil industry in both 2014 and 2015. Post
is a dummy variable that equals one if a forecast is issued between 2/1/2015 and
4/30/2015. The control variables are demeaned within firm-quarters. The dependent
variable is the adjusted EPS forecast in columns (1-2), the signed forecast errors in
columns (3-4), and the absolute value of forecast errors in columns (5-6). I restrict
the sample to forecasts made between 8/1/2014 and 7/31/2015. In columns (1), (3),
and (5), I focus on all firms except those operating in the oil industry itself (Fama-
French 49-industry code 30). In columns (2), (4), and (6), I focus on only IT firms
(Fama-French 49-industry codes 32-38). Standard errors are clustered at the analyst
× stock level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Adjusted EPS Forecast Forecast Errors PMAFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cover Oil × Post −0.076∗∗ −0.275∗∗ −0.062∗∗ −0.213∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.118∗
(−2.564) (−2.379) (−2.418) (−2.332) (2.029) (1.678)
Cover Oil 0.028 0.220∗∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.178∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.004
(1.436) (2.938) (1.764) (3.146) (−0.813) (−0.096)
Post 0.019 0.087 0.017 0.040 −0.021∗ −0.033
(1.094) (1.461) (1.140) (0.883) (−1.665) (−0.945)
Overall experience 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.002∗∗ 0.001
(0.578) (0.800) (1.432) (1.451) (2.097) (0.327)
Firm experience 0.000 −0.009 0.000 −0.005 −0.004∗∗ −0.005
(0.003) (−0.812) (0.134) (−0.581) (−2.269) (−0.833)
Number of industries −0.066∗∗ −0.375∗∗∗ −0.048∗ −0.230∗∗ −0.029 −0.117∗
(−2.115) (−2.944) (−1.831) (−2.466) (−1.408) (−1.688)
Number of stocks 0.019 0.065 0.008 −0.015 0.030∗ 0.038
(0.713) (0.636) (0.357) (−0.190) (1.818) (0.605)
Brokerage size −0.021∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.009 −0.042 0.015∗∗ 0.021
(−1.960) (−2.373) (−1.077) (−1.534) (2.236) (1.002)
Constant −0.014 −0.068∗ −0.015 −0.040 −0.003 −0.001
(−1.248) (−1.769) (−1.621) (−1.370) (−0.357) (−0.046)
Demeaned controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Excl. Oil Only IT Excl. Oil Only IT Excl. Oil Only IT
Observations 17,639 1,390 17,639 1,390 17,639 1,390
R2 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.006
the world. Yet given the large heterogeneity of firms and analysts, the effect
of belief shocks might vary for different types of analysts covering different
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firms. Moreover, because analysts probably hold diverse prior beliefs about
each industry and only cover a particular set of firms within each industry, they
might not respond identically to belief shocks coming from different coverage
industries. In this section, I exploit the heterogeneity in firms and analysts’
coverage portfolios to further assess how other industries’ performance influ-
ences analysts’ belief-forming process.
2.6.1 Coverage firms with high information asymmetry
I first try to isolate firm types for which the effect of negative belief shocks is
particularly stark. Following the idea that analysts rely more on their private
information when the coverage firm is opaque and difficult to analyze, I divide
my original sample into firms with different levels of information asymmetry.
More specifically, I break down the sample in three ways: firms in high-tech
industries (code 3 in Fama-French 5 industries) versus firms in other industries,
small firms (with below median market capitalization) versus big firms, and
young firms (went IPO in less than 10 years) versus mature firms. Table 2.8
reports the estimated effects for each subset.
In Panel A, I reestimate the specification of column (5) from Table 2.2
for each subsample, with adjusted EPS forecasts as dependent variables. As
is shown, the coefficient estimate on negative belief shocks is slightly larger
for small and young firms, and it is particularly stronger for stocks in high-
tech industries. A negative belief shock of -10% leads analysts covering high-
tech stocks to become 4.3% more pessimistic relative to the baseline of 2.7%.
A similar pattern emerges from the estimation results in Panel B, where I
reestimate the specification of column (2) from Table 2.3 with forecast errors
as dependent variables. These findings lend support to the notion that analysts
covering opaque firms (especially high-tech firms) are more influenced by the
negative performance of other coverage industries relative to other analysts.
2.6.2 Analysts with different numbers of coverage industries
My baseline results suggest that analysts covering two or more industries tend
to overgeneralize the negative performance of the other industries. To examine
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Table 2.8: Heterogeneous effects of negative belief shocks
This table reports the heterogeneous effects of negative belief shocks on analysts’
expectations. I divide the sample into firms with different levels of information asym-
metry. Specifically, I break down my sample in three ways: firms in high-tech in-
dustries (code 3 in Fama-French 5 industries) versus firms in other industries, small
firms (with below-median market capitalization) versus big firms, and young firms
(with IPO in less than 10 years) versus mature firms. I reestimate the specification
of column (5) from Table 2.2 in Panel A and column (2) from Table 2.3 in Panel
B. For brevity, I only report the coefficient estimates of the negative belief shocks,
and I suppress the coefficient estimates of the positive shocks and control variables.
All of the regression models are estimated with stock × fiscal-year quarter (demean-
ing variables within firm-quarters), calendar year-quarter, and analyst × stock fixed
effects for each subsample. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the calendar
year-quarter and analyst × stock level. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Adjusted EPS forecast as dependent variable
Subsample
High Tech Other Small Big Young Mature
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative Shock 0.429*** 0.209** 0.269*** 0.262*** 0.297*** 0.257***
(3.703) (2.236) (2.723) (2.802) (2.821) (2.652)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 324,045 1,099,147 711,424 711,768 450,763 972,429
R2 0.236 0.182 0.213 0.176 0.252 0.185
Panel B: Forecast errors as dependent variable
Subsample
High Tech Other Small Big Young Mature
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative Shock 0.411*** 0.223** 0.267*** 0.273*** 0.355*** 0.242**
(3.245) (2.560) (2.762) (2.954) (3.188) (2.571)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 324,045 1,099,147 711,424 711,768 450,763 972,429
R2 0.228 0.176 0.208 0.168 0.245 0.178
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whether this varies with analysts’ portfolio complexity, I split the sample based
on the number of industries an analyst covers and reestimate the specification
in column (5) of Table 2.2 for each subsample.
In Panel A of Table 2.9, the dependent variable is the adjusted EPS fore-
cast, computed as in Equation (2.1). I first use the full sample to demean all
of the independent variables within each firm-quarter, to control for stock ×
fiscal year-quarter fixed effects, and then estimate the regression models with
those demeaned variables, calendar year-quarter, and analyst × stock fixed
effects for each subsample. As is shown, all of the point estimates on the
negative belief shocks are positive and statistically significant, which suggests
that all analysts with multiple coverage industries lower their expectations
because of belief shocks, even those covering only two industries.
Similar to Panel A, I divide the sample and reestimate the same speci-
fication in column (5) from Table 2.3 with forecast errors as the dependent
variable in Panel B. The estimation results in Panel B confirm the baseline
findings. Analysts affected by more negative belief shocks produce more neg-
ative forecast errors. The effect size is similar to the baseline results and is
statistically significant regardless of the number of industries that an analyst
covers. There is no clear pattern of effect size increasing over all coverage
industries.
To summarize, I have shown that analysts covering multiple industries
overgeneralize and consequently make less accurate earnings forecasts, includ-
ing those covering only two industries. This finding is also interesting from
practitioners’ perspective. Due to a lack of supply of industry-experienced
analysts, brokerage houses face the trade-off between the costs and benefits
of assigning non-industry experts (Bradley et al., 2017). One could consider
overgeneralization as a potential cost of delegating analysts more industries to
cover even though they might be more talented than others.
2.6.3 “Expected” versus “unexpected” belief shocks
As noted above, analysts might have different interpretations of the signals
coming from different coverage industries because of their heterogeneous prior
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Table 2.9: Analysts with different numbers of coverage industries
This table reports the heterogeneous effects of negative belief shocks on analysts
covering different numbers of industries. In both panels, I split the sample based
on the number of industries an analyst covers, and I reestimate the specification
of column (5) from Table 2.2 in Panel A and column (2) from Table 2.3 in Panel
B. For brevity, I only report the coefficient estimates of the negative belief shocks,
and suppress the coefficient estimates of the positive shocks and control variables. I
first use the full sample to demean all of the independent variables within each firm-
quarter to control for stock × fiscal year-quarter fixed effects and then estimate the
regression models with those demeaned variables, calendar year-quarter, and analyst
× stock fixed effects for each subsample. Standard errors are two-way clustered at
the calendar year-quarter and analyst × stock level. The corresponding t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Panel A: Adjusted EPS forecast as the dependent variable
Number of industries
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n ≥ 7
Negative Shock 0.298*** 0.401** 0.359*** 0.509*** 0.282* 0.347**
(3.483) (2.573) (2.721) (3.280) (1.727) (2.020)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319,300 249,656 203,437 147,843 97,967 160,219
R2 0.267 0.292 0.300 0.305 0.312 0.244
Panel B: Forecast errors as the dependent variable
Number of industries
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n ≥ 7
Negative Shock 0.300*** 0.420*** 0.343** 0.463*** 0.388*** 0.324**
(3.815) (2.840) (2.516) (2.971) (2.641) (2.218)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319,300 249,656 203,437 147,843 97,967 160,219
R2 0.262 0.286 0.294 0.295 0.306 0.237
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beliefs about each industry. Analysts might be more likely to change their
beliefs when the shocks are unexpected and different from their priors. Recall
the example from the introduction: analyst A might have reacted less to the
negative shock in the transportation industry if he had already foreseen this
shock. However, it is empirically difficult to observe analysts’ prior beliefs
about these industry shocks.
In Panel A of Table 2.10, I use analysts’ earnings surprises as a weak
proxy for their prior beliefs and decompose belief shocks into expected and
unexpected components. Earnings surprises indicate that it is plausible that
the industry shock is not anticipated by the analyst. As earnings surprises are
only at the firm level and are probably correlated with unobserved analysts’
private signals and therefore might contaminate the coefficient estimates, the
results based on this proxy should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. I
compute the average earnings surprises across firms in a given industry and
identify industries with surprises if the shock and the average earnings surprise
have the same sign. Likewise, industries without surprises are those in which
the average earnings surprise has a different sign than that of the industry
shock.
Using decomposed belief shocks and repeating the analysis from Tables
2.2 and 2.3, I find that both expected and unexpected shocks significantly
influence analyst beliefs, with similar magnitudes. Combining the effects of
anticipated and unanticipated belief shocks seems to recover the coefficient
estimates in the corresponding columns from Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The finding
that expected belief shocks also affect analyst forecasts is interesting and sug-
gests that analysts seem to overgeneralize industry-wide shocks rather than
firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, this result supports my approach of us-
ing industry-level performance rather than firm-level performance to construct
belief shocks.
2.6.4 Industry shocks versus idiosyncratic shocks
As explained before, I use industry-level performance to construct the baseline
belief shock variable for identification purposes. In practice, however, analysts
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Table 2.10: Belief shocks and earnings surprises
In Panel A of this table, I decompose belief shocks into one component capturing
shocks to industries in which the analyst was on average surprised by the actual earn-
ings and another component capturing shocks to industries in which the analyst was
not surprised. In Panel B, I contrast industry shocks with firm-level idiosyncratic
shocks by including belief shock variables based on firm-level stock market perfor-
mance as additional control variables to my baseline specifications with belief shock
variables based on industry-level performance. In both panels, the dependent variable
is the EPS forecast in columns (1) to (3) and forecast errors in columns (4) to (6).
The specifications correspond to those in columns (2), (5), and (6) from Table 2.2
and those in columns (1) to (3) from 2.3. All of the specifications include the stock ×
fiscal year-quarter (by demeaning all of the variables within firm-quarters), calendar
year-quarter, and analyst × stock fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clus-
tered at the calendar year-quarter and analyst × stock level, and the corresponding
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Whether the analyst has earnings surprises in the shocked industries
Adjusted EPS Forecast Forecast Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock (w/ surprise) 0.081∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(2.956) (3.308)
Belief Shock (w/o surprise) 0.076∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(2.167) (2.665)
Negative Shock (w/ surprise) 0.136∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(2.861) (2.980)
Negative Shock (w/o surprise) 0.147∗∗ 0.147∗∗
(2.225) (2.382)
D1 (w/ surprise) −0.026∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(−2.829) (−3.354)
D1 (w/o surprise) −0.031∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(−3.084) (−3.323)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192
R2 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.187 0.187 0.187
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Panel B: Industry shocks versus idiosyncratic firm-level shocks
Adjusted EPS Forecast Forecast Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock (industry-level) 0.076 0.095∗∗
(1.619) (2.157)
Belief Shock (stock-level) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(5.993) (6.603)
Negative Shock (industry-level) 0.190∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(2.128) (2.252)
Negative Shock (stock-level) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(4.748) (5.405)
D1 (industry-level) −0.034∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(−3.077) (−3.349)
D1 (stock-level) −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(−5.386) (−6.361)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst × Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192 1,423,192
R2 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.187 0.187 0.187
cover a particular set of firms within each industry, rather than the entire
industry. Because an industry shock affects some firms more than others,
analysts covering different firms within the same industry might have diverse
perceptions of the shock. Specifically, does a negative industry shock still make
analysts more pessimistic when their coverage firms within that industry are
actually performing well?
To address this question, I additionally construct a belief shock variable as
in Equation (2.6) by value-weighting the stock market performance of analysts’
individual coverage firms. In Panel B of Table 2.10, I include stock-level belief
shock variables as additional control variables to my baseline specifications
with the industry-level belief shocks from Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Controlling for
stock-level belief shock variables allows me to examine how analysts respond
to the same industry shocks differently regarding the performance of their
coverage firms. If analysts only pay attention to industry shocks that sub-
stantially affect their coverage firms, the coefficients on industry-level belief
shocks would no longer be significant.
Compared to the estimates in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the coefficients on the
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baseline industry-level belief shocks are smaller in magnitude, but most re-
main statistically significant. The coefficients on stock-level belief shocks are
in the same direction as those on industry-level variables, with higher sta-
tistical significance but smaller magnitudes, which suggests that a negative
industry shock lowers an analyst’s belief more if her coverage firms in that
industry are materially affected by the shock and perform poorly. The effect
of industry shocks is still present but diminishes if the coverage firms are not
or are less affected. The larger magnitude of industry-level belief shocks rela-
tive to stock-level shocks lends further support to the notion that analysts are
more likely to overgeneralize industry-wide shocks rather than firm-level id-
iosyncratic shocks when forming expectations about firms in other industries.
Note that combining the effects of industry- and stock-level belief shocks seems
to recover the baseline estimates in the corresponding columns from Tables 2.2
and 2.3.
The higher statistical significance of stock-level belief shocks also indicates
that analysts’ expectations covary more closely with the performance of cov-
erage firms. In an unreported test in which I replace industry-level belief
shocks with stock-level belief shocks, the estimated effects of firm-level per-
formance on analysts’ beliefs are larger in both statistical significance and
economic magnitude. Nevertheless, as discussed before, the effect of firm-level
performance cannot be cleanly identified, as it is difficult to rule out reverse
causality and other potential confounding factors that drive firm performance
and analyst expectation simultaneously.
2.6.5 Does experience or the brokerage house mitigate over-
generalization?
Another interesting question is what factors mitigate the impact of overgen-
eralization, which results in analyst inaccuracy. I test two candidates: experi-
ence and brokerage firm size. As analysts gain experience, they could become
better at analyzing firms’ financial reports, identifying business cycles, and
teasing out noise from information. Clement (1999a) and others have provided
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Furthermore, analysts employed by bigger (often more prestigious) brokerage
firms are provided with more resources, such as more research assistance from
junior analysts and access to soft information through privileged house calls
with management, that enable the analysts to filter out more noise from other
industries. Table 2.11 shows the results of my test of whether analysts’ expe-
rience or employer reduces the impact of overgeneralization. I reestimate the
specifications of column (5) from Table 2.2 and columns (2) and (5) from Ta-
ble 2.3, and I interact the negative belief shock variable with analysts’ overall
experience, firm-specific experience, and the size of the brokerage firm.
If analysts with more experience or those who work for a bigger broker
house are less likely to overgeneralize negative performance of the other indus-
tries, the coefficient on the interaction terms would be statistically significant
and have an opposite sign than that of the negative belief shock variable. As is
shown in Table 2.11, however, the estimated coefficient on all of the interaction
terms turns out to be negligible. While more experienced analysts employed
by larger brokerage houses are on average more accurate, these characteristics
do not prevent them from overgeneralizing negative shocks to other coverage
industries.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper exploits the diversity of industries that analysts cover, which is
common to sell-side equity analysts. I test the hypothesis that the perfor-
mances of other coverage industries play an important role in shaping analysts’
expectations about the state of the world and thereby influence their earnings
forecasts for their focal firms.
My main finding is that negative shocks to other coverage industries make
analysts more pessimistic about the focal firms. When investigating whether
these industry shocks provide analysts with additional valuable information
or merely noise, I find strong evidence for the latter. Analysts’ pessimistic
forecasts turn out to be less accurate and much lower than the realized earn-
ings, which suggests that analysts overgeneralize negative shocks from other
59
coverage industries and unnecessarily lower their expectations about the focal
firms.
The results in this paper not only introduce a new determinant of heteroge-
neous beliefs among financial analysts but also provide a broader implication
for studying the decision-making process of multi-tasking agents, who might
overgeneralize their experience with or outcome of one task when making de-
cisions for other tasks. Moreover, because overgeneralization leads analysts to
lower expectations because of other industries’ performance, which is arguably
unrelated to the fundamentals of focal firms, this heuristic essentially provides
exogenous variation in analysts’ disagreement and pessimism. I further exploit




Table 2.A.1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description
Dependent variables
EPS forecast Earnings per share forecasts demeaned and scaled within
each firm-fiscal quarter group, computed as in Equation (2.1)
(winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels).
Forecast errors Raw eps forecast minus actual earnings, demeaned and
scaled within each firm-fiscal quarter group, computed as
in Equation (2.3) (winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels).
PMAFE Absolute value of forecast errors, demeaned and scaled within
each firm-fiscal quarter group, computed as in Equation (2.2)
(winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels).
Number of revisions Logarithm of one plus the total number of forecasts issued by
the same analyst for the same firm and fiscal quarter.
Forecast revision Magnitude of forecast revision measured as the standardized
unexpected forecast (SUF) computed as in (Stickel, 1992a)
(winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels).
CAR(0, 1) Market-adjusted cumulative announcement return over the window
(0, 1) around the analyst’s revision date (winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels).
Explanatory variables
Belief Shock Shocks to analyst belief, constructed using Fama-French 49
industries (see Section 2.3.2).
Belief Shock (EW) Belief shocks constructed using Fama-French 49 industry and
equal-weighting.
Belief Shock (Unrelated) Belief shocks constructed using three-digit NAICS industries, which
are arguably unrelated to the industry of the focal firm, as explained
in section 2.4.2.
Belief Shock (Related) Belief shocks constructed using related three-digit NAICS industries,
as explained in section 2.4.2.
Control variables
Overall experience The overall experience computed as the number of years
between an analyst’s current earnings forecast and his/her
first forecast for any firm.
Firm experience The firm-specific experience computed as the number of years
between an analyst’s current earnings forecast and his/her
first forecast covering a given stock.
Number of stocks Logarithm of one plus the number of stocks covered by the analyst
in a given year.
Broker size Logarithm of one plus the number of analysts employed by the
brokerage house in a calendar year plus one.
Number of industries Logarithm of one plus the number of Fama-French 49 industries
covered by the analyst in a given year.
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B Initial coverage and belief shocks
This appendix provides evidence supporting the identification assumption that
analysts’ coverage decisions are not driven by bad performance of the other
coverage industries. I first identify coverage initiated as when an analyst issues
her first earnings forecast on a particular stock (since 1995), and I then ex-
amine the distribution of these initial forecasts adjusted within firm-quarters
and the corresponding belief shocks prior to those forecasts. If my results
are driven by pessimistic analysts initiating coverage following negative belief
shocks, I would observe that (1) analysts’ initial forecasts are more pessimistic
relative to their peers; and (2) more of the corresponding belief shocks take
negative values. Figure 2.A.1 depicts the histogram of the forecasts and belief
shocks at initial coverage, respectively. As is shown, while there is no obvious
bias in the initial forecasts, the corresponding belief shocks are biased towards
positive values. In fact, about 48.7% of the initial forecasts are relatively
pessimistic, whereas only 34.2% of the belief shocks are negative. This find-
ing suggests that, even though analysts endogenously choose coverage, this
selection is unlikely to contaminate my results.
Figure 2.A.1: Histogram of the adjusted earnings forecasts and belief shocks
at initial coverage
Panel A: Adjusted earnings forecasts Panel B: Value of belief shocks
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C Effects of lagged belief shocks
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that analysts make less accurate forecasts,
which is more in line with the noise channel than with the information channel.
However, it may be that the information that analysts acquire takes time to
influence focal firms, which will help analysts make forecasts in the future.
In this case, even though their current forecasts are inaccurate (which is the
analysts’ mistake for using the information too soon), their future forecasts
would be more accurate. To test this possibility, I examine the effects of lagged
belief shocks on analysts’ EPS forecasts and forecast errors in Table 2.A.2. As
is shown, lagged belief shocks have no significant impact on analysts’ forecasts
or their accuracy, which is inconsistent with the notion that analysts learn




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D Overreaction to past forecast errors
The results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 imply that negative shocks to other indus-
tries lead analysts to make incorrectly pessimistic forecasts for the focal firms.
However, one potential concern is that this finding is driven by analysts who
overreact to their past forecast errors. To illustrate the idea, recall the exam-
ple from the introduction. If the negative shock to the transportation industry
also disrupts the earnings of COAL Corp in the previous quarters (2011Q1-
Q2), which surprises analyst A who is overoptimistic about COAL (assuming
analyst B is not surprised), analyst A might overreact to this individual sig-
nal and become subsequently overpessimistic about COAL in 2011Q3. This
overcorrection could for example happen if analyst A forms a diagnostic ex-
pectation (Bordalo et al., 2018a,b). As a result, his forecast is negatively
correlated with his previous forecast errors, and my results might capture this
correlation.
To address this concern, I additionally control for the forecast errors from
the previous fiscal quarters in column (5) from Table 2.2 and in column (2)
from Table 2.3. The results are shown in Table 2.A.3. The estimated coeffi-
cients on two- to four-quarter lagged forecast errors are significantly negative,
implying that analysts make more pessimistic forecasts if their forecasts for the
previous fiscal quarters were overoptimistic, and vice versa. This is consistent
with the implications of diagnostic expectations that analysts overcorrect their
past forecast errors. Nevertheless, after controlling for overcorrection to past
forecast errors, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients on
belief shock variables are virtually the same as those in the baseline, which






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Many investors rely on analysts’ forecasts to evaluate firms’ future prospects
and make trading decisions. The vast literature on the market effects of ana-
lysts has found abundant evidence that their forecasts are able to move stock
prices (Kothari, So, and Verdi, 2016a). However, different analysts often make
divergent forecasts for the same firm at the same time, which may lead in-
vestors to hold heterogeneous beliefs about the company and, consequently,
may affect the coverage company’s trading activities and price movements.
Given my findings in the previous chapter that analysts overgeneralize news
from other coverage industries and therefore make different forecasts, I hy-
pothesize that this heuristic potentially have more profound effects on financial
markets. In this chapter, I first develop a simple trading model to demonstrate
how analyst belief shocks could induce trading volume and return volatility,
and I then provide empirical evidence conforming to the theoretical predic-
tions.
To derive testable predictions, I follow Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel
and Pearson (1995) to set up a three-period trading model featuring investors
1This chapter is also based on Renjie (2019).
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with heterogeneous beliefs. Each type of investors update their beliefs about
the underlying risky asset using the forecast of a particular analyst. The key
friction is that, while analysts’ forecasts may be biased (e.g., because of the
belief shocks from the other coverage industries), investors do not discover
the potential bias in the forecasts. The model generates two main predictions.
First, because dispersion in analyst belief shocks induces analyst disagreement,
it leads to higher trading volume and larger return volatility. Second, negative
belief shocks lead analysts to make overly pessimistic forecasts, which could
exert downward price pressure and induce underpricing.
Next, I take these predictions to the data and find strong evidence con-
sistent with both predictions. First, I find that after controlling for com-
mon trends and time-invariant firm heterogeneity, a one-standard-deviation
increase in belief shock dispersion translates to 6.4%-8.1% more analyst dis-
agreement about the coverage firms and is associated with up to 13.7% higher
daily trading volume and 5.9% larger stock return volatility. Analyst overgen-
eralization seems to aggravate information asymmetries and increase uncer-
tainty about firms’ fundamentals.
Second, firms with more analysts affected by negative belief shocks expe-
rience a significant decline in stock price prior to earnings announcements.
This downward price pressure effect is more pronounced for firms with ex-
ante higher information asymmetry. Consistent with the underpricing pre-
diction that the price will reverse when the true information is revealed, a
one-standard-deviation more negative belief shocks is associated with a 63.6%
higher positive reversal upon earnings announcements relative to the average,
conditional on the direction and magnitude of earnings surprises. This effect is
about 84.5% for firms with high information asymmetry. These findings imply
that analyst overgeneralization has substantial effects on financial markets.
This chapter contributes to the literature that links analyst disagreement
to heterogeneous beliefs. Models based on investors with heterogeneous be-
liefs can explain asset price movements and trading volumes (e.g., Miller, 1977;
Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and Pearson, 1995). However, it is difficult to
directly measure investors’ beliefs. In light of analysts’ role as key information
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intermediaries, many empirical studies, such as Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina
(2002), use the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts as an empirical proxy
for differences in opinions among investors and study how analyst disagree-
ment affects asset returns and trading activities. By exploiting the effect of
overgeneralization on analyst disagreement, I put forward a new channel that
helps explain both the cross-sectional and time-series variation in analyst dis-
agreement.
In addition, my results provide some implications for other strands of litera-
ture. Overgeneralization leads analysts to adjust expectations for reasons that
are not related to the fundamental values of focal firms. In other words, this
heuristic essentially provides an exogenous variation in analyst disagreement,
which can be used to construct instrumental variables for analyst or investor
disagreement at the firm level. Moreover, as the resulting analyst disagree-
ment in turn affects stock trading volumes and return volatilities, and the
resulting analyst overpessimism leads to temporary underpricing, one could
also use overgeneralization to construct instrumental variables for trading ac-
tivities, volatilities, and mispricing. This insight could be useful for future
empirical research on related topics.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops
testable predictions. Section 3.3 discusses the data and empirical methodol-
ogy, and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 provides the empirical
evidence, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setup
This simple model follows the setups in Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel
and Pearson (1995): (1) There is a risk-free asset with a zero rate of return and
a risky security with an uncertain payoff R. (2) There are three time periods:
at time 1, investors form prior beliefs about the value of the asset; at time 2,
they update their beliefs according to analyst forecasts; at time 3, the value
of the risky asset is realized and investors consume their wealth. (3) There
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is a continuum of investors with total mass equal to 1 who maximize mean-
variance utility Ei,t[Wi] − λ2Vari,t[Wi], where λ is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. (4) There are two types of investors indexed by i = 1, 2. They
hold prior beliefs that the return R is normally distributed with mean Ri and
precision h0 = σ
−2
0 . A proportion α of traders are of type 1; without loss of
generality, they are assumed to initially be more optimistic, R1 > R2. (5)
There are two analysts indexed by i = 1, 2 who make forecasts for the risky
asset R. Their forecasts are given by Fi = R+εi, where εi ∼ N (si, hε = σ−2ε ).
The distribution of the noise term εi models that analyst i overgeneralizes
signal si from other coverage industries and makes a biased forecast for R. (6)
At time 2, type i investors update their beliefs using analyst i’s forecast Fi.
However, they trust that analysts make an unbiased forecast for R. That is,
they believe that εi ∼ N (0, hε = σ−2ε ).
There are two key frictions in this model. The first is that type i investors
update their beliefs in a naive Bayesian manner and only update beliefs with
respect to analyst i’s forecast, without taking into account the information
sets and actions of others. In particular, at time 1, they do not take into
account that at time 2, prices will be “incorrect” because the other agents
are updating their beliefs and trading using different information based on
the other analyst’s forecast. This assumption is standard in the literature of
speculative trading and information diffusion (see Kandel and Pearson (1995),
Hong and Stein (1999), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)). The second friction
is that investors are unable to debias analyst research and are therefore misled
by biased forecasts, which is supported by my results on the market reaction
to analysts’ revisions. Studies such as Jackson (2005) also provide empirical
evidence supporting this assumption.
3.2.2 Equilibrium prices and investor holdings






Vari,t [qi,1(R− P1)] .
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of the risky asset. The aggregate demands are Q1,1(P1) = αq1,1(P1) and
Q2,1(P1) = (1 − α)q2,1(P1). The market-clearing condition implies that the
total demand from all investors must equal the zero net supply. Hence, the
market-clearing equilibrium price is
P ∗1 = αR1 + (1− α)R2 = R, (3.1)








where ∆R = R1 − R2. By assumption, ∆R > 0, and the aggregate supply of
securities is zero. The second type holds a short position, q∗2,1 < 0.
After analysts 1 and 2 have issued forecasts F1 and F2 at time 2, investors
update their beliefs and resume trading. The posterior beliefs of type i in-








Similar to period 1, optimizing investors’ mean-variance preferences and using















(h0∆R+ hε∆F ), (3.4)
where ∆F = F1 − F2 = ε1 − ε2 = ∆ε indicates the difference in analysts’
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opinions.
3.2.3 Prediction regarding asset volatility and trading volume
When I compare the prices in (3.1) and (3.3), it is clear that the absolute price
change between the two periods depends linearly on the new information of
analyst forecasts and on the difference in analysts’ opinions,
|∆P ∗| = |P ∗2 − P ∗1 | =
hε
h0 + hε




Because a larger fluctuation of the security price is equivalent to higher return
volatility, a greater dispersion in analyst opinions could increase the return
volatility of the underlying risky asset.
Furthermore, calculating the change in the equilibrium holdings in (3.2)
and (3.4), I can show that it is also linearly related to the difference in analyst
forecasts. Because the net supply of the risky security is assumed to be zero,
the absolute value of the change in the aggregate holdings by type i investors
represents the trading volume in period 2. Taking the absolute difference
between (3.2) and (3.4) yields the trading volume




The trading volume is therefore also proportional to the difference in analysts’
opinions.
Recall that analyst i’s bias εi is assumed to depend on her belief shock
si from the other coverage industries, namely, E[εi] = si, which implies that
E[|∆ε|] = |s1 − s2| = |∆s|. This leads to an important empirical prediction
regarding the impact of analysts’ belief shocks on financial markets.
Prediction. If a larger dispersion in analysts’ belief shocks amplifies the dif-
ference in analysts’ forecasts, it would increase the return volatility and trading
volume of the risky security.
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3.2.4 Prediction regarding asset returns
In this simple model, the expected price change depends on the new informa-
tion in analysts’ forecasts F1,2, which are essentially determined by the signals
(or belief shocks) s1,2:
E[P ∗2 − P ∗1 ] =
hε
h0 + hε
E[F −R] = hε
h0 + hε
s, (3.7)
where s = αs1 + (1 − α)s2. If an analyst overgeneralizes negative shocks to
her other coverage industries and becomes pessimistic about this risky asset
such that s < 0, the expected return on this asset would be negative.
Moreover, the expected difference between P ∗2 and the asset’s fundamental
value R is given by
E[P ∗2 −R] =
h0
h0 + hε
(R− E[R]) + hε
h0 + hε
s. (3.8)
This expression implies that analysts’ belief shocks would lead the price to
shift away from the asset’s fundamental value. Connecting to my key empir-
ical findings above, because analysts lower their expectations based on noise
from other coverage industries, their incorrect pessimism would induce under-
pricing of the security. This underpricing would be more pronounced if more
analysts are affected by larger negative belief shocks. Of course, when the
true information is revealed to the market (realization of R in the model or
firms’ announcement of actual earnings in practice), the price will reverse to
the fundamental value.
Prediction. If some analysts receive negative belief shocks, their incorrect
pessimism would exert downward price pressure and induce underpricing.
3.3 Data and methodology
I start with the dataset of the previous chapter and aggregate the data at
the firm × fiscal year-quarter level, resulting in 191,724 observations. The
main dependent variables of interest are analyst disagreement, stock trading
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Table 3.1: Data sample and summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables. Belief shock disper-
sion is computed as the standard deviation of the belief shock variables within each
pair of firm j and fiscal quarter t. All negative shocks is computed as the sum of
the absolute value of negative belief shocks of all analysts covering firm j for fiscal
quarter t, scaled by the total number of analysts. Forecast dispersion is the standard
deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast,
for each firm j and fiscal quarter t. Trading volume is the logarithm of the average
daily stock trading volume over the estimation window, which is the period between
the earnings announcement date of fiscal quarter t and that of fiscal quarter t − 1.
Realized volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the estimation
window. Implied volatility is the average daily volatility implied from options with a
maturity of 30 days in the OptionMetrics database, over the estimation window. EA
CAR(-1, 1) is the market-adjusted cumulative announcement return over the window
(-1, 1) around the firm’s earnings announcement date. Earnings surprise is the actual
earnings minus the consensus, divided by the absolute value of the consensus. Market
value of equity (mln) is the product of total shares outstanding and fiscal quarter
closing stock price. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the current
market value of equity. ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by
the lagged total assets. Number of analysts is number of analysts following a partic-
ular stock in a given quarter. Multi-industry is the fraction of analysts who follow
multiple Fama-French 49 industries for each stock and quarter. Market volatility is
average daily VIX index in the same period as when realized and implied volatility
are computed. All dependent and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels.
N Mean St. Dev.
Percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Dependent variables
Forecast dispersion 191,726 0.25 0.62 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.50
Trading volume 191,726 12.62 1.64 10.51 11.53 12.61 13.69 14.74
Realized volatility 191,726 0.45 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.38 0.55 0.79
Implied volatility 134,541 0.48 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.42 0.58 0.78
EA CAR(-1, 1) (in %) 191,014 0.22 7.92 -8.71 -3.54 0.18 4.11 9.32
Main explanatory variable
Belief shock dispersion 191,726 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
All negative shocks 191,726 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08
Control variables
Earnings surprise 191,726 -0.05 1.10 -0.45 -0.08 0.03 0.14 0.43
MVE (in $mln) 191,726 4,196 9,309 141 328 937 3,031 10,362
Book-to-market 191,313 0.65 0.29 0.26 0.42 0.65 0.88 1.00
ROA 176,015 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07
Number of analysts 191,726 11.72 8.55 4 5 9 16 24
% Multi-industry 191,726 0.55 0.25 0.21 0.37 0.55 0.71 0.86
Market volatility 191,726 20.05 7.57 12.61 14.40 18.44 23.71 28.68
volumes, return volatilities, and earnings announcement returns. I follow Di-
ether et al. (2002) to compute analyst forecast dispersion as the standard
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deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean EPS fore-
cast. To measure trading activities, I compute the trading volume as the
logarithm of the average daily stock trading volume over the period between
the earnings announcement date of fiscal quarter t and that of fiscal quarter
t− 1. I choose this estimation window because its length is similar across dif-
ferent firms or within the same firm, and it does not depend on when analysts
issue forecasts. Nonetheless, my results are robust to alternative estimation
windows. Moreover, I compute realized volatility is the standard deviation of
daily stock returns in the estimation window. For robustness checks, I also
consider options-implied volatility, which is the average daily volatility implied
from options with a maturity of 30 days in the OptionMetrics database within
the estimation window.
To estimate the effect of the dispersion in analysts’ belief shocks, I compute
the standard deviation of the belief shocks within each pair of firm and fiscal
quarter, i.e.,
BSDispersionjt =
√√√√ 1||Ijt|| − 1 ∑
i∈Ijt
(BSijt −BSjt)2,
where Ijt denotes the set of analysts who make forecast for firm j and fiscal
quarter t, and the belief shock variable is computed as in the previous chapter.
Note that the belief shock dispersion variable corresponds to |∆s| in the model.
Thus, I can use the following specification to test the first prediction regarding
asset volatility and trading volume:
yjt = αj + αq(t) + β × BSDispersionjt + γ′Xjt + ηjt, (3.9)
where q(t) indexes the calendar quarter in which the firm announces its real-
ized earnings of fiscal quarter t, yjt is the dependent variable of interest (fore-
cast dispersion, trading volume, and return volatility), and Xjt is a vector of
firm-specific control variables such as size and profitability. All of the spec-
ifications include firm fixed effects to capture unobserved but time-invariant
heterogeneity across firms and calendar quarter fixed effects to account for
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common trends. If dispersion in belief shocks leads to more analyst disagree-
ment, higher trading volumes, and larger return volatilities, the coefficient
estimates of β are expected to positive and significant.
To test the prediction regarding stock returns, I first identify and aggregate
analysts’ belief shocks that could potentially exert downward price pressure.
For each firm-quarter observation, I construct a variable called all negative
shocks, which is computed as the sum of the absolute value of negative belief
shocks (i.e., |BS−ijt|) of all of the analysts covering firm j in fiscal year-quarter
t and then scaled by the total number of analysts, i.e.,






Note that this measure is an empirical proxy for s in Equations (3.7) and
(3.8). Using this measure, I can estimate the following specification to test
the second prediction
EACARjt = αj + αgq(t) + β ×All negative shockjt + γ′Xjt + ηjt, (3.10)
where the dependent variable is the three-day (-1, +1) market-adjusted cumu-
lative abnormal return around the focal firm’s earnings announcement date.
I use industry × calendar year-quarter fixed effects (αgq(t)) to control for any
common trend within the same industries, such as the spillover effects from
other industries. Moreover, I explicitly control for the direct market impact
of earnings surprises to distinguish reversals because of better than expected
earnings performance, from reversals that correct underpricing driven by an-
alysts’ unmerited pessimism. If more analysts are affected by negative belief
shocks and consequently make overly pessimistic forecasts that exert down-
ward price pressure, the announcement return would be more positive as the
true information (actual earnings) is revealed. In other words, the theoretical
prediction implies a positive and significant β.
Summary statistics and detailed explanations of all used variables are
shown in Table 3.1. All dependent and control variables are winsorized at
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the 1% and 99% levels. The standard errors in all regression specifications are
two-way clustered by firm and calendar quarter to account for autocorrelations
within the firm and correlations within the quarter.
3.4 Empirical evidence
This section presents the empirical results. I first confirm that dispersion in
belief shocks significantly increases analyst disagreement. I show that disper-
sion in belief shocks also leads to larger trading volumes and higher return
volatilities, which is in line with the first theoretical prediction. Furthermore,
I document that negative belief shocks induce temporary underpricing, by
showing that stocks with more analysts affected by negative belief shocks ex-
perience significantly negative returns in days before earnings announcements
but reverse upwards significantly more around the announcements.
3.4.1 Disagreement, trading volume, and volatility
Table 3.2 shows the results of my test of whether analysts’ opinions diverge
more when dispersion in belief shocks increases. I regress quarterly analyst
forecast dispersion on the dispersion of analyst belief shocks. I include time-
varying firm-characteristics as control variables in column (2), and add calen-
dar year-quarter fixed effects in column (3) and firm fixed effects in column (4).
The estimated coefficients on the belief shock dispersion variable are positive
and significant in all specifications (with t-values between 2.718 and 6.375).
The statistical significance also increases with the strictness of the regression
specifications. In economic terms, a one-standard-deviation increase in belief
shock dispersion (0.042) is associated with a 6.4% (= 0.376× 0.042/0.246) to
8.1% (= 0.474× 0.042/0.246) increase in analyst disagreement, relative to the
average level of analyst disagreement (0.246).
Table 3.3 shows the results of my test of whether dispersion in belief
shocks leads to higher trading volumes. I regress the logarithm of average
daily trading volumes on the dispersion of analyst belief shocks. I include
time-varying firm-characteristics as control variables in column (2), and add
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Table 3.2: Impact on analyst disagreement
This table reports the effect of the dispersion in analyst belief shocks on the differ-
ences of opinions about the stock. The dependent variable is the forecast dispersion,
which is computed as the standard deviation of EPS forecasts scaled by the absolute
value of the mean EPS forecast for each stock j and fiscal year-quarter t. In column
(3), I additionally include the calendar quarter fixed effects. Calendar quarter is the
year-quarter in which the firm announces its realized earnings of fiscal year-quarter
t. In column (4), I further tighten the identification to include the firm fixed effects.
Detailed definitions of the control variables are presented in Table 3.1. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the firm and calendar year-quarter level, and the cor-
responding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Forecast Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belief Shock Dispersion 0.442∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(2.718) (2.849) (5.503) (6.375)
Log(MVE) −0.055∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(−19.920) (−22.547) (−7.586)
Book-to-Market 0.146∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(8.960) (8.801) (7.686)
ROA −0.839∗∗∗ −0.712∗∗∗ −0.667∗∗∗
(−13.574) (−11.693) (−6.482)
Number of analysts 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(9.019) (9.405) (6.406)
% Multi-Industry 0.098∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(8.884) (3.275) (10.565)
Year-Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 191,726 175,665 175,665 175,665
R2 0.001 0.031 0.038 0.210
calendar year-quarter fixed effects in column (3) and firm fixed effects in col-
umn (4). The estimated coefficients on the belief shock dispersion variable are
again positive and significant in all specifications (with t-values between 3.592
and 7.682). The statistical significance is again the highest when the regres-
sion specification is tightest. As for the economic magnitude, a one-standard-
deviation increase in belief shock dispersion (0.042) is associated with a 3.1%
(= exp(0.725 × 0.042) − 1) to 13.7% (= exp(3.049 × 0.042) − 1) increase in
trading volumes.
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Table 3.3: Impact on trading volumes
This table reports the effects of the dispersion in analyst belief shocks on stocks’
trading volumes. The dependent variable is the trading volume, which is computed
as the logarithm of the average daily stock trading volume within the corresponding
investigation window. In column (3), I additionally include the calendar quarter fixed
effects. Calendar quarter is the year-quarter in which the firm announces its realized
earnings of fiscal year-quarter t. In column (4), I further tighten the identification to
include the firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of the control variables are presented
in Table 3.1. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and calendar year-
quarter level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Trading Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belief Shock Dispersion 3.049∗∗∗ 1.943∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(3.998) (3.592) (6.161) (7.682)
Log(MVE) 0.563∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(38.873) (33.268) (18.615)
Book-to-Market −0.201∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.050
(−2.467) (−5.549) (−0.974)
ROA −3.318∗∗∗ −2.318∗∗∗ 0.220∗
(−16.418) (−11.751) (1.855)
Number of analysts 0.056∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(21.408) (28.889) (15.594)
% Multi-Industry 0.566∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(10.548) (6.005) (7.288)
Year-Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 191,726 175,665 175,665 175,665
R2 0.006 0.612 0.662 0.899
I further test the prediction by estimating the effect of analyst belief shocks
on firms’ return volatility. I measure volatility in two ways: (1) realized equity
volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the period between
the announcement date of the first analyst forecast and the announcement date
of the actual earnings for each firm j and fiscal year-quarter t, and then an-
nualized; and (2) option-implied volatility from OptionMetrics averaged over
the same period. Both measures are widely used in the literature.
As shown in Table 3.4, firms’ volatility significantly increases with the
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Table 3.4: Impact on stock volatility
This table reports the effects of the dispersion in analyst belief shocks on the stock
volatility. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the realized equity volatility
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns within the corresponding investigation
window. In columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the option-implied volatility
from Option Metrics averaged over the corresponding investigation window. Both
measures are annualized. In column (2) and (5), I additionally include the calendar
quarter fixed effects. Calendar quarter is the year-quarter in which the firm announces
its realized earnings of fiscal year-quarter t. In column (3) and (6), I further tighten
the identification to include the firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of the control
variables are presented in Table 3.1. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
firm and calendar year-quarter level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Realized Volatility Implied Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Belief Shock Dispersion 0.630∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(6.047) (7.167) (7.702) (5.723) (7.271) (8.097)
Log(MVE) −0.075∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(−28.430) (−27.936) (−6.435) (−40.026) (−39.322) (−10.155)
Book-to-Market −0.186∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(−9.374) (−8.957) (−5.041) (−8.214) (−8.638) (−3.654)
ROA −0.825∗∗∗ −0.801∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗ −1.074∗∗∗ −1.019∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗
(−13.378) (−14.428) (−7.590) (−18.697) (−19.645) (−8.346)
Number of analysts 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
(12.127) (13.085) (2.706) (10.815) (11.524) (0.924)
% Multi-Industry 0.042∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007 0.014∗∗∗
(4.633) (10.938) (11.308) (0.204) (1.139) (4.027)
Market volatility 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(18.753) (8.907) (11.616) (26.702) (4.980) (8.578)
Year-Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 175,665 175,665 175,665 123,695 123,695 123,695
R2 0.426 0.478 0.679 0.513 0.564 0.771
dispersion in analyst belief shocks. In addition to firm characteristics, I con-
trol for market volatility to capture the macroeconomic uncertainty around the
same period. The coefficient estimate of belief shock dispersion remains highly
significant across all specifications. Economically, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in belief shock dispersion is associated with a 2.5% (= 0.269×0.042/0.445)
to 5.9% (= 0.630×0.042/0.445) increase in stock volatility, relative to the mean
(0.445). The results are almost identical for option-implied volatility, as shown
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in columns (4)-(6).
Overall, my empirical findings strongly support the first theoretical pre-
diction. A larger dispersion in analysts’ belief shocks increases the difference
in analysts’ forecasts, and as a result, it leads to more trading activities and
larger return volatilities.
3.4.2 Underpricing
Figure 3.1 illustrates the impact of negative belief shocks on stock prices. Panel
A uses the full sample, while Panel B focuses on the subsample of high-tech
firms. I split the sample into two groups: one group of firm-quarters with some
analysts affected by negative belief shocks (i.e., all negative shocks > 0), and
the other group with no analysts affected by negative belief shocks (i.e., all
negative shocks = 0). Defining firms’ quarterly earnings announcement date
as day 0, I trace out the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns from
30 days before to 30 days after earnings announcements. I choose 30 trading
days before to start because most analysts begin to issue their forecasts by
then.
As shown in Panel A of Figure 3.1, there is a significant decline in stock
price until five days before the earnings announcement for firms affected by
negative analysts’ belief shocks. This downward price pressure induces an
average price decline of 36 basis points. There is no such pattern for the
other group of firms. The price pressure effect is more stark in Panel B.
High-tech firms affected by negative analysts’ belief shocks decline by as much
as 95 basis points, likely due to the severe information asymmetry in those
industries. Investors rely more on analysts’ opinions to trade those firms. I
also find a stronger reversal around the earnings announcement for affected
firms, which is consistent with the underpricing prediction.
In Table 3.5, I formally test the underpricing prediction by reestimat-
ing Equation (3.9) with the three-day (-1, +1) market-adjusted cumulative
abnormal return around the focal firm’s earnings announcement date as the
dependent variable. If more analysts are affected by negative belief shocks and










































































































































































































































































































pressure, the announcement return would be more positive because the true
information (actual earnings) is revealed. To identify the impact of analysts’
negative belief shocks on stock returns, I use industry × calendar year-quarter
fixed effects to control for any common trend within the same industries, such
as the spillover effects from other industries. Moreover, I explicitly control for
the direct market impact of earnings surprises to distinguish reversals because
of better than expected earnings performance, from reversals that correct un-
derpricing driven by analysts’ unmerited pessimism.
Table 3.5: Impact of negative belief shocks on earnings announcement returns
This table shows the impact of analysts’ negative belief shocks on the focal firms’
stock returns. The dependent variable is the three-day (-1, +1) market-adjusted
cumulative abnormal return around the firm’s earnings announcement date. The
estimation results in columns (1) and (2) are based on the full sample. Column (2)
includes the firm and industry × calendar year-quarter fixed effects. In columns (3) to
(5), I focus on the subsample of high-tech firms (code 3 in Fama-French 5 industries),
small firms (with below-median market capitalization), and young firms (with IPO
in less than 10 years), respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
firm and calendar year-quarter level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
EA CAR(-1, 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All negative shocks 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗
(2.699) (1.864) (2.029) (1.954) (1.748)
Earnings surprise 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(33.948) (32.181) (19.537) (27.964) (19.879)
Log(MVE) −0.001∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(−2.512) (−14.442) (−8.769) (−13.032) (−11.863)
Book-to-Market 0.004∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(2.290) (−2.503) (−1.994) (−3.221) (−2.650)
ROA 0.038∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(5.798) (−5.166) (−2.469) (−4.663) (−4.224)
Number of analysts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(1.511) (0.158) (0.768) (1.149) (−1.153)
% Multi-Industry −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.008∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.005∗∗
(−2.877) (−1.565) (−2.283) (−1.786) (−2.047)
Industry × Year-Quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full High Tech Small Young
Observations 175,031 175,031 36,547 88,501 65,964
R2 0.030 0.131 0.131 0.170 0.194
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Conforming to the underpricing prediction, more analysts’ negative belief
shocks lead to larger price reversals around earnings announcements, as the
coefficient on the all negative shock variable is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in column (1). In the three days around the announcement, firms
gain an additional 14 basis points (=0.023×0.06) when the analysts experi-
ence a one-standard-deviation increase in the negative belief shocks, which is
an economically large effect of 63.6% relative to the average announcement
return of 22 basis points. After controlling for the industry × quarter and
firm fixed effects, the coefficient of interest decreases only slightly and remains
significant, which corresponds to a gain of 11 basis points (=0.019×0.06) and
therefore a 50% decrease. To test whether this pricing pressure effect is more
pronounced for firms with a higher level of information asymmetry, I focus
on the following three subsamples: high-tech industries in column (3), small
firms (with below-median market capitalization) in column (4), and young
firms (with IPO in less than 10 years) in column (5). Relative to the average
earnings announcement returns in those subsamples, the estimated coefficient
of interest suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in analysts’ negative
belief shocks corresponds to a larger reversal of 92.7% (=0.034×0.06/0.0022)
for high-tech firms, 72.6% (=0.023×0.06/0.0019) for small firms, and 86.7%
(=0.026×0.06/0.0018) for young firms. These findings confirm my conjecture
that the underpricing effect is more pronounced for firms with high information
asymmetry.
Taken together, the findings in this section demonstrate that analyst over-
generalization has more profound impacts on the financial market. When there
is a greater dispersion in the shocks that analysts overgeneralize, their opin-
ions about the firm’s future prospects will differ more, inducing significantly
higher trading volumes and larger return volatilities. Analyst overgeneral-
ization seems to aggravate information asymmetries and increase uncertainty
about firms’ fundamentals. Furthermore, when more analysts are affected by
negative belief shocks, their resulting pessimism will exert significant down-
ward price pressure and lead to temporary underpricing. This price pressure
effect is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter exploits my earlier finding that analysts overgeneralize bad news
from other coverage industries and therefore make overly pessimistic forecasts
for their focal firms. I use a simple trading model to demonstrate that, as many
investors rely on analysts’ opinions to evaluate companies and make trading
decisions, this heuristic could have profound impacts on financial markets. I
further provide strong empirical evidence supporting the theoretical predic-
tions. Specifically, overgeneralization leads to larger differences in analysts’
opinions about firms’ future prospects and significantly increases stocks’ trad-
ing volume and return volatility, aggravating information asymmetries and
uncertainties about the underlying assets. Analysts’ pessimism resulting from
overgeneralization exerts downward price pressure and induces temporary un-
derpricing.
Note that because overgeneralization leads analysts to lower expectations
because of other industries’ performance, which is arguably unrelated to focal
firms’ fundamentals, this heuristic essentially provides exogenous variation in
analysts’ disagreement and pessimism. This insight can be used to empirically





Director Attention and Firm
Value1
4.1 Introduction
A board of directors has the critical task of actively monitoring and advising
top management to ensure that managers act in the best interest of sharehold-
ers. However, a directorship is rarely a full-time job. Most directors have other
occupations besides their directorships, and many directors serve on multiple
boards. Given that attention is not unlimited for directors, we ask whether
directors can perform their job effectively when their other occupations require
more of their attention. Consequently, we examine how a firm performs when
its directors are distracted.
Understanding the effect of director attention is important to evaluate
the role and importance of corporate boards in corporate governance. In
this article, we empirically study the impact of limited director attention on
firm value by exploiting exogenous variation in board monitoring intensity
from time-variation in how directors allocate attention across their multiple
directorships. We find strong evidence that distracted directors spend less
time and energy monitoring and advising managers, which gives managers the
1This chapter is based on Renjie and Verwijmeren (2019), which is forthcoming in the
Financial Management.
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freedom to shirk at the expense of shareholders, leading to significant declines
in firm value.
We rely on a sample of RiskMetrics firms with at least one outside director
with multiple directorships in the Directors database. These directors need to
distribute attention among their directorships, which provides a useful setting
to study the effect of director attention. As we cannot observe exactly how
much time or energy directors spend on each of their directorships, our iden-
tification strategy is designed to exploit plausibly exogenous variation in how
directors allocate attention across their directorships. The following simple
thought experiment illustrates our approach. Consider two otherwise identi-
cal companies in a given industry and quarter. Director A sits on the board
of Company 1 and on the board of firm “Car” in a totally different industry,
namely the automotive industry. Director B sits on the board of Company
2 and on another firm that is not in the automotive industry. Suppose now
that there is an attention-grabbing event in the automotive industry. Assum-
ing limited attention, Director A may shift attention towards firm Car and
away from Company 1. The manager at Company 1 consequently receives
less monitoring and advice. In contrast, Company 2 is not affected because
its director is not related to the automotive industry. Thus, we can identify
the impact of variation in director attention on firm value by studying the
changes in the value of Company 1 relative to that of Company 2 around the
time Director A is distracted. We assign each firm to 1 of the 49 Fama-French
industries and use unusually high volatility as the main empirical proxy for
attention-grabbing events. This identification approach is similar to that of
Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017), who study how investor attention matters
for corporate actions. We confirm that our results are robust to alternative
industry classifications and various definitions of industry shocks.
To obtain insights into whether our measure of director distraction cap-
tures director attention, we start by examining board meeting attendance.
We show that directors identified by our measure as distracted attend fewer
board meetings. We next employ our measure of director distraction to study
how director attention affects firm value. By examining Tobin’s Q and stock
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performance, we find that firm value drops significantly when board members
are distracted. A deviation from no distraction to the average distraction level
is associated with a 3.3% discount in quarterly Tobin’s Q, and a stock market
underperformance of about 72 basis points per quarter. This effect is partic-
ularly strong when the distracted directors sit on an important committee of
the board.
Because our tests either include industry × quarter fixed effects or ex-
plicitly control for industry-specific shocks, our results are not likely driven
by spillovers among industries or by any variable that does not vary across
firms within a given industry and quarter, such as the state of the business
cycle. Firm-level time-invariant unobservable factors cannot drive our findings
as we also include firm fixed effects. Even with these fixed effects, a remain-
ing concern relates to the endogeneous nature of director appointments. For
instance, Company 1 chooses Director A who also holds a directorship in the
automotive industry, because the business of Company 1 is related to the au-
tomotive industry, whereas this is not the case for Company 2. Thus, shocks
in the automotive industry spill over to Company 1 but not to Company 2.
To alleviate this concern, we provide three pieces of evidence.
First, we argue that the direction of the spillover effect is mostly con-
sistent with the direction of the industry shock. If the automotive industry
experiences a positive shock, the effect spilled over to Company 1 is likely also
positive, and vice versa for negative shocks. We therefore examine distraction
from positive and negative industry shocks separately. We show that direc-
tor distraction from both positive and negative shocks in the other industry
affects firm value negatively. Secondly, because shocks in the oil and gas in-
dustry can especially have spillover effects (also in the opposite direction), we
modify our distraction measure by removing shocks from oil and gas indus-
tries and we repeat our analysis on a subsample excluding firms operating in
those industries. The results remain similar to the baseline results. Thirdly,
we ensure that attention shocks come from unrelated industries by excluding
shocks from supplier or customer industries, and again we find similar results,
which supports the validity of our distraction measure in capturing director
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attention shocks rather than industry relatedness or comovement.
This article is related to a large literature on the busyness of corporate
boards. Some studies find that directors with multiple directorships are too
busy to effectively monitor management (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999;
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel, 2014), whereas
other researchers find that busyness reflects the quality of directors, which
could provide advantages for firms (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990;
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003;
Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013). Our study disentangles busyness from
director ability and provides evidence on the costs of having busy directors.
A noteworthy feature of our identification strategy is that we consider the
source of distraction at the industry-level rather than at the firm level.2 A
firm-level approach has the crucial disadvantage that firm-level shocks could
be driven by the ability of the director. For instance, if we classify Director A
as distracted when company Car does poorly (as opposed to the whole auto-
motive industry), then this could simply be attributed to the bad performance
of Director A. Director A might be a poor monitor and/or adviser, and as a
result, both company Car and Company 1 can underperform at the same time.
Considering industry-level shocks mitigates this concern as it is less likely that
the ability of one single director affects the performance of the whole industry.
Falato et al. (2014) uses 220 sudden deaths of directors at interlocked firms
as exogenous shocks to directors’ workload. Hauser (2018) uses mergers of in-
terlocked firms as exogenous shocks to directors’ outside appointments. How-
ever, loss of outside appointments could not only decrease directors’ workload
but also reduces potentially valuable business relationships of the director.
Director deaths at interlocked firms introduces uncertainty about the effect of
director replacement. Our identification scheme study director attention while
isolating the potential confounding effects resulting from changes to directors’
appointments or to interlocked firms’ boards. Masulis and Zhang (2018) stud-
ies director attention by examining distraction events such as director illness
2Stein and Zhao (2016) examines director distraction when the source of distraction is at
the firm level.
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and winning prestigious awards, and finds that these distracting events lower
firm value. It is comforting to know that the effects of these specific shocks
are in line with the effects of the more general source of director distraction
that we study.
We further investigate multiple potential channels to better understand
the negative effect of director distraction on firm value. When managers re-
ceive less monitoring from distracted directors, two potential agency problems
might be exacerbated: (1) managers engage in empire building and make
value-destroying investment decisions (Jensen, 1986), or (2) managers become
more passive and “enjoy a quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Al-
ternatively, managers might miss important advice or have to delay making
important decisions when it is difficult to schedule meetings with distracted
directors for discussion and approval. We find that firms with more director
distraction invest significantly less and are less likely to announce takeovers.
These changes are due to firms with distracted directors being less active
rather than the directors postponing their investments. The acquisitions that
are still being announced when directors are distracted do not destroy value.
Overall, our article addresses the question of which agency problem the board
of directors mitigates. Our results suggest that an effective board of directors
prevents managers from shirking or “enjoying a quiet life” at the expense of
shareholder value.
Our findings support policies restricting the number of directorships that
an individual is allowed to have. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
we do not argue that directors with multiple directorships are detrimental
to shareholder value per se, as firms could benefit from the knowledge and
network of a director who serves on multiple boards (Field et al., 2013). The
results in our study provide insights into the trade-off of having busy directors
by isolating their busyness from their quality and highlighting that firm value
drops when directors are distracted because management becomes less active.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses
our data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 explains how we con-
struct our director distraction measure. Section 4.4 presents the main findings
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and Section 5 examines alternative explanations. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
We combine data from different sources. Director data are drawn from the
RiskMetrics Directors database for 1996-2017. This database contains director-
firm-year observations for S&P 1500 firms. We use board affiliation informa-
tion from RiskMetrics to classify directors who are not employed by the firm as
outside directors. We focus on outside directors because distraction by other
directorships is less likely for inside directors, given their employment with the
firm.3 We exclude firms that have no outside director with multiple director-
ships. We match the director data with the Compustat Quarterly database to
obtain financial reporting data and exclude regulated financial (SICH 6000-
6999) and utility (SICH 4900-4999) firms.4 We obtain stock price data from
CRSP, merger activity data from SDC, and Fama-French 49 industry portfolio
returns from Kenneth R. French’s data library. We assign each firm to 1 of
the 49 Fama-French industries based on its historical SIC code (Compustat
data item SICH). When the SICH code is not available, we follow Fama and
French (2008) and use the CRSP SIC code (data item HSICCD).
The final director-level dataset consists of 71,752 director-firm-year obser-
vations, with 5,875 individual outside directors with multiple directorships.
The final firm-level dataset consists of 75,595 firm-quarter observations, with
2,264 unique firms. Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the variables we
use in our study. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in the
Appendix. All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% level
at both tails. Our summary statistics are comparable to previous studies using
data from RiskMetrics and Compustat (e.g., Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).
3Nonetheless, we examine changes in firm value when executive directors are distracted
in Section 4.3.
4Our results are robust to these exclusions.
92
Table 4.1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the main sample of firm-quarter observations
of RiskMetrics firms with at least one director with multiple directorships over the
period 1996-2017. A complete list of variable definitions is provided in Table 4.A.1.
All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Dependent variables
Tobin’s Q 75,331 2.08 1.59 0.47 1.26 1.66 2.36 81.28
CAPEX 75,569 0.69 0.18 -1.39 0.59 0.70 0.79 2.37
Acquisition 75,595 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1
Diversifying merger 75,595 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Main independent variable
Distraction 75,595 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 6.00
Distraction (> 0) 26,982 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.25 6.00
Alternative measures
Distraction (positive) 75,595 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.58
Distraction (negative) 75,595 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00
Control variables
Total assets ($million) 75,595 8,632 26,293 124 745 1,927 5,927 347,564
Log(Assets) 75,595 7.71 1.50 2.64 6.61 7.56 8.69 12.06
Cash flow 71,928 0.04 0.03 -0.42 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.17
Board size 75,595 8.17 2.85 1 7 8 10 20
Board busyness 75,595 0.43 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.40 0.58 1
Board independence 75,595 0.74 0.18 0 0.67 0.78 0.88 1
Institutional ownership 72,031 0.76 0.20 0 0.65 0.79 0.90 1
Investor distraction 68,690 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.47
Merger deal variables
CAR(-2, +2) 5,527 0.00 0.06 -0.41 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.48
Relative deal size 5,529 0.14 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.13 11.17
Diversifying deal 5,529 0.52 0.60 0 0 0 1 1
Private target 5,529 0.74 0.44 0 0 1 1 1
Cross-border 5,529 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1
Director-level variables
Attended < 75% board 71,752 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0 1
meetings
Director distraction 71,752 0.55 0.92 0 0 0 1 10.77
Industry Shock 71,752 0.23 0.43 0 0 0 0.32 4
Director age 71,702 61.88 7.16 28 57 62 67 95
Log(Director age) 71,702 4.13 0.12 3.37 4.06 4.14 4.22 4.56
Independent 71,752 0.91 0.28 0 1 1 1 1
Number of directorships 71,752 2.64 0.95 2 2 2 3 10
Yearly Tobin’s Q 68,290 1.91 1.29 0.46 1.18 1.53 2.16 55.73
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4.3 Measuring director distraction
4.3.1 Variable construction
The main variable of interest is a firm-level proxy for how much the board
members of a given firm f are distracted in a given quarter t. The intuition
behind the Distraction measure is the same as in Kempf et al. (2017), who
examine investor distraction. A given director i of firm f is more likely to
be distracted if there is an attention-grabbing event in a different industry in
which director i has an additional directorship. For each outside director i at





wfijt × 1(Indjt 6= Indft)× IS
Indjt
t , (4.1)
where Bit\{f} denotes the set of firms other than firm f where director i serves
on the board in quarter t; the weight wijt captures how much director i cares
about firm j; 1(Indjt 6= Indft) indicates whether firm j is in the same Fama-
French 49 industry as firm f , thereby allowing only shocks from industries
other than that of firm f ; and IS
Indjt
t captures whether distracting events
occur in the industry of firm j in quarter t. We now explain the construction
of wfijt and IS
Indjt
t in more detail.
The construction of the weight wfijt is motivated by Masulis and Mobbs
(2014), who find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their
time and energy unequally based on the directorship’s relative prestige, which
they establish by firms’ market value of equity. Consequently, we calculate
the weight of each directorship (firm) j for director i with respect to the focal








where mvejt and mveft denote the market value of equity of firm j and that
of focal firm f in fiscal quarter t. This weighting-scheme accounts for the
notion that directors are less likely to be distracted from their relatively more
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prestigious directorships, as it assigns a lower weight to attention shocks from
directorships that are less important than the focal firm (i.e., when mvejt <
mveft).
Figure 4.1: Attention-grabbing industries
This figure shows which Fama-French 49 industries are identified as attention-
grabbing in each quarter from 1996 to 2017.
The term IS
Indjt
t is used to identify whether the industry of firm j is
attention-grabbing in quarter t. Because attention-grabbing industry shocks
are mostly associated with extreme returns and more news releases, which
result in high volatility, we define IS
Indjt
t as an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the Fama-French 49 industry of firm j has abnormally high volatility relative
to the other Fama-French 49 industries in a given quarter t. More specifically,






where σlt is the daily volatility of the Fama-French 49 industry portfolio l
in quarter t and σ̂lt is the daily volatility of the FF49-industry portfolio l
over the window [-283, -31] relative to the start of quarter t. Then, we sort
the 49 abnormal volatilities and consider an industry attention-grabbing if
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its abnormal volatility is positive and in the top-10 (top-quintile) across 49
industries. Note that if in a given quarter none of the industries has positive
∆σlt, there would be no attention-grabbing industry in that quarter.
5 Figure
4.1 shows which Fama-French 49 industries are considered attention-grabbing
over time. For example, IT-related industries (Fama-French industries 34-
38) are attention-grabbing during 2000-2002, and finance-related industries
(Fama-French industries 45-48) are attention-grabbing during 2008-2010. The
dispersed pattern of industry shocks in Figure 4.1 mitigates the concern that
our findings are driven by a small number of industries.
To compute firm-level distraction, we aggregate the director-firm-level dis-
traction scores across all directors with outside directorships. Specifically, for







where Bft denotes the set of outside directors with multiple directorships on
the board of firm f in quarter t, and Nft denotes the total number of outside
directors. However, Ljungqvist and Raff (2018) highlights that directors can
strategically substitute or complement co-directors’ monitoring effort, which
suggests that a larger number of outside directors does not necessarily mitigate
the effects of distracted directors. To test whether the scaling is warranted
in our setting, in untabulated analysis we have confirmed that firms in our
sample with more outside directors are affected significantly less by individual
board member distraction. These results are available upon request from the
authors.
An important advantage of Distractionft is that this firm-level director
distraction measure is by construction not related to the fundamentals of the
firm of interest (firm f), as only shocks from industries other than that of firm
f are used to construct Dift. Thus, Distractionft is a plausible candidate
for identifying exogenous shocks to the attention of firm f ’s board members.
5Using different estimation windows to compute σ̂lt, or different cutpoints such as top-5
industries (instead of top-10) yield qualitatively similar results. We have also used Fama-
French 12 industries and 2-digit SIC industries and obtained similar results.
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Another advantage of our identification strategy is that we consider the source
of distraction at the industry-level rather than at the firm-level. Exploiting
the source of distraction at the firm-level has a crucial disadvantage in that
firm-level shocks could be driven by the ability of the director. Considering
industry-level shocks alleviates this concern as it is less likely that the ability
of one single director affects the performance of the whole industry.
The summary statistics of Distractionft are presented in Table 4.1. As
is shown, this variable is right-skewed and equals 0 in more than 50% of the
sample. Therefore, we also report the distribution of the distraction variable
with only positive values. About 36% of the firms in our sample have had
distracted directors. Henceforth, we use 0.21 as the mean distraction level
and refer to distraction values above this mean as high distraction, which
involve 11% of our sample.
4.3.2 Board meeting attendance of distracted directors
To test whether our distraction measure captures director distraction, we study
the board attendance rate of directors with multiple directorships in Table 4.2.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one if a director
has attended less than 75% of the board meetings of a particular firm in
a given fiscal year. The idea is that directors are less likely to miss board
meetings when they allocate more time and effort to the firm. We aggregate
the explanatory variables accordingly as the dummy dependent variable is
at the director-firm-year level. Control variables include the directorship’s
relative ranking, the number of outside directorships, and other director and
firm characteristics. Summary statistics of these variables are presented in
Table 4.1.
We start by validating whether our industry shocks can identify attention
shocks. In Columns (1-2) of Table 4.2, we test whether directors are less likely
to miss board meetings at a firm when its industry experiences abnormally
higher volatility. To this end, we aggregate the quarterly industry shocks over
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Table 4.2: Director distraction and attendance of board meetings
This table reports the effect of director distraction on directors’ attendance of board
meetings. We use director-firm-year level observations from RiskMetrics and consider
only directors with more than one board seat in a given year. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable indicating whether a director has attended less than 75% of the
firm’s board meetings in a given year. In columns (2), (3), and (6-7), the model is
estimated with year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. In column (5), the model is
estimated with firm × year fixed effects. In column (6), the indicator variable 1(Nega-
tive shock) equals one if at least one of the director’s attention-grabbing directorships
is hit by a negative industry shock. In column (7), the indicator variable 1(Executive
in shocked industry) equals one if the director is an executive in one of the attention-
grabbing industries. In all of the specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the
director-level. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Attended < 75% board meetings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Industry shock -0.003*** -0.002*
(-2.776) (-1.656)
Director distraction 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001*
(3.022) (2.300) (2.166) (1.896) (1.742)
Director distraction × 0.003*
1(Negative shock) (1.776)
Director distraction × 0.003
1(Executive in shocked (1.575)
industry)
High ranked directorship -0.003** -0.006*** -0.002* -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.006***
(-2.281) (-4.864) (-1.866) (-4.513) (-2.331) (-4.175) (-4.557)
Log(Director age) -0.051*** -0.086 -0.051*** -0.085 -0.023*** -0.085 -0.086
(-8.048) (-1.267) (-8.008) (-1.261) (-2.831) (-1.254) (-1.277)
Independent -0.012*** 0.005 -0.012*** 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.005
(-3.766) (1.446) (-3.764) (1.449) (-1.364) (1.432) (1.455)
Number of directorships 0.005*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(4.221) (1.334) (3.800) (0.936) (1.201) (0.732) (0.949)
Board size -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 0.000
(-5.541) (1.140) (-5.410) (1.248) (-2.546) (1.309) (1.241)
Yearly Tobin’s Q -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.403) (-0.574) (-0.406) (-0.569) (-0.255) (-0.526) (-0.557)
Observations 68,244 68,244 68,244 68,244 68,244 68,244 68,244
Adj. R2 0.007 0.092 0.007 0.092 0.053 0.092 0.092
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Director FE No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm × year FE No No No No Yes No No









t is defined as in Section 4.3.1. We find that directors are signif-
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icantly less likely to miss board meetings at firms in shocked industries. The
coefficient of Industry shocks implies that an interquartile increase in director-
firm-level distraction (0.32) is associated with a 4.8% (= −0.003× 0.32/0.02)
lower probability that the director attended less than 75% of board meet-
ings. This result provides evidence that our industry shock measure captures
attention-grabbing events that could distract directors.
When directors of Company 1 are distracted and shift time and energy to
their other directorships, they might miss more board meetings of Company 1.
In Columns (3-5) of Table 4.2, we test whether directors miss more meetings
at the focal firms when they are distracted according to our measure. We sum
up the director-firm-level distraction in (4.1) over all four quarters in fiscal
year y for a particular firm f to obtain a director-firm-year-level measure for
director distraction, that is,
∑
t∈yDift.
We show in Column (3) that the coefficient of Director distraction is both
statistically and economically significant. An interquartile increase in director-
firm-level distraction is associated with a 10% (= 0.002×1/0.02) higher prob-
ability that the director attended less than 75% of board meetings. The effect
remains significant after controlling for director and year fixed effects in Col-
umn (4), where we exploit the variation at the director level over time. In
Column (5), we further exploit the variation at the firm-year level, which
isolates the source of variation that comes from pairwise comparisons of dis-
tracted directors versus non-distracted directors within the same firm in the
same year. The coefficient of Director distraction remains virtually unaffected.
Although our baseline measure captures attention-grabbing industry shocks
by means of abnormally higher volatilities, it does not distinguish between the
distraction effect of positive and negative shocks. It may be that, condition-
ing on abnormally high volatility, industries with positive performance shocks
demand less director attention than those with negative performance shocks,
because directors may face higher pressure when the firm experiences an unfa-
vorable industry shock. We test this possibility in Column (6) of Table 4.2 by
estimating whether negative industry shocks lead directors to miss more board
meetings than positive industry shocks do. We interact the yearly director dis-
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traction measure with a dummy variable indicating whether at least one of the
attention-grabbing industries is hit by a negative shock (i.e. with negative cu-
mulative stock returns). As shown, the baseline director distraction measure
remains positive and significant, as does the coefficient on the interaction term.
When the attention-grabbing industry experiences a negative shock, the af-
fected directors are about 20% (= 0.004 × 1/0.02) more likely to attend less
than 75% of board meetings. This finding suggests that although industries
with both positive and negative shocks are attention-grabbing, industries with
negative shocks are significantly more likely to distract directors.
Finally, we show in column (7) of Table 4.2 that our finding is driven not
only by directors who are executives in the attention-grabbing industries. We
interact our baseline director distraction measure with a dummy variable that
equals one if the director is an executive in one of the attention-grabbing in-
dustries. The positive coefficient on the interaction term falls slightly short of
statistical significance (t = 1.575) and thus provides only weak evidence that
directors are more likely to miss board meetings of the focal firms if they are
executives in the shocked industries as opposed to non-executives. The coef-
ficient of the baseline measure remains positive and significant, which implies
that directors with both executive and non-executive positions in attention-
grabbing industries are distracted.
A noteworthy limitation of this analysis is that we cannot observe the
exact continuous board attendance rate of directors. For example, a meeting
attendance drop from 100% to 80% (or from 70% to 20%) is substantial but
does not show up in the used binary dependent variable. Because there is
relatively little variation in the attendance dummy, we cannot fully exploit the
effect of director distraction. Accordingly, we are probably underestimating
the effect of distraction on director board meeting attendance. Overall, the
results in Table 4.2 suggest that our measure of distraction adequately captures
variation in the attention of directors. Directors attend fewer board meetings
when they are distracted, but they are less likely to miss meetings of firms in
the attention-grabbing industries, consistent with the notion that distracted
directors spend less time and energy monitoring and advising management.
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4.4 Empirical findings
This section presents our main findings. First, we test the effect of director dis-
traction on firm value. Then, we investigate three potential channels through
which director attention could affect firm value. We conclude by studying the
distraction effect for different groups of directors.
4.4.1 Main results
In Table 4.3 we examine the effect of director distraction on firm value using
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. In Columns (1) and (2), the model is
estimated with quarter and firm fixed effects, which exploits variation within
firms. In Column (3) and (4), the model is estimated with industry × quarter
fixed effects and firm fixed effects, which additionally controls for any unob-
served time-varying industry heterogeneity. Including the industry × quarter
fixed effects also mitigates the concern that our findings simply result from
spillovers among industries. In Columns (2) and (4), we also include firm and
board characteristics.
The coefficient of Distraction in Columns (1) - (4) of Table 4.3 is between
-0.237 and -0.338 (depending on the model specification) and is statistically
highly significant, suggesting that firm value decreases significantly when di-
rectors are distracted. This negative impact of director distraction is also
economically meaningful. A deviation from no distraction to the average dis-
traction level of 0.205 is associated with a 2.3% (= −0.237 ∗ 0.205/2.084) to
3.3% (= −0.338 ∗ 0.205/2.084) discount in Tobin’s Q on a quarterly basis.
Figure 4.2 plots the difference in quarterly Tobin’s Q between firms with
no director distraction and firms with high director distraction over time. The
negative impact of director distraction on firm value is relatively consistent
over time.
A potential concern relates to the endogenous nature of director choice.
The choice of Company 1 to employ Director A, who also holds a directorship
in the automotive industry, is endogenous. The possibility exists that the
business of Company 1 is more related to the automotive industry than other
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Table 4.3: Effects of director distraction on firm value
This table reports the effect of director distraction on firm value. The dependent
variable is Tobin’s Q. In column (1) and (2), the model is estimated with quarter
and firm fixed effects, which exploits variation within firms. In column (3) and (4),
the model is estimated with industry × quarter fixed effects and firm fixed effects.
In column (5) and (6), we consider distraction from positive and negative industry
shocks separately. Distraction (positive) uses only industries with abnormally high
volatility and positive performance as attention-grabbing industries; distraction (neg-
ative) uses only industries with abnormally high volatility with negative performance
as attention-grabbing industries. We use Fama-French 49 industries. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the firm level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.338*** -0.250*** -0.271*** -0.237***





Log(Assets) -0.372*** -0.380*** -0.380*** -0.380***
(-9.491) (-10.849) (-10.849) (-10.860)
Board size 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.010
(1.299) (0.935) (0.981) (0.954)
Board busyness -0.179 -0.074 -0.098 -0.089
(-1.571) (-0.711) (-0.921) (-0.862)
Board independence -0.153 -0.189 -0.187 -0.186
(-1.126) (-1.403) (-1.390) (-1.386)
Observations 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331
Adj. R2 0.499 0.516 0.574 0.589 0.589 0.589
Quarter FE Yes Yes No No No No
Industry × quarter FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
companies are. Thus, shocks in the automotive industry would spillover and
affect Company 1 more than other companies. To address this concern, we
test the prediction of this endogeneity story that the direction of the spillover
effect is likely consistent with the direction of the industry shock. That is, if
the automotive industry experiences a positive shock, the effect spilled over to
Company 1 is also expected to be positive, leading to an increase in firm value
of Company 1. Conversely, if the automotive industry experiences a negative
shock, the effect spilled over to Company 1 should be negative, leading to a
decrease in firm value of Company 1.
102
Figure 4.2: Tobin’s Q and director distraction over time
The graph plots the average quarterly Tobin’s Q for the subgroups of no
distraction (Distractionft = 0) firms and high distraction (Distractionft >
0.205) firms over time. ***, **, and * denote significance of the difference
between the no distraction and high distraction groups at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
In column (5) and (6) of Table 4.3, we consider distraction from positive
and negative industry shocks separately and reestimate their effect on firm
value. Distraction (positive) uses industries with abnormally high volatility
and positive performance as attention-grabbing industries, whereas Distrac-
tion (negative) uses only industries with abnormally high volatility with neg-
ative performance as attention-grabbing industries. The results indicate that
the coefficients of the distraction measures have the same negative sign as in
the other columns. The magnitude and t-statistics are smaller than those in
the other columns, but this is not surprising as each measure ignores many
other attention-grabbing cases and sends many firms with high distraction to
the control group of firms with low or no distraction. The stronger effect of
negative industry shocks is consistent with the idea that industries with nega-
tive shocks demand more director attention because directors may face higher
pressure when the firm experiences an unfavorable industry shock. The finding
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that positive shocks to other industries also affect firm value negatively is con-
sistent with our conjecture of director distraction and mitigates the concern
that our results are merely driven by industry spillover effects.
In Table 4.4, we test whether our results are robust to alternative defi-
nitions of industry shocks and alternative industry classifications. Our main
director distraction measure is based on stock volatility to measure attention-
grabbing events. Instead, we now follow Barber and Odean (2008) and Kempf
et al. (2017) and consider three alternative ways of capturing salient events in a
given industry: extreme positive returns, extreme negative returns, and trad-
ing volume. For extreme positive (negative) returns, we consider the industries
with quarterly stock performance in the top (bottom) decile as attention-
grabbing industries. For trading volume, we define the attention-grabbing
industries as those that have the highest (top-decile) abnormal trading vol-
ume with respect to the previous three quarters, computed as in Equation
(4.3). We reestimate the specification from Column (3) and (4) of Table 4.3
using these three alternative definitions of industry shocks. As shown in Table
4.4, using these alternative measures of attention-grabbing events produces
results qualitatively similar to our results based on stock volatility.
In addition, we consider three alternative industry classifications, namely
the Fama-French 12 industries, the SICH two-digit industries, and the Hoberg
and Phillips (2016) 10-K text-based 50-industry classifications (FIC-50).6 For
each industry classification, we measure director distraction using our baseline
volatility-based definition of industry shocks as well as the three alternative
definitions. Table 4.4 shows that using the alternative industry classifications
leads to results qualitatively similar to our results based on the Fama-French
49 industry classification. Overall, the findings in Table 4.4 indicate that our
results are not driven by a particular industry classification and are robust to
alternative measures of attention-grabbing events within a given industry.
An alternative way to test the effect of director distraction on firm value is
to investigate how director attention directly affects firms’ stock returns. To
6For each two-digit SIC/FIC-50 industry, we construct a value-weighted portfolio using
all firms in the CRSP database with a stock price above $5 in that industry.
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Table 4.4: Robustness: alternative industry classifications and definitions of
industry shocks
In this table we test the robustness of our results for alternative definitions of industry
shocks and industry classifications. Besides our baseline volatility-based distraction
measure, we use the alternative definitions of industry shocks. Extreme positive
(negative) returns consider the industries with quarterly stock performance in the
top (bottom) decile as attention-grabbing industries. Trading volume defines the
attention-grabbing industries to be those with the highest (in top-decile) abnormal
trading volume with respect to the previous three quarters, computed similarly as
in Eq. (4.3). We use the Fama-French 12 industries, the two-digit SICH code in-
dustries, and the Hoberg and Phillips (2016) 10-K text-based 50 industries (FIC-50)
as alternative industry classifications. For each two-digit SICH/FIC-50 industry, we
construct a value-weighted portfolio using all CRSP stocks priced above 5 dollars
within that industry. We reestimate the specifications from columns (3) and (4) of
Table 4.3. For brevity we only report the coefficient of the distraction variables and
suppress those of control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Industry classification Industry shocks
Firm FE & Industry ×
FE with controlsquarter FE
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Baseline:
Fama-French 49 Volatility -0.271*** (-5.332) -0.237*** (-5.387)
Alternatives:
Fama-French 49 Extreme positive returns -0.207*** (-3.340) -0.167*** (-3.091)
Fama-French 49 Extreme negative returns -0.346*** (-3.530) -0.318*** (-3.511)
Fama-French 49 Trading volume -0.224** (-2.353) -0.196** (-2.197)
Fama-French 12 Volatility -0.216*** (-3.740) -0.174*** (-3.118)
Fama-French 12 Extreme positive returns -0.181*** (-3.583) -0.223*** (-2.802)
Fama-French 12 Extreme negative returns -0.273*** (-5.646) -0.268*** (-4.772)
Fama-French 12 Trading volume -0.224** (-2.118) -0.152 (-1.558)
Two-digit SIC Volatility -0.313*** (-6.075) -0.267*** (-5.259)
Two-digit SIC Extreme positive returns -0.247*** (-2.981) -0.206** (-2.498)
Two-digit SIC Extreme negative returns -0.359*** (-5.405) -0.199** (-2.328)
Two-digit SIC Trading volume -0.276*** (-3.262) -0.231*** (-3.188)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 Volatility -0.405*** (-5.739) -0.334*** (-5.278)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 Extreme positive returns -0.408*** (-5.055) -0.370*** (-4.630)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 Extreme negative returns -0.422*** (-5.756) -0.366*** (-5.083)
Hoberg-Phillips 50 Trading volume -0.434*** (-6.166) -0.367*** (-5.105)
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this end, we use monthly stock price data from CRSP and match each month
to the corresponding fiscal quarter. Table 4.5 reports the effect of director
distraction on firms’ stock market performance. In Columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is the cumulative excess stock returns (Ret − Rf ) over
each fiscal quarter. We also use two risk-adjusted stock returns as alternative
measures in Columns (3)-(6), namely, market-adjusted returns (CAPM) and
Fama-French risk-adjusted returns (FF4). To compute the market-adjusted
returns, we first estimate the CAPM to obtain the market beta for each stock
at the beginning of each fiscal quarter using monthly returns data from the
past 36 months, and then compute the abnormal return as the excess return
over the product of the market beta and the market return in a given fiscal
quarter. To compute the Fama-French risk-adjusted returns, we first estimate
the Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model (Rit−Rft = α+βi,mktMKT t+
βi,HMLHMLt + βi,SMBSMB t + βi,UMDUMD t + εit) to obtain factor betas for
each stock in the beginning of each fiscal quarter using monthly returns data of
the past 36 month, and then compute the abnormal return as the excess return
over the product of the factor betas and the four-risk factors in a given fiscal
quarter. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), the model is estimated with quarter fixed
effects, and in Columns (2), (4), and (6), the model is estimated with stock
fixed effects. We further include the returns of the Fama-French 49 industry
portfolios to control for industry × quarter level trends.
Table 4.5 shows that firms’ stock performance is significantly worse when
their directors are distracted. A deviation from no distraction to the average
distraction level of 0.205 leads to an underperformance of about 72 basis points
(= −0.035×0.205) per quarter. The coefficient of director distraction remains
statistically significant when using market-adjusted and Fama-French risk-
adjusted returns.
4.4.2 Potential channels
Our results thus far support the notion that firms have lower valuation when
their board members are distracted. Next, we test which underlying mecha-
nism could explain the negative effects of director distraction. When managers
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Table 4.5: Effects of director distraction on stock performance
This table reports the effect of director distraction on firms’ stock performance.
In column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the cumulative excess stock re-
turns (Ret − Rf ) over each fiscal quarter. We also use two risk-adjusted stock
returns as alternative measures in columns (3-6), namely, the market-adjusted re-
turns, CAR (CAPM), and the Fama-French risk-adjusted returns, CAR (FF4). To
compute the market-adjusted returns, we first estimate the CAPM model to ob-
tain the market beta for each stock in the beginning of each fiscal quarter using
monthly returns data of the past 36 month, and then compute the abnormal re-
turn as the excess return over the product of the market beta and the market
returns in a given fiscal quarter. To compute the Fama-French risk-adjusted re-
turns, we first estimate the Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model (Rit−Rft =
α+ βi,mktMKT t + βi,HMLHMLt + βi,SMBSMB t + βi,UMDUMD t + εit) to obtain the
factor betas for each stock in the beginning of each fiscal quarter using monthly re-
turns data of the past 36 month, and then compute the abnormal return as the excess
return over the product of the factor betas and the four-risk factors in a given fiscal
quarter. In column (1), (3) and (5), the model is estimated with quarter fixed effects,
whereas in the other columns the model is also estimated with stock fixed effects.
Fama-French 49 industry portfolios are included to control for industry × quarter
level trends. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level, and the corresponding
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Cumulative returns CAR (CAPM) CAR (FF4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.024***
(-5.262) (-4.623) (-5.295) (-4.646) (-3.910) (-3.450)
Log(Assets) 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.007***
(0.220) (-4.480) (0.429) (-5.015) (0.414) (-4.629)
Board size 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(10.320) (6.464) (9.254) (4.446) (8.641) (3.986)
Board busyness -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.011** -0.009
(-5.329) (-3.907) (-3.615) (-2.825) (-2.438) (-1.528)
Board independence -0.009* -0.013 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.004
(-1.663) (-1.609) (-0.760) (0.114) (-0.157) (0.485)
Industry returns 0.936*** 0.937*** 0.401*** 0.397*** 0.274*** 0.269***
(66.205) (65.508) (31.874) (31.527) (20.525) (19.978)
Observations 75,005 75,005 75,005 75,005 75,005 75,005
Adj. R2 0.295 0.306 0.073 0.092 0.025 0.043
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
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receive less monitoring from distracted directors, two potential agency prob-
lems might be exacerbated: 1) managers engage in empire building and make
value-destroying investment decisions (Jensen, 1986), or 2) they become more
passive and enjoy a quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Alterna-
tively, director distraction might not lead to higher agency frictions, but 3)
managers might miss important advice or have to delay making important
decisions when it is difficult to schedule meetings with distracted directors for
discussion and approval.
Overinvestment
In Table 4.6 we test whether director distraction leads to managerial empire
building by studying firms’ capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEX) and
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. In Columns (1)-(6), the model is
estimated with industry × quarter fixed effects to control for the effect of
industry-wide investment shocks such as technology innovations and merger
waves. We include standard control variables in investment regressions: firm
size, one-quarter lagged Tobin’s Q, and cash flow, as well as board size, busy-
ness, and independence. In addition, we control for institutional ownership
and institutional investor distraction as in Kempf et al. (2017), which could
affect corporate investment decisions.
As shown in Table 4.6, we find that firms invest significantly less when
directors are distracted. In terms of capital expenditure, a deviation from no
distraction to the average distraction level of 0.205 is associated with a drop of
0.6% (= −0.021 × 0.205/0.690) in firms’ CAPEX. The effect remains similar
and statistically significant when we also control for firm fixed effects.
In addition to capital expenditure, we examine firms’ takeover decisions.
Acquisitions are sizable and non-routine investments in which management
is clearly heavily involved. Because we observe deal announcement dates, we
can also study whether managers decide on the timing of the deal conditional
on the monitoring intensity of the board. Moreover, we can compute deal
announcement returns to examine how the market reacts to the deal, which



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.6, the dependent variable is a dummy
variable that equals one if the firm announces at least one acquisition in the
given fiscal quarter. The estimation results suggest that, when directors are
distracted, firms are not more likely to announce an acquisition and build an
empire. If anything, they are less likely to announce an acquisition.
To test whether managers pursue private benefits when they receive less
monitoring, we test in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.6 whether firms make
more diversifying mergers when directors are distracted. Studies have sug-
gested that managers pursuing private benefits tend to make diversifying
merger deals because these reduce CEO human capital risk and offer a chance
to venture into industries that are considered fashionable, glamorous, or rep-
utable (e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)).
Interestingly, we find that firms are actually (about 5.7%) less likely to an-
nounce diversifying mergers when their directors are distracted.
Even though firms seem to make fewer acquisitions when their directors are
distracted, the deals they make might still be value destroying for shareholders.
Therefore, we examine deal announcement returns. The dependent variables
are the five-day CARs around the deal announcement date in Column (7) and
(8) of Table 4.6. We find that the announcement returns are not negative and
significant conditional on director distraction.
In sum, when directors are distracted, firms do not seem to engage exces-
sively in empire building or to make more value destroying investments. On
the contrary, firms with high director distraction are significantly less active,
have lower capital expenditures, and are less likely to announce an acquisi-
tion. Our findings suggest that distracted directors leave room for managers
to enjoy a quiet life instead of maximizing shareholder value, which leads to a
significant decrease in firm value.
It is also interesting to note that board members seems to play a different
role in monitoring the management than institutional investors do. When
institutional investors are distracted and reduce monitoring, managers tend
to make more value-destroying investments (Kempf et al., 2017). Yet, when
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directors are distracted, managers seem to enjoy a quiet life rather than engage
in empire building. This result is sensible as engaging in empire building when
investors are not distracted is likely to lead to activism, whereas a period of
relative inactivity is less likely to invoke investor activism.
Quiet life versus delayed decision making
Although the results in the prior subsection are more in line with the quiet
life hypothesis (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010)
than with empire building, they do not exclude alternative explanations. Most
notably, it may be that managers simply cannot make or implement important
decisions such as acquisition deals when it is difficult to schedule meetings
with distracted directors for discussion and approval. Managers might also
miss valuable advice from these distracted directors. Thus, managers might
have to delay important decisions until directors are no longer distracted and
can spend more time and energy on the firm.
If managers miss important advice, negative announcement effects might
be expected for takeover deals, but director distraction might simply lead man-
agers to postpone their investments. To examine this possibility, we compare
firms’ activities in times with high director distraction to those in subsequent
times with no director distraction. The delayed decision making hypothesis
predicts that, after a period in which directors are distracted, firms become
significantly more active when director attention returns and managers are
able to get advice and execute pending decisions.
We construct a subsample of firms that have two consecutive quarters
in which director distraction is high (Distractionft > 0) and two subsequent
consecutive quarters when there is no director distraction (Distractionft = 0).
We refer to the quarters with high director distraction as the “before” period
and to the subsequent quarters without distraction as the “after” period. In
Table 4.7, we compare firms’ capital expenditure, takeover decisions, and SEC
filings in the before-period to those in the after-period. Firms’ SEC filings
are retrieved from the Edgar databases. We consider filings of all form types
disclosed by the firms in our sample and use the filing dates to match the filing
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activity to our firm-quarters.
Panel A of Table 4.7 reports the means of the variables of interest in the
before- and after-periods. The difference between the before- and after-periods
is neither statistically nor economically significant for any of the variables.
Panel B uses multivariate regressions, in which we include additional control
variables and time and firm fixed effects. The coefficient on the dummy vari-
able indicating the after-period is not significant in any of the specifications.
The evidence in Table 4.7 is more consistent with the quiet life hypothesis
than with the delayed decision making hypothesis. Nevertheless, our findings
do not rule out an effect from managers not being able to make decisions.
Managers might miss valuable investment opportunities when they cannot
receive approval or advice from distracted directors, and those investment op-
portunities might have been seized by competitors or have evaporated once
director attention returns. Still, it seems unlikely that all investment oppor-
tunities would have evaporated the next period. In addition, when managers
really want to push a value-increasing investment, there are ways to do this,
even when some directors are time-constrained. Overall, our findings suggest
that the loss in firm value when directors are distracted results mostly from
managers enjoying a quiet life when they receive less monitoring from outside
directors.
4.4.3 Effect from different groups of directors
Not every outside directors is assigned the same task. In this subsection, we ex-
amine the impact of distraction from various groups of directors on firm value.
Important tasks that directors can have is to serve on the audit, nomination
and/or compensation committee. We obtain information on committee mem-
bership from RiskMetrics. In Table 4.8, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. In
Columns (1)-(5), we interact the baseline Distraction variable with a dummy
variable indicating whether at least one of the distracted director belongs to
the corresponding group.
In Column (1) of Table 4.8, we show that distraction of committee members
destroys firm value more than that of non-committee members as the corre-
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Table 4.7: Testing the delayed decision making hypothesis
In this table we test the “delayed decision-making” hypothesis. We construct a sub-
sample of firms that have two consecutive quarters in which director distraction is
high (Distractionft > 0) while in the subsequent two consecutive quarters there is no
director distraction (Distractionft = 0). We refer to the quarters with high director
distraction as the “before” period and to the subsequent quarters without distraction
as the “after” period. The variables of interests are capital expenditures, takeover
decisions, and the number of SEC filings. Panel A reports the mean of the variables of
interest in the “before” and “after” period, respectively. Panel B reports the results of
multivariate regressions including time and firm fixed effects. In all regressions, After
is a dummy variable indicating the “after” period. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: difference in means
Distraction Difference
High (before) No (after) After - Before
N Mean Mean t-stat.
CAPEX 4,366 0.68 0.68 -1.01
Acquisition 4,366 0.06 0.05 -0.97
Log(1+Filings) 3,867 2.04 2.11 1.41
Panel B: OLS regressions
CAPEX Acquisition Log(1 + Filings)
(1) (3) (4)
After -0.007 -0.006 0.001
(-1.384) (-0.575) (0.040)
Log(Assets) 0.018 0.012 0.109***
(1.099) (0.840) (2.739)
Board size -0.018*** -0.002 -0.010
(-3.031) (-0.320) (-0.487)
Board busyness -0.065* 0.020 0.179
(-1.668) (0.457) (1.251)
Board independence -0.023 0.005 0.280
(-0.495) (0.120) (1.377)
Lagged Q -0.002 0.018** 0.040
(-0.142) (2.252) (1.633)
Cash flow 0.184 0.067 -0.146
(0.868) (0.467) (-0.287)
Observations 4,028 4,028 3,550
Adj. R2 0.628 0.083 0.713
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.8: Effect of different groups of directors
This table reports how distraction of different groups of directors affects firm value.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. In all columns, the model is estimated with
industry × quarter and firm fixed effects. In columns (1-5), we interact the baseline
distraction variable with a dummy variable whether at least one of the distracted
director belongs to the corresponding group. In column (6), we estimate the effect of
distracted directors who are executives at the focal firm but hold directorships in the
attention-grabbing industries. This distraction measure is computed in the same way
as that of outside directors, that is, first indicate whether the executives hold any other
directorships in the shocked industries, then aggregate individual executive-director’s
distraction at the firm-level, and finally scale by the total number of executives on
the board. In all of the specifications, standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.126* -0.199*** -0.233*** -0.186*** -0.254*** -0.238***
(-1.935) (-4.101) (-4.709) (-3.336) (-4.658) (-5.289)
Distraction × 1(All committee) -0.173*
(-1.956)
Distraction × 1(Audit) -0.104
(-1.106)
Distraction × 1(Nomination) -0.018
(-0.200)
Distraction × 1(Compensation) -0.139*
(-1.917)




Observations 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331 75,331
Adj. R2 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.589
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sponding interaction term is negative and significant. Results in Columns (2)-
(4) show that the stronger effect from committee members is mostly driven by
distracted compensation-committee members. In fact, the distraction of audit-
or nomination-committee members is not more detrimental to firm value than
that of non-committee members. In Column (5), we show that firms do not
suffer more if some of the distracted board members are executives in the
shocked industries. It is important to note that the Distraction variable alone
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remains negative and highly significantly in all columns. This implies that
the reduction in firm value due to distraction is not due to only one type of
director; for example, it applies to directors both with and without executive
roles in shocked industries.
In the final column of Table 4.8, we consider executive directors who hold
directorships in the attention-grabbing industries. Our baseline analysis ex-
cludes executive directors because we assume that attention shocks from other
directorships are less likely to distract directors from their primary occupation
at the focal firms. However, it is possible that our results are partially driven
by those distracted executives. We test this possibility by constructing the
distraction of executive directors in the same way as that of outside directors
and then estimating the effect of their distraction on firm value. As shown
in Column (6), the effect of executive-directors’ distraction is not statistically
significant, and the effect of outside directors’ distraction remains virtually
identical to the baseline estimate in Table 4.3. These results are in line with
executives at focal firms being less likely to get distracted. Furthermore, they
indicate that our baseline results are robust to controlling for the effects of
executive directors’ distraction.
4.4.4 Distraction and directors’ career outcomes
Our findings thus far suggest that temporary director distraction leaves room
for managers to shirk at the expense of shareholders, which leads to a signifi-
cant decline in firm value. It is then natural to ask whether shareholders take
actions to replace distracted directors. As our study focuses on temporary dis-
tractions, this analysis could add to the evidence in Masulis and Zhang (2018)
that more permanently distracted directors are replaced. The estimation re-
sults indicating whether temporarily distracted directors are more likely to be
replaced in the next year are presented in Table 4.9, in which the dependent
variable equals one when a director is replaced the next year.
The coefficients of Director distraction and the interaction effects in Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 4.9 suggest that directors’ temporary distraction because of
other attention-grabbing industries does not significantly increase the proba-
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Table 4.9: Effect of distraction on directors’ career outcomes
This table reports how distraction affects directors’ career outcomes. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the director is replaced in the next
year. Control variables are the same as those in Table 4.2. In Columns (4) and
(5), we distinguish between whether the departure is voluntary or forced. We clas-
sify a departure as voluntary based on an analysis of news sources around turnover
announcements (Alexandridis et al., Doukas, and Mavis, 2018) and/or if the age of
the director is 72 or older. The remaining cases are classified as forced departures.
Variables are defined in the Appendix. In all of the specifications, standard errors
are clustered at the director level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Replaced in the next year Voluntary Forced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Director distraction -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
(-1.299) (-1.328) (-1.539) (-0.232) (-1.585)
Distraction × ∆Tobin’s Q -0.001
(-0.300)
Distraction × Attended < 75% board meetings 0.019* -0.002 0.022*
(1.698) (-0.897) (1.933)
∆Tobin’s Q -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.002* -0.003*
(-2.899) (-2.301) (-2.903) (-1.952) (-1.933)
Attended < 75% board meetings 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.011* 0.036**
(4.593) (4.593) (2.938) (1.712) (2.421)
Number of directorships -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.008*** -0.015***
(-12.433) (-12.425) (-12.519) (-9.064) (-8.718)
High ranked directorship -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.000 -0.012***
(-4.873) (-4.873) (-4.872) (-0.335) (-4.997)
Log(Director age) 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.329*** -0.104***
(14.412) (14.411) (14.412) (30.382) (-6.443)
Independent -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.014*** -0.035***
(-7.873) (-7.874) (-7.851) (-5.120) (-5.906)
Board size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.000 -0.011***
(-17.973) (-17.968) (-17.974) (0.168) (-18.423)
Observations 59,312 59,312 59,312 59,312 59,312
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.055 0.014
bility of their departure, even if the distraction is associated with lower firm
values (∆Tobin’s Q), unless the distraction is also associated with board meet-
ing absence. In other words, temporarily distracted directors are replaced only
when the distraction leads them to actually miss board meetings. One inter-
pretation of this result is that shareholders take actions to replace distracted
directors once they miss board meetings. An alternative interpretation is that
distracted directors who attend fewer board meetings resign voluntarily to
be able to focus more on other directorships. To obtain some insights into
these different interpretations, we distinguish between voluntary and forced
departures in the last two columns of Table IX. We classify a departure as
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voluntary if an analysis of news sources around the turnover announcement
indicates that the director stepped down voluntarily and/or if the age of the
director upon the departure is above 72 years, which corresponds to the most
common retirement age cited in the policies of S&P 1500 companies.7 We
consider the remaining cases to be more representative of forced departures.
Using this classification, the results in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.9 show
that missed board meetings due to director distraction are significantly related
to forced departures, but not to voluntary departures.
Overall, our findings indicate that shareholders take actions to replace dis-
tracted directors once the distraction becomes observable in terms of board
meeting absence. These findings add to the literature as our measure of dis-
traction is based on temporary attention-grabbing events in unrelated indus-
tries, which are events that shareholders of the focal firm might not easily link
to perceived director distraction (as opposed to, e.g., severe health issues of a
director). In our setting, shareholders may more easily observe the outcome
of distraction rather than the cause.
4.5 Alternative explanations and robustness
The results in the previous section are consistent with our conjecture that
distracted directors spend less time and energy monitoring and advising man-
agers, which leaves room for managers to shirk and leads to decreases in firm
value. In this section, we test and rule out some alternative explanations that
could drive our results.
7See Jon Lukomnik, “Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms,” Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (February 9,
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-trends-at-sp-1500-
firmshttps://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-trends-at-sp-1500-
firms. The classification based on news sources follows the Alexandridis, Doukas, and Mavis
(2018) analysis of CEO replacements. We thank Christos Mavis for his help with this
analysis and for sharing data.
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4.5.1 Endogeneity of director choice and industry relatedness
An alternative explanation that we explained earlier is related to the endo-
geneous nature of director choice. Because directors are likely to sit on the
boards of firms in related industries, our results could be driven by industry
spillover effects (Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang, 2014). Our use of fixed
effects and our finding that both positive and negative shocks in a different
industry decrease firm value in companies with distracted directors reduce this
concern. Nevertheless, one could still argue that a positive shock in one in-
dustry can sometimes create a negative shock to another industry, especially
when those industries are vertically related. For example, positive oil price
shocks are good news for oil producers, but often reduce the profitability of oil
consumer industries. In this section, we add two pieces of evidence to alleviate
the concern of industry spillovers.
First, as noted, oil and gas industries often experience price shocks that are
exogenous to any individual firm, and then spillover to other related industries
with opposite effects (e.g., Lamont, 1997). To rule out the spillover effects from
energy industries, we modify our distraction measure by removing attention
shocks from oil and gas industries, and focus instead on a subsample that
excludes firms operating in oil and gas industries.8 In Table 4.10, we reestimate
the baseline specifications from Columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.3. In addition to
Tobin’s Q, we use CAPEX and Acquisitions as dependent variables. We find
that the coefficient estimates of the adjusted director distraction variables are
similar to the baseline results. The magnitude and t-statistics are smaller
for the distraction variable based on positive and negative attention shocks
separately, which is not surprising as each measure now ignores some attention-
grabbing cases and sends some firms with high distraction to the control group
of firms with low or no distraction.
Second, we disregard shocks from supplier or customer industries. We use
the three-digit NAICS code to classify industries, which allows us to exclude
industries that are likely to have supplier and/or customer relationships. We
detect possible economic links by using the 2007 U.S. Input-Output Tables
8Oil and gas industries correspond to Fama-French 49-industry codes 28-31.
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Table 4.10: Additional tests concerning industry spillovers
This table provides evidence mitigating the concern that our results are merely driven
by industry spillover effects. First, we exclude firms operating in oil or gas industries
and disregard attention shocks from those industries. Second, we use the three-
digit NAICS code as industry classification to exclude industries that are likely to
have supplier or customer relationships. We reestimate the baseline specifications in
column (4-6) from Table 4.3 with Tobin’s Q, CAPEX, and acquisition as dependent
variables in each panel respectively. In all specifications, the model is estimated
with quarter fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Included control variables are the
same as in Table 4.3 and 4.6 respectively, but are suppressed for brevity. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q
Subsample excl. Oil & Gas Unrelated Naics Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.370*** -0.639***
(-5.273) (-3.985)
Distraction (positive) -0.189** -0.169*
(-2.325) (-1.781)
Distraction (negative) -0.283** -0.876***
(-2.268) (-5.783)
Observations 70,722 70,722 70,722 65,359 65,359 65,359
Adj. R2 0.169 0.168 0.168 0.176 0.176 0.176
Panel B: Capital expenditure
CAPEX
Subsample excl. Oil & Gas Unrelated Naics Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.015* -0.039**
(-1.924) (-2.441)
Distraction (positive) -0.024* -0.031*
(-1.733) (-1.692)
Distraction (negative) 0.008 -0.064***
(0.702) (-3.265)
Observations 61,467 61,467 61,467 65,352 65,352 65,352
Adj. R2 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.076 0.076 0.077
Panel C: Acquisitions
Acquisitions
Subsample excl. Oil & Gas Unrelated Naics Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction -0.019** -0.031*
(-2.495) (-1.777)
Distraction (positive) -0.028** -0.048***
(-2.100) (-2.784)
Distraction (negative) -0.012 -0.050***
(-1.067) (-2.611)
Observations 61,474 61,474 61,474 65,359 65,359 65,359
Adj. R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.013 0.013 0.013
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from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which are based on NAICS codes and
provide detailed information about the flows of the goods and services among
industries.9 We define supplier and customer industries as those that have any
flows to or from a given industry.
In Table 4.10, we use director distraction measures constructed based on
NAICS codes and attention shocks from plausibly unrelated industries. The
magnitude and t-statistic of the coefficient estimates are similar to those in
the baseline Tables 4.3 and 4.6, suggesting that our distraction measure does
indeed captures director attention shocks rather than just industry relatedness
and comovement.
4.5.2 Single-segment firms
Another potential concern is that our results are simply driven by the multi-
segment structure of conglomerate firms. Because our sample consists of S&P
1500 firms, which are relatively large, many of the firms in our sample operate
in multiple industries. If company 1 in our thought experiment also operates
in the automotive industry, then shocks in the automotive industry could
directly affect the investment and valuation of company 1, even though the
automotive segment is not the primary segment of company 1 (Lamont, 1997;
Stein, 1997).
To address this concern, we construct a subsample of single-segment firms,
based on the number of segments reported in Compustat’s segment files, and
reestimate the regressions in Tables 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6. If our results are driven
by sub-segments of conglomerate firms, we should find an insignificant effect of
director distraction on the investment and valuation of single-segment firms.
As shown in Table 4.11, the effect of director distraction estimated for
single-segment firms is similar to that in Tables 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6. This similar-
ity applies to both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the effects.
As such, our findings in Section 4.4 do not seem to be driven by the internal
capital market of conglomerate firms.
9We use the 2007 table of commodities by industry valued at purchasers’ prices under
the Use Tables/After Redefinitions/Purchaser Value (https://www.bea.gov/industry/io_
annual.htm).
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Table 4.11: Results of single-segment firms
This table replicates the main results in Table 4.3 and 4.6 for the subsample of single-
segment firms. We identify single-segment firms according to the number of segments
reported in Compustat’s segment files. In all columns, the model is estimated with
quarter fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Included control variables are the same as
in Table 4.3 and 4.6. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and the corre-
sponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Tobin’s Q CAR (CAPM) CAPEX Acquisition Diversifying merger
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distraction -0.262*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.010*
(-3.868) (-3.820) (-3.389) (-2.657) (-1.688)
Log(Assets) -0.386*** -0.011*** -0.003 0.020*** 0.007***
(-7.395) (-4.512) (-1.120) (8.382) (3.523)
Board size 0.015 0.002** -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.001**
(0.918) (2.270) (-8.164) (-3.736) (-2.187)
Board busyness -0.204 -0.000 -0.093*** -0.022** 0.002
(-1.294) (-0.052) (-6.373) (-2.322) (0.400)
Board independence -0.231 0.003 -0.070*** 0.015 0.017**
(-1.169) (0.299) (-4.466) (1.432) (2.371)
Lagged Q 0.001 0.008*** 0.004**
(0.509) (4.200) (2.209)
Cash Flow 0.045 0.054 0.012
(0.420) (1.018) (0.395)
Investor distraction -0.025 -0.070* -0.017
(-1.063) (-1.812) (-0.632)
Institutional ownership 0.032 0.030*** 0.009
(1.636) (2.699) (1.204)
Observations 54,316 43,188 47,666 47,670 47,670
Adj. R2 0.526 0.034 0.065 0.012 0.005
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4.5.3 Robustness checks: Matching
In addition to OLS estimations, we now use the nearest-neighbor and propensity-
score-matching strategies to test the robustness of our results (Abadie and Im-
bens, 2006). More specifically, firms with high director distraction (Distractionft >
0.205) are in the treatment group, and we construct control groups of firms
that have no director distraction (Distractionft = 0) and are matched to the
treated firms along a set of relevant and observable characteristics: firm size
(logarithm of total assets), one-quarter lagged Tobin’s Q, board size, busy
board (ratio), board independence (ratio), fiscal year and quarter, and Fama-
French 49-industry classification. Each observation in the treatment group is
matched with the nearest observation in the control group. Table 4.12 reports
121
the results of the matching analysis.
Table 4.12: Results of nearest-neighbor and propensity-score matching
This table reports the results from nearest-neighbor and propensity-score matching
estimation. The considered outcome variables are Tobin’s Q, capital expenditure
(CAPEX), acquisition likelihood, and diversifying deal likelihood. Firms with high
director distraction (Distractionft > 0.10) are in the treatment group, and we con-
struct control groups of firms that have no director distraction (Distractionft = 0)
and are matched to the treated firms along a set of relevant and observable char-
acteristics: firm size (the logarithm of total assets), one-quarter lagged Tobin’s Q,
board size, busy board (ratio), board independence (ratio), fiscal year and quarter,
and Fama-French 49 industry. Each observation in the treatment group is matched
with the “nearest” observation out of the control group. In Panel A we determine
the “nearest” by using a weighted function of the covariates. In Panel B and C we
determine the “nearest”by using the propensity scores estimated respectively by the
logistic treatment model and probit treatment model. Each panel reports the es-
timated average treatment effect of high director distraction, robust Abadie-Imbens
standard error, corresponding z-statistic, and number of observations in the treatment
group. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Nearest-neighbor matching
Tobin’s Q CAR (CAPM) CAPEX Acquisition Diversiying merger
ATE -0.130*** -0.031*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.001
S.E. 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004
z-stat. -11.418 -6.398 -4.852 -0.955 -0.284
N 8,557 7,678 8,571 8,573 8,573
Panel B: (Logistic) Propensity-score matching
Tobin’s Q CAR (CAPM) CAPEX Acquisition Diversiying merger
ATE -0.060*** -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.006*
S.E. 0.015 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003
z-stat. -4.101 -5.488 -3.284 -2.354 -1.769
N 8,557 7,678 8,571 8,573 8,573
Panel C: (Probit) Propensity-score matching
Tobin’s Q CAR (CAPM) CAPEX Acquisition Diversiying merger
ATE -0.077*** -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.008***
S.E. 0.029 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003
z-stat. -2.659 -4.831 -2.984 -3.457 -2.667
N 8,557 7,678 8,571 8,573 8,573
In Panel A of Table 4.12, we determine the nearest match by using a
weighted function of the covariates. In Panels B and C, we determine the
nearest match by using the propensity scores estimated by a logistic treat-
ment model and probit treatment model, respectively. We find a negative and
significant effect of high director distraction on firms’ valuation and invest-
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ment in all specifications, consistent with our baseline results in Section 4.4.
The matching estimates are even larger in economic magnitude and stronger
in statistical significance.
4.6 Conclusion
Boards of directors are tasked with the critical function of actively monitoring
and advising top management. By exploiting exogenous shocks to unrelated
industries in which directors have additional directorships, we show that di-
rector attention affects board monitoring intensity and thereby firm value as
management becomes less active. Firms with more director distraction invest
significantly less and are less likely to announce takeovers. These changes are
due to firms with distracted directors being less active rather than postpon-
ing their investments. Our results suggest that an effective board of directors
prevents manager from shirking or enjoying a quiet life at the expense of
shareholder value.
Our results contribute to the important and lively debate on the busyness
of directors. Directors holding multiple directorships have to divide their at-
tention, but the reason they are appointed to multiple boards likely reflects
their quality. Isolating busyness from ability is therefore a challenging task,
as having multiple directorships might reflect both. Our study is able to dis-
entangle busyness from director ability and provides evidence on the costs of
having busy directors. As such, our findings render support for policies re-
stricting the number of directorships that an individual is allowed to have.
Indeed, according to the Spencer and Stuart U.S. Board Index 2016 Report,
74% of S&P 500 firms now impose some restrictions on their directors’ ability
to accept other corporate directorships, compared to 27% in 2006.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.A.1: Variable description
Variable Description
Dependent variables
Tobin’s Q Book value of assets plus the market value of common
equity minus the book value of common equity and
deferred taxes divided by total assets:
(atq + (cshoq ∗ prccq)− ceqq)/atq
Cumulative returns Cumulative excess stock returns (Ret−Rf ) over each
fiscal quarter
CAR (CAPM) Cumulative market-adjusted returns
CAR (FF4) Cumulative returns adjusted for the four Fama-French
risk factors
CAPEX Invested capital divided by lagged total assets: icaptq/atqt−1
Acquisition Dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces an
M&A transaction in a given fiscal quarter and zero
otherwise. We consider all majority-stake acquisitions
recorded in SDC between 1996-2014 with a minimum
deal value of $10 million.
Diversifying merger Dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a
cross-industry M&A transaction in a given fiscal quarter
and zero otherwise. A deal is cross-industry if the
bidder and target are not in the same Fama-French
49 industries.
Explanatory variable
Distraction Firm-quarter level director distraction, computed as
described in section 4.3
Distraction (positive) Firm-quarter level director distraction where the attention-
grabbing industries not only have abnormally high volatility,
but also have cumulatively a positive return in that given
quarter
Distraction (negative) Firm-quarter level director distraction where the attention-
grabbing industries not only have abnormally high volatility,
but also have cumulatively a negative return in that given
quarter
Control variables
Total assets ($million) Atq
Log(Assets) Logarithm of total assets: log(atq)
Lagged Q Previous fiscal quarter’s Tobin’s Q
Cash flow Previous fiscal quarter’s operating income before
depreciation divided by lagged total assets: oibdpq/atqt−1
Board size Number of directors
Busy board Number of directors sitting on more than one board
divided by number of directors
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Board independence Number of independent directors divided by number of directors
Institutional ownership Fraction of the firm’s stock owned by institutional investors
as reported in the Thomson Reuters 13f database
Investor distraction Investor distraction computed as in Kempf et al. (2016) with
Fama-French 49 industries; and attention-grabbing industries
are the three best and three worst performing industries
Merger deal level variables
CAR(-2, +2) Five-day cumulative abnormal return around the merger
announcement date with estimation window (-280, -31)
Relative deal size Value of transaction divided by current quarter’s total asset
Diversifying deal Dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer and target are
not in the same two-digit SIC industry
Private target Dummy variable equal to one if the target firm is private
Cross-border Dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer and target are
not in the same country
Director level variables (from RiskMetrics)
Director distraction Director i’s distraction regarding firm f in a given fiscal
year, computed as summing up Dift from Eq. (4.1) over the four
quarters in that fiscal year
Industry Shock Measure of the attention-grabbingness of a given industry,
computed as in Eq. (?)
Attendance < 75% board Dummy variable equal to one if a director has attended
meeting less than 75% of board meetings in a given year:
attend less75 pct
Director age Age
Log(Director age) Logarithm of director age: log(Age)
High ranked directorship Dummy variable equal to one if the market cap of this
directorship is greater than median of the market cap
across all firms that the director serves on the board
Independent Dummy variable equal to one if a director is classified
as independent
Number of directorships Number of total board seats at public companies:
outside public boards+ 1




Labor Markets of Financial
Analysts1
5.1 Introduction
Workers at more prestigious companies have on average better performance.
For example, academic researchers at higher ranked schools have better publi-
cation records; attorneys at larger law firms win more court cases; and sell-side
equity analysts employed by more reputable brokerage houses produce more
accurate earnings forecasts. This performance premium is driven by two dis-
tinct effects: the direct effect (influence) of more resourceful employers and
the selection effect because of sorting in the labor market, which leads more
prestigious companies to hire better candidates. This sorting mechanism cre-
ates an endogeneity problem, making it troublesome to establish and quantify
the causal effect of employers on workers’ performance.
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle those two confounding effects
and quantify their relative importance, by estimating a two-sided matching
model for the labor market of sell-side equity analysts. Analysts play an im-
portant role in gathering, analyzing, and distributing information in financial
markets. Their most important outputs are earnings forecasts, and they have
strong incentives to accurate predictions. Mikhail et al. (1999), Hong et al.
1This chapter is based on Renjie and Xia (2019).
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(2000), and Groysberg et al. (2011) show that more accurate forecasts can
help analysts avoid job termination or move down to less reputable brokerage
firms, especially for early career analysts. Also, Stickel (1992b) and Groysberg
et al. (2011) show that analysts with higher forecast accuracy are more likely
to be nominated as “All-star” analysts and earn higher compensations.
We find that new analysts working for more reputable brokerage firms
are more accurate on average. An analyst employed by the most reputable
brokerage is about 6% more accurate than an analyst employed by a minor
brokerage, which is equivalent to an advantage of 17.5 years of more experience.
This performance premium is driven by the fact that more reputable brokerage
firms have more resources that improve analysts’ forecast accuracy; and by the
sorting effect, whereby more reputable brokerage firms attract more talented
analysts who are intrinsically better forecasters. Using a two-sided matching
model, we are able to quantify the relative importance of these two distinct
effects in determining analyst forecast accuracy. We find that both effects
are important, and the influence effect accounts for 73% of the total effect
of brokerage firms’ reputation on analyst forecast accuracy, while the sorting
effect accounts for the remaining 27%.
More reputable brokerage houses can help their new analysts improve their
forecast accuracy in several ways. First, analysts working for more reputable
brokerage firms may have access to better data and research support (Clement,
1999b). Better information acquisition and analysis in more reputable broker-
age houses lead to more accurate forecast results. Second, analysts working
for more reputable brokerage firms may have better personal communication
opportunities with the management teams they follow (Clement, 1999b), and
private interactions with these teams is one of the most influential factors that
determine forecast accuracy (Soltes, 2013; Brown et al., 2015). On the other
hand, sorting captures the effect that better-talented analysts are attracted to
work for more reputable brokerage firms. Therefore, even if brokerage firms’
reputations have no direct impact on analysts’ forecast performance, we still
observe that analysts who work for higher-reputation brokerage firms perform
better, because the sorting effect leads to positive assortative matching be-
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tween analysts’ individual talent and broker reputation.
Distinguishing these two effects is challenging. Brokerage firm reputation
becomes endogenous when better-talented analysts work for more reputable
firms, and analysts’ talent cannot be perfectly measured. The unobserved part
of talent can then be correlated with the brokerage firm reputation measure,
and the estimated effect of brokerage firm reputation will be biased upward.
This concern increases when we focus on new analysts where the datasets con-
tain little information on their abilities. The ideal solution to this endogeneity
problem is to find an instrumental variable that is independent of an analyst
forecasting ability but correlates with the reputation of the brokerage house
hiring this analyst. However, the matching decision between analysts and bro-
kerage firms are mutual choices, and it is a complicated process involving a
number of observable and unobservable factors. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no valid instrument that solve this endogeneity problem.
To circumvent this endogeneity issue, we take a structural approach similar
to Sorensen (2007a). Our structural model contains two key elements: first,
an outcome equation that models the determinants of analysts forecast ac-
curacy, and second, a one-to-many associative matching model that captures
the sorting process. The matching model explicitly models the matching pro-
cess between analysts and brokerage firms and allows for matching decisions
to interact with different agents. The matching decision interaction between
agents creates difficulties in estimating the model, but also provides a rank
order property that is useful for identification. The rank order property of the
two-sided matching model means that the matching decision depends on the
relative ranking of the agents in the market. Therefore, it not only depends
on the characteristics of the matched agents themselves, but also on the other
agents’ characteristics. If the agents’ characteristics vary exogenously across
the market, we can identify the sorting effect by comparing the performance
difference between analysts of different quality but match with brokerage firms
with similar reputations in different markets. Similarly, we can identify the in-
fluence effect by comparing the performance difference between analysts with
similar quality but match with brokerage firms with different reputation in
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different markets.
The key identification assumption is that agents are exogenously assigned
across different markets. That is, we need sufficient variation across the new
analyst labour market, and agents cannot choose to participate in a particular
market for reasons correlated with the agents’ characteristics in that market.
In this study, we assume the new analyst labour market is segregated by
the calendar year and geographically. A similar identification assumption has
been made in Sorensen (2007a), Park (2013), Chen (2014), Ni and Srinivasan
(2015), Pan (2015), Akkus et al. (2016a), and Xia (2018).
Agents’ matching decisions interact, so any analysis of the likelihood func-
tion of one agent’s decision must also take account of other agents’ decisions.
The likelihood function then becomes a high dimensional integral function
and it cannot be factored out, as in the standard Heckman selection model
(Heckman, 1979) where agents’ decisions are independent of each other. To
overcome the numerical difficulty in solving the high dimensional integration
problem, we apply a Bayesian approach, use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method to transform the integration problem into a simulation prob-
lem to make estimation feasible (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert and Chib,
1993; Sorensen, 2007a; Park, 2013; Chen, 2014; Ni and Srinivasan, 2015).
Our research contributes first to the literature on the determinants of an-
alyst forecast accuracy. Brokerage firm resources have been found to affect
analyst forecast accuracy (Clement, 1999b; Kothari et al., 2016b), and be-
cause of the lack of an identification strategy the sorting effect cannot be
disentangled from the total impact. Therefore, the influence on analyst fore-
cast accuracy is unknown. Our results not only provide the first quantitative
estimates of the influence effect of the brokerage firm but also quantify the
relative importance of the influence and the sorting effects.
Second, our study contributes to the literature that uses the two-sided
matching model to understand the incentives for agents to match and the
outcomes of the matching results in markets such as the venture capital market
(Sorensen, 2007a; Akkus et al., 2016a; Fox et al., 2018), the labour market
(Agarwal, 2015; Pan, 2015; Matveyev, 2016; Xia, 2018), M&A market (Park,
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2013; Akkus et al., 2016b), and the bank lending market (Chen and Song,
2013; Schwert, 2018).
The results of our study also help to understand workers’ incentives to
work for firms with good reputations, and the incentives for firms to maintain
their reputations. Edmans (2011) finds that firms with better reputations
on average perform better, and our results suggest that the reputation of a
firm can serve as a sorting mechanism to attract talented employees, which is
beneficial for firm performance. More talented employees also like to work for
firms with good reputations, because they can scale their ability by using the
firms’ resources and achieve better personal performance and better future
career outcomes. Our results suggest that for new analysts the influencing
effect of firms’ reputations is 2.7 times larger than the sorting effect. Therefore,
the benefit of working for high-reputation firms is particularly attractive for
new workers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 the
data and the OLS estimation results are discussed. Section 5.3 presents the
theoretical and empirical model and a discussion of identification. Section 5.4
provides the estimation results. Section 5.5 concludes the paper.
5.2 Data and OLS results
5.2.1 Sample selection and key variables construction
We consider new hires by brokerage firms in each year between 1996 and 2013.
Our data comes from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
database, which collects analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations for
companies worldwide. We use the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations File to
identify the brokerage firm an analyst is employed by in any given year. The
recommendation file starts in 1992 and expands its coverage over the first
three years, so we only consider analysts who started in 1996 or later. We
classify an analyst as a new hire in a given year if she appears for the first
time in the dataset in that year, and stays at least for the subsequent four
years in the dataset and works for the same brokerage firm. We cross-check
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with the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings History File to further exclude analysts who
had previously issued any earnings forecasts, and those who do not issue any
earnings forecasts at all. We manually search for the location of the brokerage
firms and remove analysts employed by foreign broker houses that do not have
any offices in the U.S. Our final sample consists of 1,815 analysts hired by 284
brokerage firms for the period between 1996 and 2013.
Figure 5.1: Geographic distribution of brokerage firms
This figure shows the distribution of the US brokerage firms’ headquarters in different
states. The darker the states, the more brokerage firms are located in that state.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of brokerage houses from
our sample. We plot the number of firms in each state. A clear geographic
clustering on the demand side can be clearly seen in the Northeastern states
such as NY and MA, accounting for roughly 65% of our sample. We therefore
divide the analysts into 36 markets: Northeastern states and the remaining
states for 18 years from 1996 to 2013. Note that pooling the other states
together into one labour market each year is less of a concern under the as-
sumption that those small local markets are independent of each other.2
2We also run our analysis by considering all of the states as one big market in each year,
and the results are similar.
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To measure an analyst’s performance, we first determine her accuracy for
each stock she covers in a given year and then take the average of this accuracy
across all coverage stocks over the first five years of her tenure. Specifically,
for analyst i making a forecast for the earnings of fiscal year t of stock j, we
compare her absolute forecast error to the average absolute forecast error of
other analysts covering the same stock during the same time period. We rank
all available absolute forecast errors from small to large and assign a rank
that corresponds to the relative ranking of analyst i’s forecast error for that
stock-year. The analyst ranked n-th (where the most accurate/smallest error





The lower the rank, the less accurate the forecast. We aggregate those accuracy












where Jt denotes analyst i’s coverage in year t.
The brokerage firm prestige is measured by using Carter and Manaster
(CM) ranking. This ranking measure is based on the order of brokerage firms
in firms’ IPO tombstone announcements. The measure is developed by Carter
and Manaster (1990) and extended by Carter et al. (1998) and Loughran and
Ritter (2004). We obtain the data from Jay Ritter’s website. On a scale of 0
to 9, the higher the rank, the more prestigious the brokerage firms. Morgan
Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, and CITI Group are
among the most frequently listed in the highest reputable brokerage groups.
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of our variables. The mean
growth rate for these brokerage firms is 14.5% yearly, and the median growth
rate is 5%. These firms are on average expanding through the sample period.
The newly hired analysts on average start by covering slightly more than 8
stocks, less than the average number of stocks covered by analysts in the whole
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I/B/E/S universe, which is 14. Most of the analysts cover less than three
different industries. The financial analyst labour market is racially dominated
by white analysts, based on the surname search, and in our sample we classify
less than 17% as nonwhite analysts. Analysts do not cluster in the main
industries they cover in our sample. The largest group of analysts (27.9% of
the total sample) cover firms in the high-tech industry, followed by 26.8% who
mainly cover industries other than those listed in the table. As over half of
the U.S. publicly listed firms from 1996 to 2013 are classified in the high-tech
industry or in “other” industries, this is a reasonable assumption.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables. We consider an analyst’s
tenure as her first five years working for the brokerage firm. Broker reputation is the
Carter and Manaster rank on a scale of 0 to 9, and the higher the rank the more
prestigious the brokerage firm. Broker growth is the percentage of brokerage size
increase from last year. Number of stocks and industries is the average number of
firms and industries she covers during her tenure. Log(Market Cap) is the logarithm of
the total market cap an analyst covers in her first year. Ethnicity indicates whether
the analyst is white Caucasian or not based on the analyst’s surname (1 indicates
not, 0 indicates yes). To include the focus industry fixed effects, we define industries
using the Fama-French five industry classifications, and classify an analyst’s focus
industry as the one in which she covers the most stocks. We indicate the following
four industries: Consumer (including retails & wholesales), Manufacturing & Energy,
High Tech, and Health. Num IPO indicates the total number of IPOs made in a
specific year.
N Mean St. Dev
Percentile
Variables 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Accuracy 1,815 0.514 0.082 0.410 0.473 0.521 0.567 0.609
Broker Reputation 1,815 5.948 3.112 0 5.001 7.001 8.501 9.001
Broker Growth 1,815 0.145 0.467 -0.181 -0.066 0.052 0.191 0.500
Log(Market Cap) 1,815 8.642 1.974 6.052 7.260 8.602 10.119 11.952
Num Stocks 1,815 8.511 4.780 2.6 5 8 11.4 14.75
Num Industries 1,815 1.683 0.771 1 1 1.5 2 2.8
Ethnicity 1,815 0.167 0.374 0 0 0 0 1
I.Consumers 1,815 0.141 0.348 0 0 0 0 1
I.Manuf & Energy 1,815 0.196 0.397 0 0 0 0 1
I.High Tech 1,815 0.279 0.449 0 0 0 1 1
I.Health 1,815 0.116 0.320 0 0 0 0 1
Num IPO 1,815 168.047 148.497 38 60 131 223 384
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5.2.2 Naive OLS results
In this subsection, we document a robust and strong empirical correlation be-
tween brokerage reputation and newly hired analysts’ forecast performances.
According to the level of brokerage prestige, we first plot the correlation be-
tween brokerage prestige and analyst performance.
Figure 5.2: Relation between brokerage firm prestige and analyst performance
This figure shows the correlation between brokerage firms’ reputations and newly
hired analysts’ forecast accuracy from 1996 to 2013. Our sample is grouped into
10 bins according to broker prestige. The shadow area represents a 95% confidence
interval.
Figure 5.2 illustrates strong positive correlations between broker prestige
and analysts’ accuracy and their likelihood of becoming an all-star analyst.
Analysts who start with the lowest prestige brokerage firms on average ex-
hibited performance of 0.493, while those who start with the highest prestige
firms on average exhibited performance of 0.522, and those analysts are on
average 6% more accurate. This effect is close to those documented in the
literature (e.g. Clement (1999b)), which is equivalent to the advantage of 17.5
years of more experience.
To investigate these relations more formally, we estimate an OLS model for
analyst accuracy. Table 5.2 shows that for the entire 1996 - 2013 period, ana-
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Table 5.2: Naive OLS Regression
This table reports estimation results of the OLS model for analyst accuracy. Columns
(1) to (3) present this relationship by using the whole sample from 1996 to 2013.
Column (4) analyzes this relationship using the first half of the sample and column
(5) analyzes the relationship using the second half of the sample. Parentheses include
the corresponding standard errors. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 5.1.
Analyst forecasting accuracy
Whole sample 1996 - 2004 2005 - 2013
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Broker prestige 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0022** 0.0031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Broker growth 0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0017
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Log(Market cap) 0.0006 0.0005 0.0020 -0.0011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Num stocks 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0019** 0.0013**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Num industries 0.0017 0.0022 0.0012 0.0033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Ethnicity 0.0075 0.0099* 0.0230*** 0.0016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Num IPOs 0.0000** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,815 1,815 1,815 785 1,030
R-squared 0.0088 0.0212 0.0490 0.0570 0.0458
lysts work for higher prestige brokerage firms on average have greater forecast
accuracy. The magnitude does vary when we include other broker and analyst
characteristics in column (2) and market fixed effect in column (3). In column
(4) and column (5) we repeat the analysis on subsamples from 1996 - 2004 and
2005 - 2013. Here, broker reputation is also positively correlated with analyst
forecast accuracy. Overall, the positive correlation between broker prestige
and analyst forecast accuracy is robust to different controls and split sam-
ple regressions. If an analyst moves from the lowest to the highest reputable
group of brokerage firms, the analyst forecast accuracy will increase by 4.7%
(= 0.0234× 9/0.493), which is equivalent to 13.8 years of more experience.
In addition to broker prestige, other factors affect newly hired analyst fore-
cast accuracy. From Table 5.2, we observe that the more stocks analysts cover,
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the more accurate their forecasts are. This observation may appear to con-
tradict previous findings that the more complex the portfolios that analysts
are covering, the less accurate their forecasts are. We argue this is less of a
concern because our sample only contains newly hired analysts, so the number
of stocks analysts cover also contains information on analysts’ ability. Another
critical factor explaining analyst forecast accuracy is the ethnicity of the ana-
lyst. In the whole sample, non-white analysts constitute less than 17% of the
total sample but on average they perform better than white analysts. This
outperformance is particularly strong in the first half of the sample, possibly
because sell-side analyst jobs used to be occupied by white candidates and so
the entry bar is higher for non-white candidates. For non-white candidates to
get a job, their ability must be better than average, and thus they perform
better3.
As we explain in the introduction, the quality of brokerage firms becomes
endogenous when sorting and causes more reputable brokerage houses to em-
ploy analysts who are better, along with many dimensions unobserved in the
data. Analysts with better unobserved characteristics, as captured by the error
term in the regression, match with brokers of better quality. The error term
becomes positively correlated with broker size and broker accuracy, and the
coefficient estimates are biased upwards relative to the brokers’ actual influ-
ence. As no obvious instrumental variable is independent of analyst outcome
but is related to the quality of the brokerage firm employing this analyst, we
adopt the structural model developed by Sorensen (2007a) that exploits the
implications of sorting to separate sorting from influence. Sorting implies that
in a market with better broker firms, a given firm is pushed down the relative
ranking and is left with worse analysts. Hence, a broker’s new hire decisions
depend on the characteristics of other agents in the market. Nevertheless, the
outcome of the analyst is independent of these other characteristics, and the
other brokers’ characteristics serve as a source of exogenous variation. We now
3Similar evidence has been found in the asset management industry, where the entry bar
is higher for candidates with low-income family backgrounds. Consequently, to become fund
managers these candidates need to be significantly better than those from wealthy families
(Chuprinin and Sosyura, 2018)
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discuss the model in more detail.
5.3 Model
5.3.1 Two-sided matching model
We model the labor market of sell-side analysts as a one-to-many two-sided
matching market, which is based on the college admission model developed
by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth and Sotomayor (1992) and is similar to
the VC-entrepreneur matching model in Sorensen (2007a). Each firm can hire
multiple analysts, while each analyst candidate can only be employed by one
firm. However, in any given market, brokerage firms are restricted to the num-
ber of new analysts they can hire, as firms’ hiring capacity is capped because
of the limited demands and resources. Each potential match has a valuation
(V ), which represents the discounted expected future payoff of the possible
matched pair. The brokerage firm receives λ fraction of the valuation, and
the analyst expects to receive 1 − λ fraction, where λ is fixed for all possible
matches in a market. Such setting rules out transfers and guarantees a unique
equilibrium for the model. This assumption is reasonable because analysts are
sharing profits of the firm. Even though we do not observe analyst compen-
sation in general, most compensation is paid in the form of a bonus, which is
high when a firm’s bonus pool expands and low when it shrinks (Groysberg
et al., 2011). In addition, because we focus on newly hired analysts, who
have little bargaining power at the beginning of their career, it is unlikely that
these analysts can negotiate on pay. Therefore, their compensation structure
is mostly fixed, and they cannot match more reputable firms by being offered
a lower profit share by the firm.
Agents
The matching model has two types of agents: analyst candidates and brokerage
firms. In each market m, a set Im contains all of the analyst candidates, and
a set Jm contains all brokerage firms that are looking for new analysts. Each
candidate will be employed by by one brokerage firm, and each brokerage firm
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can hire a limited number of analysts. Let brokerage firm j’s quota be qj ,
where qj > 0. The set Mm contains all possible matches of analysts and firms
in market m, therefore Mm = Im×Jm. A matching contains observed hirings
in market m denoted as µm, where µm ⊂ Mm. Denoting that µj contains all
of the analysts firm i hires and µi is the brokerage firm analyst i works for,
then a match between firm i and analyst j can be expressed as: (i, j) ∈ µ,
i = µ(j), or j ∈ µ(i).
Agents on both sides of the market choose their matched partners to max-
imise the matching value, which represents the expected latent joint utility
at the time of hiring. Let each possible match have a matching value and
let the value of the match i, j be denoted as Vi,j regardless of whether i, j is
a matched pair or not. The matching values are assumed to be distinct to
avoid the possibility that agents can be indifferent between two matches. The
matching utility is divided between the brokerage firms and analysts. Firms
receive λ share of the matching value and the analysts receive (1 − λ) share,
and λ is fixed for all matches and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Equilibrium
A matching is an equilibrium if it is stable and no pair of agents would like to
deviate from their current matches and form a new match together to become
a blocking pair. The stable equilibrium always exists (Gale and Shapley,
1962) and under the fixed sharing rule of the matching value the equilibrium
is unique (Sorensen, 2007a). The unique equilibrium is characterised by a set
of inequalities based on the no blocking pairs condition.
For i, j to be a stable match, we need no blocking pair to exist for i, j,
that is, the opportunity cost of analyst i remaining match with firm j or the
opportunity cost of firm j remaining match with analyst i has to be smaller
than the matching value of i, j, Vi,j .
The opportunity cost of analyst i is the maximum value that analyst i can
get from the feasible set of deviations of analyst i instead of working for the
firm j. The opportunity cost of brokerage firm j is the maximum value that
firm j can get from the feasible set of deviations of firm j instead of hiring
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analyst i. The fixed sharing rule means that finding the maximum value that
agents on one side of the market can get is equivalent to find the maximum
matching value that a pair of agents can achieve together. We denote OCi
as the corresponding matching value for analyst i’s opportunity cost and OCi
is the corresponding matching value for brokerage firm j’s opportunity cost.
That is,
Vi,j < max[OCi, OCj ],
where
OCi ≡ max[Vi,j′ ],∀j′ ∈ J ∩ (Vi,j′ > Vµ(j′),j′),
OCj ≡ max[Vi′,j ],∀i′ ∈ I ∩ (Vi′,j > min
i′′∈µ(j)
Vi′′,j).
If in other circumstances analyst i and brokerage firm j are not matched,
then (i, j) cannot become the blocking pair for their current matches. Then
it is sufficient that,
Vi,j > max[Vi,µ(i), min
i′′′∈µ(j)
Vi′′′,j ].
We denote V i,j ≡ max[OCi, OCj ], and V i,j ≡ max[Vi,µ(i),mini′′′∈µ(j) Vi′′′j ].
For µ to be a stable matching, the following conditions need to hold:
Vi,j < V i,j , ∀(i, j) /∈ µ, (5.2)
Vi,j > V i,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ µ. (5.3)
5.3.2 Empirical Model
The first part of the empirical model is a matching function determining the
matching value of the match between two agents. The matching value is
unobserved and modelled as a latent variable. Without loss of generality, the
matching value of analyst i and brokerage firm j can be written as:
Vi,j = αWi,j + ηi,j ,∀(i, j) ∈M, (5.4)
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where Wi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are observed by
econometricians. ηi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are
not observed by econometricians but are known for every agent in the market
and ηi,j ∼ N (0, ση).
The second part of the model is the outcome equation. This determines
the outcome of all possible matches, which is only observable to those matches
that are realised. The outcome of analyst i and brokerage firm j can be written
as:
Yi,j = αXi,j + εi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈M, (5.5)
where Xi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are observed
by econometricians. εi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that
are not observed by econometricians but known for every agent in the market
and εi,j ∼ N (0, σε).4
Directly estimating the outcome equation leads to biased results, as the
matching decision between analyst i and firm j is not random but correlated
with the error term in the outcome equation, which cannot be observed by
econometricians. This problem is captured by a third equation determining
the correlation between the error terms in the valuation equation and the
outcome equation:
εi,j = δηi,j + ξi,j , (5.6)
where ξij ∼ N (0, σξ). If there is no correlation between the two error terms
then δ = 0.
5.3.3 Identification and estimation
We now discuss how we identify and estimate the parameters in the outcome
equation. The main feature of the matching market is that the agents’ deci-
sions on matching interact with each other, and this leads to better-talented
analysts sorting by brokerage quality. If analyst A is hired by brokerage firm
1, then brokerage firm 2 cannot approach analyst A, as analyst A is not avail-
4If the outcome is binary, there will be a third part containing a binary outcome function,
i.e. Oi,j = 1[Yi,j > 0]
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able anymore. Similarly, if brokerage firm 1 has used up its hiring quota, then
other analysts with relatively lower quality than analyst A cannot match with
broker 1 anymore. As such, in each market, agents’ matching decisions do
not only depend on their own qualities, but also correlate with other agents’
characteristics.
The sorting and interaction feature helps us identify the direct influence
effect from brokerage firms. As we rank all of the new analysts and all broker-
age firms based on their characteristics in each market, with the top-ranked
analyst candidate matched with the top-ranked brokerage firm, we continue
to match the second highest ranked analyst candidate with the top-ranked
brokerage firm until the hiring quota is entirely filled, and then we continue
to form matches between analysts with the second highest ranked brokerage
firm until we fill all of the vacancies in the market. This rank-order prop-
erty means the matching decision is determined by the relative ranking of the
agents on two sides of the market, and partly depends on the agents’ own
characteristics, and partly on the characteristics of other agents. As the char-
acteristics and quality of “other” agents vary between markets, similar-quality
analysts would be matched with brokerage firms with different reputations for
exogenous reasons, and can help to identify the parameters in the outcome
equation.
The cross-market variation means that same-quality brokerages and same-
quality analysts cannot match in two different markets. Assume in market
1, brokerage i and analyst j are matched. In market 2, brokerage i′ has the
same quality as brokerage i, but assume market 2 contains similar brokerage
firms but with more talented analysts. Therefore, an analyst j′ with the same
quality as analyst j will rank much lower in market 2, and cannot match with
brokerage i′, and instead is matched with another brokerage firm with lower
quality. Brokerage house i′ can match with another analyst k who has better
quality than analyst j′. The effect from matching is different, but the impact
from the brokerage firm influence is the same, and this will lead to differences
between outputs from analyst j and analyst k. This will help us identify the
effect of matching.
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More formally, let Y ∗ij denote the observed match (i, j)’s outcome in one
market, and then to estimate the coefficients based on the empirical model we
have:
E[Yi,j |Xi,j ] = E[Y ∗i,j |Xi,j , (i, j) ∈ µ]
= E[Y ∗i,j |Xi,j , Vi,j > V i,j ]
= β + E[εi,j |αWi,j + ηi,j > V i,j ]
= β + E[δηi,j + ξi,j |ηi,j > V i,j − αWi,j ]
= β + δE[ηi,j |ηi,j > V i,j − αWi,j ].
The first equality comes from the equilibrium condition of the matching
model, and the fourth equality comes from the error term correlation struc-
ture. Therefore, the exogenous variation in this expression identifies outcome
equation parameters β, and the expression varies with V i,j . As V i,j is deter-
mined by the other agents’ characteristics in the market, if the allocation of
the other agents in the market is exogenously given, then the parameters in
the outcome equation are identified. 5
The key identification assumption is that agents are allocated exogenously
across markets, which is reasonable because the new analyst labour market is
likely to be influenced by macro or financial industry factors instead of agents’
sort on different markets (i.e., waiting to hire later because they know there
will be better candidates one year later). Figure 5.3 shows that even though
the average is reasonably consistent across markets, there are significant vari-
ations of main variables within each market, and this variation fluctuates from
market to market. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the agents are exogenously
allocated across markets.
The estimation method we use is the Bayesian estimation with Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). The sorting and interaction feature of the model
makes estimation difficult. The likelihood function for one pair of agents’
matching decisions also depends on the other agents’ choices, so all of the error
5A complete discussion of the identification strategy can be found in Sorensen (2007b).
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Figure 5.3: Variation in main variables across markets
This figure shows the cross and within market variation of the key Y variable: analyst
forecast accuracy, and the key X variable: broker reputation. Each subgraph depicts
the average of the variable (black solid line) and one standard deviation around the
mean (light blue error bar). Subgraph (a) shows the variation of analyst accuracy
across different markets. Subgraph (b) shows the variation of brokerage reputation
across different markets.
(a) Analyst forecast accuracy (b) Broker reputation
terms must be integrated simultaneously. To circumvent this high-dimensional
integration problem, we take advantage of the Bayesian method with MCMC
(Tanner and Wong, 1987; Geweke et al., 1994; Albert and Chib, 1993), and
instead of solving the integration problem, we augment the observed data
with the simulated value of the latent matching value and the performance
of the counterfactual matches. The simulated distribution converges to the
augmented posterior distribution. The detailed simulation procedure can be
found in Appendix 5.A.
5.4 Estimation results
5.4.1 Main result
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results. In Table 5.3
Panel B, the coefficients estimated represent agents’ preferences. The results
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show that an analyst prefers to work for brokerage firms with higher reputa-
tions and higher growth rates, and brokerage firms prefer to hire analysts who
can cover large value portfolios, cover fewer stocks, have less industry focus,
and are from a non-white background. Thus, firms prefer non-white analysts
who can cover a limited amount of large firms and span less industries. The
probability of an analyst match with a broker with the highest reputation
score is 90.6%. The probability that brokerage firms prefer a non-white ana-
lyst is 55.13%. Compared with a new analyst who can only cover the lowest
ten percentile of the portfolio market size, brokerage firms prefer analysts who
cover the top ten percentile of the portfolio market size by a probability of
59.5%. Overall, the results from the matching equation suggest analysts have
strong preferences in terms of broker reputation, rather than other observed
factors that brokerage firms have on analysts. Broker reputation is the most
important factor in measuring brokerage firms’ quality, while the analysts’
ethnicity or portfolio sizes are simply indirect measures of their quality.
Panel C of Table 5.3 represents the effect of sorting on unobserved char-
acteristics. If there is no sorting between unobservables, a matching model
is not needed. The result shows δ is positive and 0 is not contained in the
99% highest posterior distribution, and that the sorting effect exists and is
significant, indicating that unobserved agents’ characteristics affect matching
values and also matching outcomes. This also highlights the key point of the
study: controlling for matching is crucial given its significant effect.
Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the estimated coefficients in the outcome equa-
tion after controlling for endogenous matching. The coefficient associated with
broker reputation is positive and 0 is not contained in the 95% highest pos-
terior distribution, which suggests after controlling for sorting, the effect of
brokerage reputation is crucial in explaining analyst forecast accuracy. This
finding is consistent with channels suggested by Clement (1999b) that broker-
age resources (proxied by brokerage reputation in this study) are important
in determining analyst forecast accuracy.
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Table 5.3: Bayesian estimate of the matching model and the outcome equation
This table reports Bayesian estimation results of two equations from the structure
model. The dependent variable in the outcome equation is analyst forecast accuracy,
and the dependent variable in the valuation equation is the latent matching value. A
detailed description of the variables is given in Table 5.1. Mean, Median, and Stan-
dard Dev. are the statistics of the simulated posterior distributions of the parameters.
Marginal effects of the valuation equation represent the probability of choosing two
matches with only marginal change in one variable, and are calculated by following
Sorensen (2007a). Estimates are based on 110,000 simulations of the posterior distri-
bution. The initial 11,000 simulations are discarded for burn-in. ***,**,and * denote
that zeros are not contained in the 10%, 5%, and 1% credible intervals, respectively.
Variables are defined in Table 5.1.
Dependent variable: Analyst forecasting accuracy
Mean Median Marginal effect Standard Dev. 95% HPD
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Outcome equation
Broker reputation 0.0019*** 0.0019 0.0007 [ 0.0006, 0.0033 ]
Broker growth -0.0044 -0.0044 0.0043 [ -0.0130, 0.0041 ]
Log(Market cap) -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0011 [ -0.0024, 0.0019 ]
Num stocks 0.0013*** 0.0013 0.0005 [ 0.0004, 0.0022 ]
Num industry -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0027 [ -0.0084, 0.0023 ]
Ethnicity 0.0036 0.0037 0.0052 [ -0.0070, 0.0140 ]
Num IPO 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0001 [ -0.0000, 0.0001 ]
Panel B: Matching equation
Broker reputation 0.1439*** 0.1409 0.0406 0.0261 [ 0.0974, 0.1952 ]
Broker growth 0.0651 0.0663 0.0184 0.1219 [ -0.1732, 0.3010 ]
Log(Market cap) 0.0569*** 0.0560 0.0161 0.0149 [ 0.0284, 0.0868 ]
Num stocks -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0027 0.0068 [ -0.0233, 0.0034 ]
Num industry -0.1763*** -0.1753 -0.0497 0.0316 [ -0.2381, -0.1145 ]
Ethnicity 0.1820*** 0.1786 0.0513 0.0664 [ 0.0556, 0.3115 ]
Panel C: Variance
δ 0.0063*** 0.0063 0.0037 [ 8.89e-07, 0.0131 ]
5.4.2 Relative importance
Although the above analysis clearly shows that broker reputation has a signif-
icant direct impact on analyst forecast accuracy because sorting on unobserv-
ables also has a significant impact on the outcome, the relative importance of
the direct effect of broker reputation, and the indirect effect from sorting is
unknown.
In determining the relative importance, we compare the OLS and Bayesian
estimated results in Table 5.4. Column (1) presents the OLS regression re-
sults, and column (2) the Bayesian estimation results. Figure 5.4 shows how
we decompose the total effect into the influence effect and the sorting effect.
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Table 5.4: Bayesian estimate of alternative market and comparison
This table compares the outcome equations from models with different market defini-
tions and compares the coefficient estimated from the naive OLS regression for analyst
accuracy. Bayesian estimates are based on 110,000 simulations of the posterior distri-
bution. The initial 11,000 simulations are discarded for burn-in and a tune-in factor
of 10. Parentheses represent the corresponding t-statistics. ***,**,and * denote sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as in
Table 5.1.
Dependent variable: Analyst forecasting accuracy
OLS Bayesian estimation Difference with OLS
Main Expanded market Main Expanded market
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Broker reputation 0.0026 0.0019 0.0019 0.0007** 0.0007**
(2.3459) (2.3459)
Broker growth -0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0028
(0.5741) (-1.3397)
Log(Market cap) 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005
(1.4906) (0.8518)
Num stocks 0.0015 0.0013 0.0009 0.0002 0.0006***
(0.9377) (2.8132)
Num industry 0.0022 -0.0031 -0.0034 0.0053*** 0.0056***
(5.3979) (5.7035)
Ethnicity 0.0099 0.0036 -0.0031 0.0063*** 0.0130***
(2.6854) (5.5420)
Num IPO -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-9.5108) (-9.5108)
δ 0.0063 0.0074
Markets 36 36 18
Controlling for sorting effect, analysts employed by the brokerage houses with
the highest reputation rank are on average 3.5% (= 0.0019×9/0.493) more ac-
curate than those employed by the small brokers. This advantage in accuracy
is comparable to 10.2 years more experience. On the other hand, the differ-
ence between the OLS and MCMC coefficient estimates of broker reputation
indicates the selection effect because of sorting in the labor market, which is
both economically and statistically significant. The selection effect accounts
for 27% of the total effect estimated by the naive OLS regression, while the
influence of brokers accounts for 73% of the total impact.
5.4.3 Alternative market
In our main analysis, our definition of new analyst labour market is by one cal-
endar year but segregated by geographical locations. The market segregation
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Figure 5.4: Decomposition of influence and sorting
This figure shows the results comparison between the naive OLS regression results and
the sorting controlled outcome equation results in Table 5.4 for the highest reputable
brokerage firms. The dashed line represents influence effect of the broker reputation
after controlling for the selection effect.
is a critical identification assumption, and will fail if new analyst candidates
or brokerage firms choose to participate in the specific market, based on un-
observed characteristics of other agents in that market. For example, if the
Northeast of the US has more reputable brokerage firms and if that reputation
is sufficient to attract analyst candidates, this will lead to analysts sorting be-
tween different locations, and so a more appropriate definition of the market
is to consider the whole US as a single market.
In this subsection, we expand the market definition to evaluate the ro-
bustness of the estimation results. In Column (3) of Table 5.4, we treat the
Northeast and the rest of the US as the same market and repeat the analysis.
The estimated coefficients are at a similar magnitude and significance level,
particularly the key variables of broker reputation and δ. The magnitude of
the coefficient associated with broker reputation is robust to different speci-
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fications and the statistical significance is also similar. The magnitude of δ
increases but the statistical significance is similar. This indicates that minor
sorting exists between the geographical locations in the same year, but the
baseline Bayesian estimation does not capture this minor effect. For our main
purpose of estimating the direct effect of broker reputation, this is less of a con-
cern because this cross-location sorting appears to have little correlation with
broker reputation. Overall, the results provide an intuitive robustness test
that confirms that the identification assumption is valid and our estimation
results are not sensitive to different market definitions.
5.5 Conclusion
Our study focuses on the new analyst labor market. We find new analysts
working for firms with higher reputations perform better. This total effect
is a combination of the direct influence effect, in which reputable firms can
help analysts perform better, and the sorting effect, in which brokerage firms
with high reputations can attract more talented analysts. To disentangle these
two effects, we utilize a one-to-many two-sided matching model to circumvent
the need to find the instrumental variable. The features of the matching
model can capture how agents’ matching decisions interact, and how the other
agents’ characteristics determine the relative ranking of the agents’ matching
decisions, but the other agents’ characteristics do not have an effect on the
agents’ performance. Therefore, the exogenous variation of the other agents’
characteristics helps to identify the coefficients of the outcome equation.
In the sample of 1815 new analyst-brokerage firm matched pairs from 1996
to 2013, we find that both the influence effect and the sorting effect have a
significant impact on analyst forecast accuracy. The influence effect accounts
for 73% of the total impact, and the sorting effect for 27%.
The results of the study have more general implications for understanding
the incentives for workers to choose more reputable firms to work for and the
incentives for firms to spend resources in maintaining their reputation. High
reputation firms provide resources for workers and help them perform better,
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and in our results the forecast difference between analysts of the same quality
working for the lowest and the highest reputation firms is equivalent to 15 years
of experience. A firm’s reputation is valuable, as it not only motivates current
workers but also attracts more talented new workers. Both of these effects
are important in understanding the benefit of firms’ reputation on workers
performances.
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5.A Appendix: MCMC estimation procedure
Let the markets be indexed by m = 1, . . . , N , latent valuation variables be
Vm ≡ {Vij , ij ∈ Mm}, matching characteristics Wm ≡ {Wij , ij ∈ Mm}, and
exogenous explanatory variables be Xm ≡ {Xij , ij ∈ Mm}, for all potential
matches ij ∈ Mm in each market m. The following algorithm shows how to
draw from the posterior the distribution of the parameters augmented with the
latent valuation variable, Vij , and the missing observations y
∗
ij for unobserved
matches. We are interested in estimating the parameters α, β, and δ. The
Markov chain is generated by drawing each individual dimension of the joint
posterior distribution conditional on the draws of the other dimensions as
follows:
1. Start Gibbs-sampler for g = 1 : Gburn−in +Gsample total runs.
2. Initialise the sampling by drawing α, β, δ, and σ2ξ from prior distri-
butions: α ∼ N (α0, A−1α = 10Ik), β ∼ N (β0, A−1β = 10Ip), δ|σ
2
ξ ∼
N (δ0, σ2ξ/Aδ), and σ2ξ ∼ IG(a = 2.1, b = 1).
3. Draw latent valuation variables Vij for all potential matches in each
market m, and draw outcome variable Yij for unobserved matches in
each market m, from distributions conditional on parameters α, β, δ, σ2ξ .
4. Update α, β by drawing from a Bayesian Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(BSUR) of [V ;Y ] on [W ;X] conditional on δ, σ2ξ .
5. Update δ, σ2ξ by drawing from a Bayesian regression of Y −Xβ on V −
Wα, conditional on α, β.
6. Go back to step 3 and repeat.
We now describe how to draw from each conditional distribution.
5.A.1 Conditional distribution of valuation variables Vij
The conditional augmented posterior distribution of Vij depends on whether
brokerage firm i and analyst j are matched or not:
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- when ij /∈ µm, we draw Vij from N(W ′ijα, 1) truncated from above at V ij ;
- when ij ∈ µm, we draw Vij from
Vij |α, β, δ, σ2ξ , Yij ∼ N
(







truncated from below at V ij .
The expressions for V ij and V ij are given in the equation.
5.A.2 Conditional distribution of unobserved outcome vari-
ables Yij
We only need to simulate the outcome variable Yij if ij /∈ µm, i.e., for unob-
served matches. We draw Yij from
Yij |α, β, δ, σ2ξ , Vij ∼ N
(
X ′ijβ + δ(Vij −W ′ijα), σ2ξ
)
.
5.A.3 Conditional distribution of α and β
We apply a BSUR of [V; Y] on [W;X] to sample α and β,























δ δ2 + σ2ξ
 .
5.A.4 Conditional distribution of δ and σ2ξ
Draw δ, σ2xi|α, β, V, Y from a Bayesian regression of ε = Y−Xβ on η = V−Wα:
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1. Draw σ2ξ ∼ IG(a + N, b + S), where N is the number of all potential
matches from all markets, and S = (ε−ηd)′(ε−ηd)+(d−δ0)′Aδ(d−δ0),
and d = (η′η +Aδ)
−1(η′ε+Aδδ0).











This thesis consists of four empirical essays on sell-side equity analysts and
boards of directors.
Chapter 2 sheds light on how sophisticated financial agents such as equity
analysts form expectations. I show that bad news in other coverage indus-
tries makes analysts more pessimistic about the focal firms. The resulting
pessimistic forecasts turn out to be less accurate and much lower than the
realized earnings. Analysts also overreact to bad news in industries that have
no business relationships with the focal firms. I interpret these findings as
evidence that analysts overgeneralize bad news in other coverage industries,
become overpessimistic about the state of the world, and therefore lower their
earnings expectations for the focal firms.
This study contributes to the large literature on analysts, which still has
little empirical evidence on the source of analyst disagreement. My results help
explain both the cross-sectional and time-series variations in analyst disagree-
ment, which has been widely used to measure the level of heterogeneous beliefs
among investors. Moreover, the finding of overgeneralization contributes to the
more general literature that studies the impact of experience on decision mak-
ing in financial markets. I show that multi-tasking agents might overweight
information from one task when making decisions for other tasks.
In the second study of this thesis, I further examine the effects of ana-
lyst overgeneralization on the financial market. As many investors rely on
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analyst’s opinions to evaluate companies and make trading decisions, the dis-
agreement among analysts could significantly affect firms’ trading activities
and stock price movements. A simple trading model predicts that, because
overgeneralization induces analyst disagreement, it leads to higher trading vol-
umes and larger return volatilities, and the resulting analysts’ overpessimism
exerts downward pressure and induces temporary underpricing. I find strong
empirical evidence supporting both predictions.
In addition, the result in these two chapters also have some insights for
other strands of literature. As overgeneralization makes analyst adjust expec-
tations for reasons not related to firms’ fundamentals, it essentially provides
an exogenous variation in analyst disagreement and pessimism. This insight
could be useful for future empirical research that study the effects of investor
disagreement and temporary underpricing.
Chapter 4 turns to the board of directors, who play a crucial role in corpo-
rate governance. Their job is to actively monitor and advise top management,
ensuring that managers act in the best interest of shareholders. However, a
directorship is rarely a full-time job. Most directors have other occupations,
and many directors serve on multiple boards. Given that attention is not
unlimited for directors, those with multiple directorships have to divide their
attention, but the reason they are appointed to multiple boards likely reflects
their quality. Isolating busyness from ability is therefore a challenging task,
as having multiple directorships might reflect both. Our study is able to dis-
entangle busyness from director ability and provides evidence on the costs of
having busy directors.
By exploiting exogenous shocks to unrelated industries in which directors
have additional directorships, we show that director distraction affects board
monitoring intensity and leads to higher level of inactivity by management.
Directors attend significantly fewer meetings when they are distracted. Firms
with more distracted board members experience a significant decline in firm
value and tend to invest less and are less likely to announce takeovers. Our
results suggest that an effective board of directors prevents manager from
shirking or enjoying a quiet life at the expense of shareholder value.
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The final study turns to study the labor markets of financial analysts.
Consistent with the general observation that workers at more prestigious com-
panies tend to have better performance, equity analysts employed by more
reputable brokerage houses produce significantly more accurate earnings fore-
casts. An analyst employed by the most reputable brokerage is about 6% more
accurate than an analyst employed by a minor brokerage, which is equivalent
to an advantage of 17.5 years of more experience.
This performance premium is driven by two distinct effects: on the one
hand, more reputable brokerage firms provide better resources that improve
analysts’ forecast accuracy (influence effect); on the other hand, more rep-
utable brokerage firms are more likely to attract talented candidate analysts
(sorting effect). Distinguishing these two effects is however challenging, as
the sorting mechanism creates an endogeneity problem. We disentangle these
two effects and quantify their relative importance, by estimating a two-sided
matching model for the labor market of analysts. The matching model allows
for a one-to-many assortative matching process between firms and analysts,
which helps control for the selection effect. Using a sample of 1,815 newly
hired analysts from 1996 to 2013, we find that both the influence effect and
the sorting effect have a significant impact on analyst forecast accuracy. The
influence effect accounts for 73% of the total impact, while the sorting effect
accounts for the remaining 27%.
An interesting direction for future research is to examine whether this per-
formance premium exists for other agents, e.g., corporate lawyers and mutual
fund managers, and to disentangle the direct influence of the employers from
the selection effect of sorting. It is also interesting to evaluate policies related
to the labor markets of financial agents. For instance, the recent legislation of
MiFID II aims to foster market efficiency, resilience, and transparency. How-
ever, because MiFID II requires EU investment banks and brokers to separate
the costs for research from asset management, it might force many analysts to
leave the industry and leads to a decrease in analyst coverage. If so, examining
the effects of such exodus of analysts on the information environment of EU
(and US) companies provides valuable insights that advise policy-makers.
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Another research direction is to further exploit the implications of ana-
lyst overgeneralization. As mentioned above, overgeneralization can be used
to construct instrumental variables for analyst or investor disagreement. One
can build on this insight to establish causality in many related research areas.
For example, an interesting question is how information uncertainty influ-
ences firms’ financing choices. One difficulty in answering this question is that
any good proxy for information uncertainty, such as analyst disagreement or
volatility, inevitably picks up other confounding factors such as the firm risk,
which contaminates the estimation results. However, using shocks to other
coverage industries as an IV for analyst disagreement, one can circumvent this
endogeneity problem and provide causal evidence on the role of information
uncertainty in capital structure. This identification strategy can be applied in
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Dit proefschrift is een bundeling van vier empirische studies over financiële
analisten en leden van de raad van commissarissen.
Analisten spelen een belangrijke rol op de aandelenmarkt. Hun menin-
gen kunnen de publieke opinie bëınvloeden en daarmee ook de koersprijzen.
Echter hebben analisten vaak grote meningsverschillen over dezelfde bedrijven
en maken uiteenlopende voorspellingen, en verschillende studies laten over-
tuigend zien dat deze meningsverschillen tot markt-inefficiëntie en onjuiste
prijzen leiden. Ondanks de zware gevolgen, weten we tot nu toe heel weinig
over de oorzaken van de meningsverschillen tussen analisten.
In de eerste studie van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik waar hun meningsver-
schillen vandaan komen. Ik verzamel hiervoor analistvoorspellingen voor een
groot aantal Amerikaanse ondernemingen, en vind sterk bewijs dat nieuws
(voornamelijk slecht nieuws) van andere industrieën de voorspellingen van
analisten bëınvloeden. Het feit dat veel analisten meerder industrieën tegelijk
volgen heeft ervoor gezorgd dat, wanneer het slecht gaat met één van hun
portefeuille industrieën, ze meer pessimistisch worden over bedrijven in die
andere industrieën, ten opzicht van hun gelijken die dezelfde bedrijven volgen.
Dit pessimisme blijkt overdreven te zijn en wijkt aanzienlijk af van de realiteit.
Ik toon verder aan dat dit gedrag door over-generalisatie wordt veroorzaakt.
Over-generalisatie, ook bekend als “overhaaste generalisatie”, is een drogreden
waarbij men een algemene conclusie uit te weinig gegevens trekt. In dit geval,
kan over-generalisatie verklaren waarom analisten overdreven op nieuws van
andere industrieën reageren en daardoor uiteenlopend voorspellingen maken.
De tweede studie bouwt verder op de bevinding dat over-generalisatie van
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analisten tot meningsverschillen leidt en bestudeert de gevolgen daarvan op
de aandelenmarkt. Uit een simpel theoretisch model kunnen we afleiden dat,
aangezien veel investeerders naar analisten luisteren om aandelen te verhande-
len, meningsverschillen tussen analisten zorgen voor meer handelsactiviteiten
en meer fluctuaties van aandelenkoersen. Het over-pessimisme van analisten
ten gevolge van over-generalisatie tijdelijk veroorzaakt een neerwaartse druk
op de aandelenprijzen en daardoor te lage prijzen. Ik test deze twee stellingen
empirisch en heb sterk bewijs van beide gevonden.
De derde studie richt zich op leden van de raad van commissarissen (RvC).
RvC van beursgenoteerde bedrijven vertegenwoordigt de aandeelhouders en
heeft de belangrijke taken om toezicht te houden op en advies te geven aan
het bestuur. Het komt echter vaak voor dat iemand als commissariaat bij
meerdere bedrijven tegelijkertijd tewerkgesteld is. Aangezien dat aandacht
van een beperkte capaciteit is, zullen deze drukbezette commissariaten niet
altijd in staat zijn om alle taken tegelijk uit te voeren. Een belangrijke vraag
is dus of deze commissariaten hun werk naar behoren kunnen vervullen. Het
antwoord ligt eigenlijk niet voor de hand, want het feit dat deze commis-
sariaten drukbezet zijn is ook een indicatie van hun bekwaamheid. Duidelijk
onderscheid maken tussen drukte en bekwaamheid is daarom een uitdaging.
Onze studie pakt dit probleem aan door gebruik te maken van mogelijke
afleidende gebeurtissen. We stellen dat commissariaten afgeleid worden door
onverwachte gebeurtenissen in niet-gerelateerde industrieën waarbij ze ook op
de RvC zitten. Rond deze tijd kunnen ze minder aandacht aan andere bedri-
jven besteden en kunnen we bekijken hoe het met deze bedrijven gaat. We
vinden bewijs dat het bestuur minder actief zijn wanneer de commissariaten
afgeleid worden. Bedrijven met meer afgeleide commissariaten investeren veel
minder en hun beurswaarde daalt aanzienlijk. Onze onderzoekresultaten be-
nadrukken het belangrijke rol van de RvC in corporate governance om toezicht
te houden op het bestuur.
In Hoofdstuk 5 keren we weer terug op financiële analisten en proberen
te verklaren waarom analisten van grotere handelshuizen gemiddeld genomen
meer accurate voorspellingen maken dan die bij kleinere handelshuizen. Dit
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prestatieverschil komt voornamelijk door twee factoren: grotere bedrijven
bieden meer hulpmiddelen en beter voorzieningen aan hun medewerkers (invloed-
effect), en grotere bedrijven trekken in eerste instantie ook betere kandidaten
aan (selectie-effect). Duidelijk onderscheid maken tussen deze twee effecten is
moeilijk omdat het selectie-effect voor een endogeneiteit probleem zorgt. In
deze studie maken we gebruik van een één-op-veelzijdig matching model om
voor het selectie-effect te controleren. Onze resultaten laten zien dat beide
effecten significant zijn, waarbij het invloed-effect 73% van het totale verschil
uitmaakt en het selectie-effect 27%.
In zijn geheel beschouwd geeft dit proefschrift nieuwe inzichten in de gedra-
gen van de belangrijke marktspelers zoals analisten en leden van RvC. Psy-
chologische factoren bëınvloeden de oordelen en beslissingen van analisten en
commissariaten, en daardoor ook het koersverloop van bedrijven. Daarente-
gen vinden we dat hulpmiddelen van werkgevers het besluitvormingsproces
van deze marktspelers kunnen vergemakkelijken en verbeteren. Deze studies
dragen niet alleen bij aan de wetenschappelijke literatuur, maar hebben ook
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Those Who Move Stock Prices
REX WANG
This thesis consists of four empirical essays on sell-side equity analysts and boards of directors, who play 
important roles in stock markets. The first two studies shed light on how sophisticated financial agents 
such as equity analysts form expectations and examine how their beliefs aect trading activities and 
stock prices. We show that analysts overgeneralize bad news in other coverage industries and become 
overpessimistic about the focal firms. The resulting disagreement among analysts leads to higher trading 
volumes and larger return volatilities, and the resulting overpessimism exerts downward pressure and 
induces temporary underpricing. The third study highlights the impact of limited director attention on 
the eectiveness of corporate governance. We find that exogenous director distraction aects board 
monitoring intensity and leads to a higher level of inactivity by management. The final essay helps explain 
why analysts at reputable brokerage houses produce more accurate earnings forecasts. This follows 
both from the direct influence of better resources provided by the firms and from the sorting in the labor 
market, which leads reputable firms to hire more talented candidates. We estimate a two-sided matching 
model to disentangle these two eects and quantify their relative importance.
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interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
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